Spelling suggestions: "subject:"electrical utilities -- finance""
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Electric utility pricing and investment decisions under uncertaintyEllis, Randall P January 1981 (has links)
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 1981. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND DEWEY. / Vita. / Bibliography: leaves 278-286. / by Randall Poor Ellis. / Ph.D.
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Methods for market analysis, risk management and finance in the deregulated power industryJiang, Ning 28 August 2008 (has links)
Not available / text
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Financial and regulatory considerations in capacity expansion planning for the electric utility industrySaraf, Sampat Kumar January 1982 (has links)
Due to large amounts of capital involved, the financial considerations gain paramount importance in the capacity planning decision of an electric utility. Three important financial issues are choice of appropriate capital and fuel costs, effect of regulation and scarcity of capital. The first section of the dissertation is devoted to an overview of the electric utility industry and literature review.
In the second section, we address the issue of selection of appropriate capital and fuel costs. When a time-stepped approach is used for electric utility capacity planning, an important question is what fuel and capital costs should be used in a single period model to replicate the first period part of the multiperiod optimal solution. We address this question and show that a generalization of Baughman-Joskow surrogate fuel price is optimal for the case of a linear load duration curve. Similarly, a generalization of Soyster- Murphy annualization process is obtained for the selection of appropriate surrogate capital costs.
In the third section, capacity planning for a regulated utility is analyzed when the objective of the utility is value maximization. the resulting mathematical program is shown to have the same algebraic form as the cost minimization capacity planning model. The optimal solution under the value maximizing assumption is consistent with several important results of regulated economics. The value maximizing approach is extended to include certain inperfections like lead times and finite equipment lifetimes.
In the final section, a single period capacity expansion model is developed for a utility faced with a rising supply curve of capital. The properties of the optimal solution to this model are analyzed. It is shown that if one uses a constant cost of capital model for a utility faced with a rising cost of capital, one produces an overly capital intensive solution. A graphical procedure for solving the rising cost of capital, single period model is developed and presented. A technique for estimating the capital supply curve for the electric utility industry is developed. The sensitivity of the capital supply curve to various regulatory parameters is analyzed and the capital supply curve is found to be very sensitive to regulatory parameters. / Ph. D.
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The financing of power transmission interconnector projects : a case study of viable financial packaging utilising project finance principles for the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP)Hekandjo, O'Brien Alexander 12 1900 (has links)
Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / Over the past few years the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been facing regional power shortages. These regional power shortages currently being experienced within the SADC region have been partly due to a lack of generation capacity and transmission capacity constraints. This situation has been further aggravated by the unanticipated economic growth within the SADC region. In order for the SADC region to meet its electricity demand, the region needs to invest in new generation and transmission projects. However, due to the inability of regional utilities to raise funds to finance these projects, the projects tend to not reach financial close resulting in the increase of the regional power deficits.
Although these regional power shortages have been attributed to the lack of adequate investment in power generation projects and power transmission interconnector projects, this research report was limited to the development and financing of power transmission interconnector projects. The objective of this research report was to identify the dynamics that prohibit regional power transmission interconnectors from reaching financial close and to recommend possible solutions on how best to develop and package these projects. The research used the proposed developmental approach of the ZIZABONA transmission interconnector project as a case study to develop a generic model that could be utilised on other regional transmission interconnector projects.
Based on the research presented in this research report, the study has highlighted project finance as a viable funding strategy. Regional utilities can utilise this funding strategy to package and finance joint transmission regional interconnectors to alleviate the current regional power shortages by facilitating regional electricity trade.
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Analysing tacit collusion in oligopolistic electricity markets using a co-evolutionary approachThai, Doan Hoang Cau, Australian Graduate School of Management, Australian School of Business, UNSW January 2005 (has links)
Wholesale electricity markets now operate in many countries around the world. These markets determine a spot price for electricity as the clearing price when generators bid in energy at various prices. As the trading in a wholesale electricity market can be seen as a dynamic repeated game, it would be expected that profit maximising generators learn to engage in tacit collusion to profitably increase spot market prices. This thesis investigates this tacit collusion of generators in oligopolistic electricity markets. We do not follow the approach of previous work in game theory that presupposes firms' collusive strategies to enforce collusion in an oligopoly. Instead, we develop a co-evolutionary approach (extending previous work in this area) using a genetic algorithm (GA) to co-evolve strategies for all generators in some stylised models of an electricity market. The bidding strategy of each generator is modelled as a set of bidding actions, one for each possible discrete state of the state space observed by the generator. The market trading interactions are simulated to determine the fitness of a particular strategy. The tacitly collusive outcomes and strategies emerging from computational experiments are thus obtained from the learning or evolutionary process instead of from any pre-specification. Analysing many of those emergent collusive outcomes and strategies. we are able to specify the mechanism of tacit collusion and investigate how the market environment can affect it. We find that the learned collusive strategies are similar to the forgiving trigger strategies of classical supergame theory (Green and Porter, 1984). Also using computational experiments, we can determine which characteristics of the market environment encourage or hinder tacit collusion. The findings from this thesis provide insights on tacit collusion in an oligopoly and policy implications from a learning perspective. With modelling flexibility, our co-evolutionary approach can be extended to study strategic behaviour in an oligopoly considering many other market characteristics.
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Analysing tacit collusion in oligopolistic electricity markets using a co-evolutionary approachThai, Doan Hoang Cau, Australian Graduate School of Management, Australian School of Business, UNSW January 2005 (has links)
Wholesale electricity markets now operate in many countries around the world. These markets determine a spot price for electricity as the clearing price when generators bid in energy at various prices. As the trading in a wholesale electricity market can be seen as a dynamic repeated game, it would be expected that profit maximising generators learn to engage in tacit collusion to profitably increase spot market prices. This thesis investigates this tacit collusion of generators in oligopolistic electricity markets. We do not follow the approach of previous work in game theory that presupposes firms' collusive strategies to enforce collusion in an oligopoly. Instead, we develop a co-evolutionary approach (extending previous work in this area) using a genetic algorithm (GA) to co-evolve strategies for all generators in some stylised models of an electricity market. The bidding strategy of each generator is modelled as a set of bidding actions, one for each possible discrete state of the state space observed by the generator. The market trading interactions are simulated to determine the fitness of a particular strategy. The tacitly collusive outcomes and strategies emerging from computational experiments are thus obtained from the learning or evolutionary process instead of from any pre-specification. Analysing many of those emergent collusive outcomes and strategies. we are able to specify the mechanism of tacit collusion and investigate how the market environment can affect it. We find that the learned collusive strategies are similar to the forgiving trigger strategies of classical supergame theory (Green and Porter, 1984). Also using computational experiments, we can determine which characteristics of the market environment encourage or hinder tacit collusion. The findings from this thesis provide insights on tacit collusion in an oligopoly and policy implications from a learning perspective. With modelling flexibility, our co-evolutionary approach can be extended to study strategic behaviour in an oligopoly considering many other market characteristics.
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Analysing tacit collusion in oligopolistic electricity markets using a co-evolutionary approachThai, Doan Hoang Cau, Australian Graduate School of Management, Australian School of Business, UNSW January 2005 (has links)
Wholesale electricity markets now operate in many countries around the world. These markets determine a spot price for electricity as the clearing price when generators bid in energy at various prices. As the trading in a wholesale electricity market can be seen as a dynamic repeated game, it would be expected that profit maximising generators learn to engage in tacit collusion to profitably increase spot market prices. This thesis investigates this tacit collusion of generators in oligopolistic electricity markets. We do not follow the approach of previous work in game theory that presupposes firms' collusive strategies to enforce collusion in an oligopoly. Instead, we develop a co-evolutionary approach (extending previous work in this area) using a genetic algorithm (GA) to co-evolve strategies for all generators in some stylised models of an electricity market. The bidding strategy of each generator is modelled as a set of bidding actions, one for each possible discrete state of the state space observed by the generator. The market trading interactions are simulated to determine the fitness of a particular strategy. The tacitly collusive outcomes and strategies emerging from computational experiments are thus obtained from the learning or evolutionary process instead of from any pre-specification. Analysing many of those emergent collusive outcomes and strategies. we are able to specify the mechanism of tacit collusion and investigate how the market environment can affect it. We find that the learned collusive strategies are similar to the forgiving trigger strategies of classical supergame theory (Green and Porter, 1984). Also using computational experiments, we can determine which characteristics of the market environment encourage or hinder tacit collusion. The findings from this thesis provide insights on tacit collusion in an oligopoly and policy implications from a learning perspective. With modelling flexibility, our co-evolutionary approach can be extended to study strategic behaviour in an oligopoly considering many other market characteristics.
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Analysing tacit collusion in oligopolistic electricity markets using a co-evolutionary approachThai, Doan Hoang Cau, Australian Graduate School of Management, Australian School of Business, UNSW January 2005 (has links)
Wholesale electricity markets now operate in many countries around the world. These markets determine a spot price for electricity as the clearing price when generators bid in energy at various prices. As the trading in a wholesale electricity market can be seen as a dynamic repeated game, it would be expected that profit maximising generators learn to engage in tacit collusion to profitably increase spot market prices. This thesis investigates this tacit collusion of generators in oligopolistic electricity markets. We do not follow the approach of previous work in game theory that presupposes firms' collusive strategies to enforce collusion in an oligopoly. Instead, we develop a co-evolutionary approach (extending previous work in this area) using a genetic algorithm (GA) to co-evolve strategies for all generators in some stylised models of an electricity market. The bidding strategy of each generator is modelled as a set of bidding actions, one for each possible discrete state of the state space observed by the generator. The market trading interactions are simulated to determine the fitness of a particular strategy. The tacitly collusive outcomes and strategies emerging from computational experiments are thus obtained from the learning or evolutionary process instead of from any pre-specification. Analysing many of those emergent collusive outcomes and strategies. we are able to specify the mechanism of tacit collusion and investigate how the market environment can affect it. We find that the learned collusive strategies are similar to the forgiving trigger strategies of classical supergame theory (Green and Porter, 1984). Also using computational experiments, we can determine which characteristics of the market environment encourage or hinder tacit collusion. The findings from this thesis provide insights on tacit collusion in an oligopoly and policy implications from a learning perspective. With modelling flexibility, our co-evolutionary approach can be extended to study strategic behaviour in an oligopoly considering many other market characteristics.
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Analysing tacit collusion in oligopolistic electricity markets using a co-evolutionary approachThai, Doan Hoang Cau, Australian Graduate School of Management, Australian School of Business, UNSW January 2005 (has links)
Wholesale electricity markets now operate in many countries around the world. These markets determine a spot price for electricity as the clearing price when generators bid in energy at various prices. As the trading in a wholesale electricity market can be seen as a dynamic repeated game, it would be expected that profit maximising generators learn to engage in tacit collusion to profitably increase spot market prices. This thesis investigates this tacit collusion of generators in oligopolistic electricity markets. We do not follow the approach of previous work in game theory that presupposes firms' collusive strategies to enforce collusion in an oligopoly. Instead, we develop a co-evolutionary approach (extending previous work in this area) using a genetic algorithm (GA) to co-evolve strategies for all generators in some stylised models of an electricity market. The bidding strategy of each generator is modelled as a set of bidding actions, one for each possible discrete state of the state space observed by the generator. The market trading interactions are simulated to determine the fitness of a particular strategy. The tacitly collusive outcomes and strategies emerging from computational experiments are thus obtained from the learning or evolutionary process instead of from any pre-specification. Analysing many of those emergent collusive outcomes and strategies. we are able to specify the mechanism of tacit collusion and investigate how the market environment can affect it. We find that the learned collusive strategies are similar to the forgiving trigger strategies of classical supergame theory (Green and Porter, 1984). Also using computational experiments, we can determine which characteristics of the market environment encourage or hinder tacit collusion. The findings from this thesis provide insights on tacit collusion in an oligopoly and policy implications from a learning perspective. With modelling flexibility, our co-evolutionary approach can be extended to study strategic behaviour in an oligopoly considering many other market characteristics.
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Analysing tacit collusion in oligopolistic electricity markets using a co-evolutionary approachThai, Doan Hoang Cau, Australian Graduate School of Management, Australian School of Business, UNSW January 2005 (has links)
Wholesale electricity markets now operate in many countries around the world. These markets determine a spot price for electricity as the clearing price when generators bid in energy at various prices. As the trading in a wholesale electricity market can be seen as a dynamic repeated game, it would be expected that profit maximising generators learn to engage in tacit collusion to profitably increase spot market prices. This thesis investigates this tacit collusion of generators in oligopolistic electricity markets. We do not follow the approach of previous work in game theory that presupposes firms' collusive strategies to enforce collusion in an oligopoly. Instead, we develop a co-evolutionary approach (extending previous work in this area) using a genetic algorithm (GA) to co-evolve strategies for all generators in some stylised models of an electricity market. The bidding strategy of each generator is modelled as a set of bidding actions, one for each possible discrete state of the state space observed by the generator. The market trading interactions are simulated to determine the fitness of a particular strategy. The tacitly collusive outcomes and strategies emerging from computational experiments are thus obtained from the learning or evolutionary process instead of from any pre-specification. Analysing many of those emergent collusive outcomes and strategies. we are able to specify the mechanism of tacit collusion and investigate how the market environment can affect it. We find that the learned collusive strategies are similar to the forgiving trigger strategies of classical supergame theory (Green and Porter, 1984). Also using computational experiments, we can determine which characteristics of the market environment encourage or hinder tacit collusion. The findings from this thesis provide insights on tacit collusion in an oligopoly and policy implications from a learning perspective. With modelling flexibility, our co-evolutionary approach can be extended to study strategic behaviour in an oligopoly considering many other market characteristics.
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