abstract: Ever since the registration of private banks was deregulated in Taiwan in 1991, the sector has suffered significant decline in profitability. Facing such a dynamic sector yet vital to domestic economy, what should the banks do to successfully improve their competiveness? As external changes are often unpredictable, the exploration and buildup of internal resources is a critical approach. This article focuses on how to effectively manage internal competition so as to upgrade business performance and accomplish organizational goals. This article discusses the effects of the compensation system and employee incentives on business performance in banking in two areas. First of all, based on the statistics on the banking sector in Taiwan, it explores the regulating effects of different compensation systems on two conflicts in the industry. It also reviews the literature on Conflict Theory. Research shows that when people trust each other, they tend to accept a value statement different from theirs. And our research also shows that trust can minimize task conflict and relationship conflict between team members. Moreover, after identifying the role of compensation structure to trust and task conflict, this article further categorizes the structure into team performance reward and individual performance reward. Analysis points out that when the organization bases compensation payment on team performance reward, the relationship between trust and task conflict is higher than that on individual performance reward. That is, team performance reward better helps to reinforce such correlation compared to individual performance reward. Second, the research studies different forms of employee incentives in Taiwan’s banking sector as well as resulting performance. During the studied period, the majority of the financial institutions preferred cash bonus. In addition, financial institutions also take other incentives. Cash bonus covered the highest percentage, followed by share bonus, treasury repo and transfer, and options in order. We study the ROEs under different incentives and conclude it is higher and more stable in the institutions offering multiple employee shares instead of single method. Whether the incentives are implemented also influence the level of net ROE. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Business Administration 2016

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:26:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Alexandre Rogerio da Silva.pdf: 444221 bytes, checksum: 93a299afd8c6e16987e2b9cb06ea71f0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-01-28 / This study examines the involvement of funds of Venture Capital and Private Equity and the widespread use of stock options in IPOs (Initial Public Offering) in Brazil. The Agency theory, developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), argues that the tools of controlling and incentive can behave as a complement of one another. Several studies conducted abroad and in Brazil analyzed the impact of monitoring funds of PE / VC of the performance of IPOs, however the literature is still scarce aimed at analyzing the strategies of incentives through stock options (ISOs) as a strategy of reducing the agency conflict. This study seeks to fill the gap found in Brazilian literature, analyzing the involvement of funds of VC / PE and generalization of incentive plans via stock options (ISOs) interact to predict the performance of IPOs in Brazil. The results suggest that companies backed by venture capital funds and private equity are more likely to use the widespread use of stock options for all employees. The results also suggest that companies backed by funds from Venture Capital and Private Equity have a CAR (Cumulative Abnormal Return) higher than companies that aren´t backed for this type of fund. / Este estudo analisa o envolvimento de fundos de Venture Capital e Private Equity e o uso generalizado de Stock Options nos IPOs (Oferta Publica Inicial) no Brasil. A teoria de Agência, desenvolvida por Jensen e Meckling (1976), argumenta que as ferramentas de controle e de incentivo podem comportar-se como complemento uma da outra. Diversos estudos realizados no exterior e no Brasil analisaram o impacto do monitoramento dos fundos de PE/VC no desempenho dos IPOs, porem ainda é escassa a literatura voltada a analisar as estratégias de incentivos via opções de compra de ações (ISOs) como estratégia para a redução do conflito de agência. Este estudo procura preencher a lacuna encontrada na literatura Brasileira, analisando como o envolvimento de fundos de VC/PE e a generalização de planos de incentivo via opções de compra de ações (ISOs) interage para prever o desempenho dos IPOs no Brasil. Os resultados sugerem que as empresas apoiadas por fundos de Venture Capital e Private Equity apresentam maior probabilidade de utilização de uso generalizado de Stock Options para todos os funcionários. Os resultados também sugerem que as empresas apoiadas por fundos de Venture Capital e Private Equity apresentam um CAR (Retorno Excendente Acumulado) superior do que as empresas que não possuem participação deste tipo de fundo.