Technological knowledge is of many different kinds, from experience-based know-how in the crafts to science-based knowledge in modern engineering. It is inherently oriented towards being useful in technological activities, such as manufacturing and engineering design. The purpose of this thesis is to highlight special characteristics of technological knowledge and how these affect how technology should be taught in school. It consists of an introduction, a summary in Swedish, and five papers: Paper I is about rules of thumb, which are simple instructions, used to guide actions toward a specific result, without need of advanced knowledge. One off the major advantages of rules of thumb is the ease with which they can be learnt. One of their major disadvantages is that they cannot easily be adjusted to new situations or conditions. Paper II describes how Gilbert Ryle's distinction between knowing how and knowing that is applicable in the technological domain. Knowing how and knowing that are commonly used together, but there are important differences between them which motivate why they should be regarded as different types: they are learnt in different ways, justified in different ways, and knowing that is susceptible to Gettier type problems which technological knowing how is not. Paper III is based on a survey about how Swedish technology teachers understand the concept of technological knowledge. Their opinions show an extensive variation, and they have no common terminology for describing the knowledge. Paper IV deals with non-scientific models that are commonly used by engineers, based on for example folk theories or obsolete science. These should be included in technology education if it is to resemble real technology. Different, and partly contradictory, epistemological frameworks must be used in different school subjects. This leads to major pedagogical challenges, but also to opportunities to clarify the differences between technology and the natural sciences and between models and reality. Paper V is about explanation, prediction, and the use of models in technology education. Explanations and models in technology differ from those in the natural sciences in that they have to include users' actions and intentions. / <p>QC 20140512</p>

This thesis consists of two essays and an introduction. The main theme is technological knowledge that is not based on the natural sciences.The first essay is about rules of thumb, which are simple instructions, used to guide actions toward a specific result, without need of advanced knowledge. Knowing adequate rules of thumb is a common form of technological knowledge. It differs both from science-based and intuitive (or tacit) technological knowledge, although it may have its origin in experience, scientific knowledge, trial and error, or a combination thereof. One of the major advantages of rules of thumb is the ease with which they can be learned. One of their major disadvantages is that they cannot easily be adjusted to new situations or conditions. Engineers commonly use rules, theories and models that lack scientific justification. How to include these in introductory technology education is the theme of the second essay. Examples include rules of thumb based on experience, but also models based on obsolete science or folk theories. Centrifugal forces, heat and cold as substances, and sucking vacuum all belong to the latter group. These models contradict scientific knowledge, but are useful for prediction in limited contexts where they are used when found convenient. The role of this kind of models in technology education is the theme of the second essay. Engineers’ work is a common prototype for pupils’ work with product development and systematic problem solving during technology lessons. Therefore pupils should be allowed to use the engineers’ non-scientific models when doing design work in school technology. The acceptance of these could be experienced as contradictory by the pupils: a model that is allowed, or even encouraged in technology class is considered wrong when doing science. To account for this, different epistemological frameworks must be used in science and technology education. Technology is first and foremost about usefulness, not about the truth or even generally applicable laws. This could cause pedagogical problems, but also provide useful examples to explain the limitations of models, the relation between model and reality, and the differences between science and technology. / <p>QC 20111118</p>

Philosophers, historians of technology, and anthropologists often offer accounts of technology that include a “human clause,” some phrase to the effect that only humans use or make technologies. When these academics do consider tool use, they refer to a few cases, usually from chimpanzee studies, as special and unusual in the animal kingdom and whose similarities to human tool use can be explained through some shared evolutionary heritage. However, new observational and laboratory animal studies demonstrate that tool use and the use of learned techniques are actually more widespread than many scholars have appreciated, encompassing the behaviors of dolphins, crows, gorillas, and octopuses. Some studies have shown that even species that are not known to produce tools in the wild can, in the right contexts, produce and use tools as capably as related species that do employ tools. Some of the non-human animals' tool use and manufacture indicates learned components, shared material cultures, innovation, an understanding of 'folk' physics and causal reasoning, the standardization of tools, and the use of metatools. This dissertation involves a reflection on these new animal studies cases: what they might indicate, how they relate to concepts used in defining technology (and humanity), how they might disrupt human-centered models of technology. This dissertation also provides a framework for considering these animal cases within the context of technological knowledge, one important concept in philosophy of technology. To highlight the relationships between two different approaches to technological knowledge, this project introduces a graphical model for considering animal cases alongside human technologies; mapping individual technologies and techniques in terms of technological know-how and encapsulation of information allow for the additional consideration of animal constructions – webs, nests, dams, etc. – alongside animal tool use and human technologies. By categorizing non-human animal constructions, tool use, and technology along the same axes, we see that the individual material products of humans and non-humans are often a matter of degree, and not a matter of kind. Animal constructions and tool use can be productively incorporated into philosophy of technology. / Ph. D.