M.Comm. / A revolution in genetic research, known as the Human Genome Project (HGP), is taking place. This project, initiated in 1984, is a twenty-year, six billion-dollar science project designed to map the entire genetic structure (Genome) of the human species (Brockett and Tankersley, 1995). In 1998, the HGP leaders expected to complete the project by 2003 (Lowden, J. A., 1999:33). The Human Genome Project is designed to sequence the human genome (the blue print of genetic information) and to identify the estimated 100000 genesherein. This has added a new dimension to the technology available to underwriters in the life and health insurance industry for the selection of medical risks. Genetic testing can identify inherited diseases and predict illnesses that might not manifest for decades (Brackenridge & Elder, 1998:89). Genome research has opened up new opportunities for diagnosis and in some cases, early treatment of medical conditions. This new basis of knowledge is referred to as the advent of the molecular age in medicine. Medical journals, the mass media and genetic interest groups are treating human genetics and the opportunities it presents as a high-profile issue, with great attention being paid to the complex and emotive topics of life insurance and genetic testing (Regenauer & Schmidtke, 1998:5). The Insurance Industry can use genetic testing to identify high-risk applicants more accurately and price products accordingly, thereby improving risk assessment and profitability. These potential advantages, however, are counter-balanced by ethical considerations that are much more difficult to address (Lowden, J. A., 1999:33). Many consumers, ethicists and geneticists fear that insurers will use this data for unfair discriminatory purposes, identifying a genetic underclass of people who, although clinically well, will be uninsurable. Genetic testing could invade the privacy of applicants and their families. There are concerns about the confidential handling of genetic information as well as the accurate interpretation of genetic tests. The uncertainty about the predictive value of genetic tests, the shortage of trained geneticists and counsellors and the psychological impact of that knowledge of a predictable serious disease might have, have lead to much opposition to the use of genetic information by third parties. In the United States most Americans receive health insurance through their place of employment. There are fears that genetic testing will be used to discriminate against prospective employees and render many people unemployable and uninsurable (Council for responsible Genetics, 1997: http://www.gene-watch.org/genclisc htuil Consumer groups have lobbied effectively for the prohibition of testing or the use of testing by insurers in the United States and Europe and legislators aim to ban the use of genetic information on a broad basis. Insurers, on the other hand, are assuming that the new laws will cause untold damage to the fiscal stability of their companies (Lowden, J. A., 1999:33). However, it seems inevitable that genetic testing will affect risk classification sooner rather than later and to a greater extent than most believe (Chambers, 1997: http://www.Inrc.com/epirr/issues/143/143-4.htm).

This is a deconstruction of "child pornography" through an analysis of media images of child spanking and their relationship with the criminal law and cinema, video and broadcasting regulation in Britain and Canada. It suggests that the law's primary concern is not the protection of children but the elimination of the heresy that children are sexually attractive. Chapter 1 introduces the phenomenon under discussion, namely internet sites that collect stills and clips from mainstream movies and television showing children receiving corporal punishment. The chapter postulates that these sites are for sexual gratification and explores what society understands by "sexual exploitation of children" and "sex" itself. Part I considers whether the web sites are child pornography under English or Canadian criminal law. Chapter 2 looks at Canada's definitions of obscenity and child pornography. Chapter 3 asks whether the images might be indecent according to England's law. These chapters examine the law's understanding of child spanking as a sexual act, exploring what constitutes "sex". While Part I declines to state definitively whether such web sites are illegal, it argues that the movies and television from which the images originate are tolerated for the reasons that give the images sexual appeal. Part II looks at the regulation in Canada and Britain of the movies and television from which the images are taken. Chapter 4 deals with cinema and video regulation, which prohibits eroticising violence and children, and asks how films are nevertheless rife with images of child beating used for sexual arousal. Chapter 5 similarly examines broadcasting regulation and asks whether the ban on sexualising children might be unconstitutional under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Part III concludes by looking at how society permits the eroticisation of children, while condemning the "paedophile". It suggests that the web sites may arise from childhood trauma over corporal punishment, compares the harm of that practice with that caused by the web sites and concludes that if there be prohibition, then it should be of child spanking, rather than the sites, which are non-exploitative testament to ingenuity in the face of a hypocritically censorial regime.

The most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge concerning his own feelings and circumstances that immeasurably surpass those that anyone else can have.-John Stuart Mill, On Liberty / One feature that varies within competing conceptions of medical shared decision-making is how a patient's values are to be engaged by a physician. One detail that can be overlooked under "shared" decision-making is whether or not a physician ought (or be allowed) to attempt to persuade the patient to adopt particular health-related values. Some argue that it is incumbent on a physician to share her privileged understanding of medicine so as to help her patient embrace "better" values. This thesis argues that it is dangerous to patient autonomy for a physician to exert moral suasion on her patient to attempt to influence or change those values; the danger lies in the power imbalance between patients and physicians that seems inherent in medical encounters, and is exacerbated by the sick role. Thus, while a physician ought to help her patient articulate his health-related values, she ought not try to change them.

In the past century, the scope of patentable objects has greatly expanded. Patents are now being granted on living organisms, human biological material and genes. What are the consequences of such practices for scientific research and health care? One of the fundamental philosophical questions behind this issue is the following: are we justified in patenting human genetic material? An examination of the traditional philosophical justification of intellectual property will allow us to critically explore whether or not this practice is ethically justifiable. It will be argued that the consequentialist justification of intellectual property requires, in this present case, that we modify the patent regimes in order to maximise social benefits and minimize public burdens.

M.Cur. / Modern technology has brought on the possibility to sustain life for an indefinit3e period, but does not give answers to the questions arising from such situations. In view of shrinking resources available for tertiary care, and the growing awareness of justice, indefinite continuation of life-support therapy has been subjected to scrutiny. Traditionally the treating physician made all decisions regarding therapy. In Western culture the public are more aware of their right to self-determination and participation in decision making with the autonomy to do so. The nurse's role also changed from "handmaiden" to an independent practitioner who takes part in decision making regarding her patient. Decisions regarding life-support therapy is sensitive and becomes more complicated the more people become involved. The following question can then be asked: What are all the factors in decision making concerning life-support therapy? The aim of this study is to identify the factors in decision making concerning life support, as the first step in defining the parameters in decision making. The design chosen to identify these factors is a qualitative, exploratory, contextual, phenomenological case-study design. one case study was done on a patient where the continuation of life support was questioned. All persons involved with the patient were included in the case study. Interviews were conducted, observations and field notes were made and patient records were explored to identify factors in decision making. A narrative was written to present this information. As these constituted the micro-level, a literature study was done to identify factors on the macro- and meso-levels. The results of the analysis are presented as a list of factors in decision making concerning life-support therapy.

M.Cur. / The purpose of the research study is to describe guidelines to counteract unethical behaviour in homes for the aged by auxiliary nurses and care workers. The objectives are to explore and describe the factors related to the unethical behaviour in homes for the aged by auxiliary nurses and care workers by: Exploring and describing the perceptions of the auxiliary nurses and care workers relating to unethical behaviour of auxiliary nurses and care workers in homes for the aged; and Exploring and describing the perceptions of the registered nurses relating to unethical behaviour of auxiliary nurses and care workers in homes for the aged. The point of departure for the research was an uncovering of abuse in homes for the aged by M-Net's Carte Blanche team and the observations of the researcher over a long period of time

M.A. (Philosophy) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

This thesis moves beyond the traditional approaches of how we ought to treat animals, and instead concentrates on the best strategy for preventing animal suffering in the farming industry. Chapter 1 considers the question of how we can know that animals feel pain, and concludes not only that it is rational to believe that they can, but also that this is a significant fact. Chapter 2 then analyses one possible strategy for helping to prevent animal suffering, namely demi-vegetarianism. For a number of reasons, however, this strategy is found to be flawed, therefore Chapter 3 analyses a second possible strategy, namely vegetarianism, and concludes that this is, in fact, the best strategy for helping to prevent animal suffering in the farming industry.

This is a deconstruction of "child pornography" through an analysis of media images of child spanking and their relationship with the criminal law and cinema, video and broadcasting regulation in Britain and Canada. It suggests that the law's primary concern is not the protection of children but the elimination of the heresy that children are sexually attractive. Chapter 1 introduces the phenomenon under discussion, namely internet sites that collect stills and clips from mainstream movies and television showing children receiving corporal punishment. The chapter postulates that these sites are for sexual gratification and explores what society understands by "sexual exploitation of children" and "sex" itself. Part I considers whether the web sites are child pornography under English or Canadian criminal law. Chapter 2 looks at Canada's definitions of obscenity and child pornography. Chapter 3 asks whether the images might be indecent according to England's law. These chapters examine the law's understanding of child spanking as a sexual act, exploring what constitutes "sex". While Part I declines to state definitively whether such web sites are illegal, it argues that the movies and television from which the images originate are tolerated for the reasons that give the images sexual appeal. Part II looks at the regulation in Canada and Britain of the movies and television from which the images are taken. Chapter 4 deals with cinema and video regulation, which prohibits eroticising violence and children, and asks how films are nevertheless rife with images of child beating used for sexual arousal. Chapter 5 similarly examines broadcasting regulation and asks whether the ban on sexualising children might be unconstitutional under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Part III concludes by looking at how society permits the eroticisation of children, while condemning the "paedophile". It suggests that the web sites may arise from childhood trauma over corporal punishment, compares the harm of that practice with that caused by the web sites and concludes that if there be prohibition, then it should be of child spanking, rather than the sites, which are non-exploitative testament to ingenuity in the face of a hypocritically censorial regime. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

A research report submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Applied ethics for professionals Johannesburg / The advent of digital ICT has raised a range of privacy problems that previously did not occur, owing to the scope and volume of data that can be collected, as well as the processing capacity of the application. These digital privacy problems are arguably not easily addressed within any particular traditional macroethical framework. We may therefore need to find an alternative approach. One such approach is proposed by Luciano Floridi, who has devised “Information Ethics” - a macroethics for the identification, clarification and solution of digital ethical issues. While IE is useful in that it highlights questions of digital agency, it will be demonstrated that it is flawed when applied to problems of privacy posed by digital ICT. IE, however, points us in the right direction: An object-oriented ethics may be able to address the issue of digital agents. In this essay I develop an argument for the moral intentionality of digital agents, based on the concepts of emergent value and indirect intentionality, that can underpin an object-oriented ethical approach to digital privacy for both digital and human agents. Using Nissenbaum’s concept of contextual spheres, I provide normative guidelines for evaluating the competing interests of agent-objects in various digital spheres. A brief evaluation of the approach, by way of an example, shows that the object-oriented LoA that I am proposing can be adopted for digital privacy problems. In such cases, and for the specific purpose of weighing up the competing rights and values of the agents and patients, we can treat all agents (human and non-human) as both intentionality and real. This provides a reading of the case that goes beyond the consequentialist or ownership-based approaches, and arguably gets closer to the heart of the issue. Where the approach is still open, however, is that we still have to justify and balance these interests. There is no simple formula to apply. A need for practical wisdom or Phronesis, in the form of a judicious weighing of moral interests, continues to apply to digital problems posed by ICT. / GR2017