Private property in the United States arose out of a tradition that emphasized the individual freedom to control holdings without interference from governmental influences. A sharp distinction between society as a whole and individual rights isolated ownership of private property from a notion of the common good. This dualistic framework excludes the possibility for forms of property that do not fall completely into either category. Property ownership attitudes are central to issues that often divide environmentalists and landowners. Property rights must be put in the context to understand the divergence between landowner attitudes and provisions made when the institution of private property was created. Finally, land itself as a type of property should be considered ethically distinct from other forms of property because of the interdependencies of human and nonhuman interests that the science of ecology has revealed.

This thesis defends an individual's moral right to be aided in dying by a physician (that is, voluntary active euthanasia, or VAE), but departs significantly from the view in its favor generally accepted in the bioethics literature. The prevailing view appeals to both respect for an individual's autonomy and promotion of an individual's well-being as necessary conditions for a right to VAE, so as to justify the right only for those suffering grave illnesses and/or disabilities. The author argues that such a view is logically untenable; one or another aspect must be given up. Since invoking the premise that certain individuals would be better off dead necessarily relies on controversial assumptions about both the value of life and the nature and value of death, about which reasonable people disagree, it is the justification from an individual's best interest which must be excluded in a liberal society. The author endorses a self-determination justification for the right to VAE, but rejects understanding this in terms of respecting personal autonomy, instead making the case for a right to VAE grounded in self-ownership. The author's main conclusion is that the right to VAE is a general right applying to all competent adults, not only those suffering grave illnesses or disabilities, or those whose choice for VAE is an exercise of autonomy. Moreover, by analyzing the basis of physician authority over prescription medicine and how this can be justified to a society of self-owners, she maintains that individuals have not only the right to choose VAE without state interference, but also the right to be provided VAE by doctors. Nevertheless, both rights are compatible with reasonable limitations to protect both the interests of VAE seekers and the rights of others.