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This dissertation consists of three essays addressing two issues related to crime and tax evasion. The first essay investigates the relationship between property and violent crime with law enforcement expenditures. The second essay examines the market structure in transition economies and the effects on firm-level tax evasion. The third essay investigates the incidence of tax evasion in a general equilibrium framework. The topics in all three essays are linked by their focus on criminal or illegal behavior. The essays also answer questions related to developing sound governmental policy and decision-making. Chapter one attempts to identify the impact on crime of increasing law enforcement expenditures. We examine the specific channels the public has to influence crime (e.g., the level of expenditures, the number of police officers), to determine what role, if any, they may play in influencing crime rates for property crime and for violent crime. Conclusions in previous research are equivocal, and often do not adequately address the obvious simultaneity of crime and enforcement efforts. We use the Arellano-Bond system GMM estimation method to control for this simultaneity. Results from our preferred GMM estimation method show clearly that increases in law enforcement expenditures help reduce crime rates; other methodologies typically give results that are not robust. The second chapter extends previous empirical work evaluating the determinants of tax evasion by firms in which tax evasion may be similar to a tax advantage under the law. This chapter contributes to the tax evasion literature by identifying market structures in which it may be easier to evade or where high levels of evasion take place. Results indicate that fighting corruption is still an important factor in determining the level of evasion. However, the data also suggests a long run situation in which the tax advantage of evasion has been replicated and competed away; more competitive markets have lower levels of evasion whereas monopolistic markets have higher levels of evasion. Further, tax evasion will occur in more service oriented industries. Chapter three develops and calibrates a general equilibrium model to investigate how tax evasion affects the incidence of taxes. Previous tax incidence work has considered tax evasion; however little has been done considering the distributional impact of tax evasion. There may be cases in which individuals, other than evaders, indirectly benefit or lose from tax evasion. This work contributes to the literature by clearly linking the individual or firm decision to evade to a general equilibrium analysis of tax evasion using microeconomic foundations. Including evasion decisions in tax incidence analysis has implications for both tax policy and enforcement agency decision making, and is an important step toward understanding how evasion affects the whole economy.

In this thesis, a pursuit-evasion game, in which the pursuer moves with simple motion whereas the evader moves at a fixed speed but with a curvature constraint, is investigated. The game is the inverse of the usual homicidal chauffeur game. Square of the distance between the pursuer and the evader when the game is terminated is selected as the cost function. To solve such a zero-sum game, the variational approach will be employed to solve the problem. An algorithm will be proposed to determine a saddle point and the value of the game under consideration

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 304-319).

This thesis discusses the notion of tax evasion in Rwanda. It looks at the role of tax administration and fiscal codes in Rwanda in the implementation of tax anti-evasion measures in the country. The tax administration and fiscal codes provide opportunities for the Rwandan people to realize a tax evasion free society not only because of the tax administration departments in place to curb tax evasion, the types of taxes, the measures of collection, but also the reasonable fiscal procedure process in tax payment and also in allowing the taxpayer participation in the tax assessment process, an essential component of co-operative taxpayer attitudes for potential tax revenue collections to thrive. / However, this thesis scrutinizes the reality in Rwanda for the extent to which tax administration and tax laws have gone to achieve the goal of curbing tax evasion. / Tax administration measures and fiscal code provisions in place, can not be said to be perfect as at times it is foreign ideas imported into Rwanda, which must be adopted often as a conditionality to that much needed development assistance. This in light of the persistent institutionalized corruption existing in Rwanda, and the reality of public participation in the tax assessment process given the Rwandan culture of evading taxes, makes the anti-evasion process inadequate in Rwanda, thus further "watering down" the sufficiency of the tax law and tax administration as a previously perceived usable strategy for curbing tax evasion. The thesis argues therefore that the tax administration and fiscal codes in curbing tax evasion are limited by existence of these realities unless modifications are made in the implementation of measures against tax evasion in Rwanda.

This study proposes to analyze the phenomenon of tax treaty abuse and the use of tax treaties as tools to avoid or minimize the taxation by residents doing business in a foreign jurisdiction. This study analyses a particular strategy using tax treaties known as "treaty shopping." This paper will argue that treaty shopping constitutes an abuse of the tax treaty regime. However, this study rejects the traditional arguments against treaty shopping and proposes a different basis to challenge the legitimacy of this practice and to explain why this strategy constitutes an improper use of tax treaties.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, 2005. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains xii, 159 p. : ill., map. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 152-159).

Thesis (S.T.D.)--Catholic University of America, 1944. / "Biographical note": p. 177. Bibliography: p. 165-169.