Submitted by Elba Lopes (elba.lopes@fecap.br) on 2015-12-21T14:12:16Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Ana_Cristina_Russo_Nascimento.pdf: 9067895 bytes, checksum: f5d0854e1572e991b963b73b2414e563 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-12-21T14:12:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Ana_Cristina_Russo_Nascimento.pdf: 9067895 bytes, checksum: f5d0854e1572e991b963b73b2414e563 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-08-04 / It has been a challenge for companies and scholars the issue of alignment of interest between owners and executives, called agency problems. Among its various views and administrative tools, created with the purpose of mitigating these problems the salary of the executive which can be a tool of encouragement when it is compensated in a variable way linked to purposes which set challenges to add value to the companies and thus a higher return to stockholders. There are claims in this context that the remuneration models which determine long-term goals are more appropriate, once they enable measure tangible results for organizations. Thereforeaim of this study was to investigate the relationship between the presence of variable remuneration linked to long-term goals and business performance as well as the behavior of that financial performance by business sector. One hundred fifty-fivepublicly traded companies were analyzed in 2010, which information has been extracted from References Forms (FR). The indicators used were Enterprise Value, EBITDA and Total Return to Shareholders (TRS), constructed with data provided by the Econom??tica System, for the period from 2010 to 2013. The significance of variables was tested using the method of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and the figure which was carried out showed statistical significance the impact on the type of remuneration on the financial performance of the sample only for the indicator Enterprise Value, the results suggested that the long-term goal linked to the remuneration can positively influence the company's performance. / A quest??o do alinhamento de interesse entre acionistas e executivos, denominada problemas do agente-principal, tem sido um desafio para empresas e estudiosos. Dentre seus diversos aspectos e ferramentas administrativas, criados com o prop??sito de mitigar esses problemas, est?? a remunera????o do executivo que pode ser instrumento de incentivo, quando paga de modo vari??vel atrelada a finalidades que estabele??am desafios para agregar valor ??s empresas e, assim, maior retorno aos acionistas. Nesse contexto, h?? afirma????es de que os modelos de remunera????o que determinam metas de longo prazo s??o mais adequados, uma vez que possibilitam aferir resultados concretos para as organiza????es. Assim, o objetivo deste estudo ?? verificar a rela????o entre a presen??a de remunera????o vari??vel atrelada a metas de longo prazo e o desempenho empresarial, bem como o comportamento do referido desempenho financeiro por setor de atividade. Foram analisadas 155 empresas de capital aberto no ano de 2010, cujas informa????es foram extra??das dos Formul??rios de Refer??ncias (FR). Os indicadores empregados foram Valor da Empresa, LAJIDA e Retorno Total ao Acionista (RTA), constru??dos com dados fornecidos pelo sistema Econom??tica, para o per??odo de 2010 a 2013. A signific??ncia das vari??veis foi testada recorrendo ao m??todo dos M??nimos Quadrados Ordin??rios (MQO), e as estimativas realizadas mostraram signific??ncia estat??stica do impacto do tipo de remunera????o sobre o desempenho financeiro da amostra apenas para o indicador Valor da Empresa, cujos resultados sugeriram que o objetivo de longo prazo vinculado ?? remunera????o pode influenciar positivamente o desempenho da empresa.

Orientation: Over the years, the increase in executive remuneration in both the private sector and state-owned entities (SOEs) has been the subject of intense discussions. The poor performance of some SOEs with highly remunerated executives begs the question whether chief executive officers (CEOs) in South African SOEs deserve the high levels of remuneration they receive. Research purpose: The main purpose of the study was to determine whether there is a relationship between CEOs’ remuneration and company performance in South Africa’s Schedule 2 SOEs. Motivation for the study: A greater understanding of the relationship between CEO remuneration and organisational performance would expand knowledge when developing optimal CEO remuneration systems to ensure sustainability of SOEs in the South African context. If a relationship exists, it could justify the high remuneration received by CEOs. Research design, approach, and method: This quantitative, longitudinal study, conducted over a nine-year period, collected secondary data from the annual reports of 18 Schedule 2 SOEs. The primary statistical techniques used in the study included were OLS multiple regression analysis and correlational analysis on a pooled dataset. Main findings/results: The primary finding was that there is a relationship between CEO remuneration and company performance (mainly an inverse relationship), with no consistent trend between the constructs. Turnover appears to be an important component, as it was the most stable measure of company performance during the study period. The results indicate that the CEOs’ remuneration continued to increase, even when the SOEs were performing poorly. Practical managerial implications: Since the study focused on the relationship between CEOs’ remuneration and company performance, it may aid policymakers in forming new rules and regulations that would help improve the country’s economic performance while attracting international investors. Contribution/value-add: The study provides new knowledge to the limited research available on SOEs in South Africa. Further, this research focused on three different components of CEOs’ remuneration, thereby shedding more light on the relationship between their remuneration and company performance. / Business Management / PhD (Management Studies)