The aim of this thesis is to provide an explication and analysis of the existential concept of authentic existence, through an examination of Sartre, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Buber. It is primarily Sartre's treatment of authenticity, only implicit in his writings, which this thesis seeks both to make explicit and to defend. The positions of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Buber are each used to compare or contrast with key aspects of Sartre's concept of authentic existence, in order to establish the strengths and weaknesses of the Sartrean position. Sartre's concept of individual authenticity rests upon an ethics designed to liberate the individual from living in 'bad faith' by means of a reflective comprehension of the nature of human reality. It is an ethics of self-recovery or authentic existence, having as its ideal the development of the morally autonomous individual who chooses to take freedom as his ultimate value. Sartre also maintains that authenticity requires that we take the freedom of others, as well as our own, as our goal. At the same time, however, his discussion of relations with others in Being and Nothingness is a profoundly negative one, which contends that conflict is the original meaning of 'being-for-others'. It will be argued that Sartre's theory of groups in Critique of Dialectical Reason provides an account of how positive social relations are indeed possible within the parameters of his ontology. The theory of groups thus renders intelligible that aspect of his concept of authentic existence which requires of us common action on behalf of the freedom of all. Finally, Sartre's sociopolitical ideal, or that towards which authentic action is ultimately directed, is identified as a 'direct democracy'. Such a community would be the concrete embodiment of a free society of disalienated individuals mutually choosing to promote each other's freedom. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

This thesis is a logical/historical inquiry into the concept of being. Relative to this concept, there are (I contend) two great traditions in Western philosophy. According to the one, the predicational use of the verb 'to be' is not independent of its existential use; according to the other, it is. That is to say, the first tradition assumes that 'a is F' entails 'a exists', while the other tradition denies this entailment. There are prima facie problems in both traditions, and the thesis attempts to resolve those arising on the assumption that the entailment holds. The thesis does not assume that either tradition as such is wrong. It is rather maintained that we may adopt either forms of language in which the predicational use of 'to be' is not independent of its existential use, or else forms of language in which the two uses are independent. When we make the first move, the result is a Fregean style of quantification theory in which existential generalization holds as an unconditionally valid form of inference; when we make the second move, the result is a free logic such as we find in the systems of Lambert and van Fraassen. Though I do not attempt to discredit either tradition as a whole, I do criticize specific claims made by the adherents of both traditions. On the whole, however, I am far more critical of those in the tradition to which the free logicians belong than I am of those in the tradition to which Frege belongs. The thesis attempts to show that in Frege's quantification theory we have a satisfactory explication of our concept of existence. The thesis offers some reasons for thinking that in the alternative tradition of the free logicians no such explication has yet emerged. The thesis concludes with a brief account of modality in which it is not assumed that individuals can possess characteristics independently of their existence. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

Thesis (M.A.R.)--Emmanuel School of Religion, Johnson City, Tennessee, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 60-66).

Thesis (M.A.R.)--Emmanuel School of Religion, Johnson City, Tennessee, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 60-66).

Thesis (M.A.R.)--Emmanuel School of Religion, Johnson City, Tennessee, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 60-66).

Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學. / Manuscript. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 1-2(2d group)). / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue. / Chapter 第一章： --- 導論 / Chapter 第二章： --- 存在主義在西方文化上的根源 / Chapter 第一節： --- 以信仰為主的希伯來傳統 / Chapter 第二節： --- 以理性為主的希臘傳統 / Chapter 第三節： --- 存在主義與希伯來文化 / Chapter 第三章： --- 有神論存在主義的先軀 / Chapter 第一節： --- 蘇格拉底作為個人的存在 / Chapter 第二節： --- 奧古士丁 / Chapter 第三節： --- 巴斯噶 / Chapter 第四章： --- 齊克果哲學概論 / Chapter 第一節： --- 從生命的反映 / Chapter 第二節： --- 齊克果的作品 / Chapter 第三節： --- 齊克果的存在哲學 / Chapter 第五章： --- 儒家哲學略論 / Chapter 第六章： --- 齊克果哲學及儒家哲學比較

No description available.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Texas at Dallas, 2006 / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 293-329)

The primary aim of this thesis is to discern whether Sartre's early work on phenomenal consciousness has distinctive and valuable contributions to make to current debates over these issues in anglophone philosophy. The method is resolutely analytical, aiming to identify and assess the details of Sartre's position and arguments for it in the light of classical and current debates. This involves much exegetical work concerned with Sartre's use of terms and principles drawn from previous thinkers. The secondary aim is to show the extent to which the famous themes of Sartrean existentialism - freedom, bad faith, and the look - are grounded in his theory of phenomenal consciousness. The principal text is Being and Nothingness, though extensive use is made of works that preceded it. The thesis comprises four chapters. Chapter 1 is concerned with clarifying Sartre's conception of intentionality in relation to current anglophone conceptions of intentionality. I detail and defend Sartre's view that intentionality is a relation of apprehension that involves both qualitative and classificatory awareness. Chapter 2 situates Sartre in relation to classical and current theories of consciousness and assesses Sartre's arguments for his conception of intentionality. I claim that Sartre has shown that his conception is useful, but not that it is correct. In chapter 3, I argue that Sartre succeeds in maintaining that perception and hallucination involve distinct types of experience, where current anglophone attempts to maintain this fail. In Chapter 4, I argue that Sartre's holistic view of the subject as an environment-inclusive being-in-the-world is preferable to reductionism, and that his theory of qualitative aspects of experience is preferable to the representationalist approaches dominant in anglophone thought. I conclude by drawing out the implications of my discussion for Sartre's theories of freedom, bad faith, and the look.

Thesis (Ed.D.)--University of Tulsa, 1973. / Bibliography: leaves 155-159.