Thesis (M.A.)--University of Nevada, Reno, 2006. / "August, 2006." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 36-37). Online version available on the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ed.D.)--University of Tennessee, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 49-55).

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 68-80) Also available in print.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Nevada, Reno, 2007. / "December, 2007." Includes bibliographical references (leaf 18). Online version available on the World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Toronto, 2007. / Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-06, page: 3296.

Thesis (M.A.)--Carleton University, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

The false/ recovered memory debate has highlighted the complexities involved in assessing the validity of memories for emotional childhood events. This dissertation begins by tracing the history of the dominant school of thought on memory, the spatial perspective, as well as far less conspicuous reconstructive views, and challenges influential modern spatial views (e.g., repression) in light of a more defensible reconstructive model. The empirical component of this dissertation was designed to compare the nature of real, created, and fabricated childhood memories for emotional events within individuals. The critical issues being addressed in the experiment were: (1) whether people could come to remember false ("created") memories for emotional events; (2) if so, whether differences existed between created memories and real and/or intentionally lied about (fabricated) memories, and; (3) whether there were individual differences in susceptibility to created memories. Using a variation of an approach developed by Hyman, Husband, and Billings (1995), a questionnaire was forwarded to participants' parents inquiring about six categories of negative emotional events (serious medical procedure, serious animal attack, getting seriously hurt by another child, serious indoor accident, serious outdoor accident, and getting lost) which the participant may or may not have experienced between the ages of 4 and 10 years. Parents were asked to describe each event which had occurred and to give a number of specific pieces of information relating to the event. Based on the questionnaire information (85% response rate), 77 participants were interviewed about each of a: (1) real event; (2) false event; and (3) fabricated event, in three weekly-spaced interviews. Over the three interviews, the interviewers attempted to implant a created memory for the false emotional event using encouragement, context reinstatement, guided imagery, and instructing daily recall attempts. In the first interview, participant were asked about the real event and the false event (counterbalanced), each introduced as a true event. They were provided the event tide and four specific pieces of information to cue their memories (their age, location, season/ month, and people present), based on questionnaire information (contrived for the false events). In the second interview, participants were re-interviewed about their memories for the false event followed by the implantation procedure. In the third interview, participants were again interviewed about the false event with the same interview approach. Finally (after the last attempt at recalling the false event), they were provided written instructions to fabricate a childhood memory, again with an event category and four information clues, given preparation rime and a monetary incentive, and interviewed about the fabricated event with the same format as the other two memory types. Following transcription of the two or three (if a created memory had emerged) final memory reports, the memories were compared on several dependent measures, collectively designated the Memory Assessment Procedure (MAP), relating to their subjective and presentation characteristics. Participants were then asked to complete a Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES) questionnaire to examine if susceptibility to created memories was related to a general dissociative cognitive pattern. Results indicated that twenty (26%) of participants created complete memories for the false emotional events (seven animal attacks, five instances of getting seriously hurt by another child, four serious outdoor accidents, three episodes of getting lost, and one medical procedure). Furthermore, 29.9% of participants reported some false information pertaining to the false event ("partial" memories), for a total of 55.9% of participants recalling information relating to the false event. The remaining participants (44.2%) reported no information pertaining to the false event. There were several interesting differences among the three memory types, including stress ratings, vividness/ clarity ratings, confidence ratings, coherence, number of details, repeated details, and memory failures. For example, when relating a created memory, participants were less confident and the memories were less vivid and detailed compared to the other memory types, but similar in sensory components and relevancy. On the other hand, participants were highly confident in their fabricated memories which were rated as highly stressful and vivid, and the memories were detailed. However, when relating a fabricated memory, participants repeated details and were less willing to admit lacking memory, relative to real memories. Other findings are reported on the origin of the created memories, age factors, memory perspective, reasons provided for first forgetting the false event, and post-interview confidence in the created memories. On the DES , participants who had come up with a partial or a created memory scored, on average, about twice as high as those participants who had recalled no false information, indicating that susceptibility to memory distortion may be related to a general dissociative pattern. This was the largest scale created memory study to date and the first to look at a variety of emotional childhood events and the content of the memories. Implications of the findings for the false memory debate and memory assessment in forensic contexts are discussed. / Arts, Faculty of / Psychology, Department of / Graduate

This study separated participants into four different conditions based on a 2 (blocked or random study trials) x 2 (blocked or random test trials) between-subjects design. Using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm the researcher investigated whether or not false memories were produced at the time of study or the time of test. According to the paradigm, participants who view a series of categorical words (mad, fear, hate, rage, temper) are thought to semantically associate critical lures (anger), as a part of the list presented, more frequently than participants who see a string of unrelated terms. The production of false memory is commonly accredited to the priming effect and the relationships among categorical terms. The current study explored whether manipulating blocked versus random word lists had an effect on false memory rates and further examined the conditions under which false memories are produced, in order to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon. Participants' responses were assessed based on their recall under either blocked or random conditions in both the study and test phases. Using measures of recognition and reaction time (RT), the results indicate that false memories are created primarily during original study and not during · the test of recognition. However, although the highest rates of false memories occurred during the blocked-study condition, the fastest reaction times for false memories were seen during blocked-test. These findings can contribute to the theoretical understanding of the origin of false memory. After comparing false memory rates and reaction times, concluding whether or not the mind exclusively produces these memories during the encoding process has yet to be determined.

This study examined whether schemas formed during training (graduate coursework, clinical supervision, etc.) are responsible for the tendency of clinicians to experience higher rates of false recall for clinical case details when compared to novices. Participants in this study were recruited from a general psychology class to limit preexisting knowledge of psychological disorders. Half of the participants were trained to recognize features of Generalized Anxiety Disorder with the purpose of forming a schema for that disorder, whereas the other half were not. Participants’ memory for the diagnostic and non-diagnostic details within a hypothetical case vignette was tested using a free recall prompt followed by a yes/no recognition test. Trained participants falsely recognized the diagnostic detail ‘restlessness’ and falsely recalled the diagnostic detail ‘uncontrollable worry’ at a significantly higher rate than controls, suggesting that the training successfully formed a schema for GAD symptoms.

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