Family firms are ubiquitous around the world. Family involvement in family businesses gives rise to unique features that not only make family firms behave distinctively from their nonamily counterparts but also lead to great variations among such firms. From an innovation perspective, while family firms are regarded as conservative businesses that lack an innovation spirit in some studies, others recognize family firms as key economic drivers demonstrate entrepreneurial spirit. This dissertation is an attempt to advance the understanding of family firm innovation heterogeneity by focusing on the role of family CEOs. In particular, this research explores what idiosyncratic resources and capabilities are generated from family management, specifically when a family member holds the CEO position. Employing a capability-based perspective of firm innovation, this research posits that the impact of a family CEO on firm innovation is twoold. Family CEOs have a direct impact on firm innovation due to the distinctive resources possessed and the unique goals pursued. Family CEOs also have an indirect impact on firm innovation via the configuration and orchestration of other top management team (TMT) members’ competencies, which manifests as high-order, idiosyncratic managerial capabilities. Therefore, superior or inferior family firm innovation is the result of both TMT members’ unique competencies acquired and developed by family firms as well as family CEOs’ idiosyncratic managerial capabilities. A randomly selected sample of 250 high-technology firms was used for the empirical tests. Findings suggest that family CEOs have a direct impact on firm innovation input and output and that family CEOs configure and orchestrate TMT resources distinctively compared to their professional counterparts. The results reveal theoretical implications for both family business and firm innovation and offer practical implications for leaders of family firms.

Background/Problem: The financial crisis in 2008 affected the whole economy and the CEO's compensation was one of the factors causing this crisis. Although, it is now years after the onset of the financial crisis, the CEO’s compensation is still an ongoing topic of debate and, for this reason, vital to study. According to literature, non-family CEOs are more likely to emphasize financial performance rather than socioemotional objectives and returns. On the contrary, family CEOs are more motivated by socioemotional wealth and non-financial goals. Taking these viewpoints into consideration, this study examines how CEOs in family firms view and value compensation and rewards. Purpose: This study aims to explore how family CEOs view and value compensation and rewards, in comparison to non-family CEOs in family firms. Method: This study is conducted using a qualitative method and utilizing semi-structured interviews. Five family firms participate in this study and they comprise of 4 family CEOs and 1 non-family CEO. Conclusion: The findings of this study support the idea that family CEOs view and value compensation and rewards in other terms than just financial value. Moreover, the evidence points to that the non-family CEO is more connected to financial factors. Weighing together the evidence from this study there is a difference regarding how family CEOs and non-family CEOs view and value compensation and rewards. Additionally, based on this research, SEW exists within family firms. The findings in this study contribute to the current knowledge in designing compensation packages for CEOs in family firms. Moreover, this study is the first step towards enhancing our understanding of how CEOs view and value compensation and rewards.

In the near future several Swedish family firms will face a need for succession. Many times there is no available successor within the family firm. Hiring a non-family CEO (NFC) is thus a solution to keep the firm within the family. Using a multiple case study with 6 participating family firms, we have identified how clashing logics between family business owners and NFCs, on the role of the NFC, influence their expectations and relationships. Clashing logics were often a source of disagreements and conflicts, leading to failure in the owner-NFC relationship. Furthermore, we have identified that the two parties often perceived the non-family CEO to offer more professional management which was a motive why family firms in this study hired NFCs. This perceived professionalism was also a reason for conflicting expectations. Adding to previous studies we also identified a series of influencing factors impacting the family business owner-NFC relationship. To conclude this study provides new insights for further research and practical recommendations for family firms in the process of hiring NFCs.