Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 506-537). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Michigan State University, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 250-259).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaiʻi, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 141-146).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 68-70).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Santa Cruz, 2000. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 114-118).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2009. / Title from title screen (site viewed October 15, 2009). PDF text: ix, 71 p. : ill. (some col.) ; 2 Mb. UMI publication number: AAT 3358963. Includes bibliographical references.

This dissertation covers both policy-oriented and theory-based topics in International Economics. The first two chapters cover financial policy related to the capital account, while the third chapter covers tariff policy related to the current account. The first chapter examines the theoretical value of capital controls in reducing the probability of bank runs. I develop a global game model with information-based bank runs and strategic complementarities within and between foreign and domestic creditors. My analysis appears to be the first to model the interconnectedness of foreign and domestic creditor behavior. The framework pins down the probability of a bank run and shows that a capital control can lower the probability of a domestic bank run and of capital flight. I also find that a control on outflows is relatively more effective than a control on inflows. Finally, I test the model's implications using the abnormal returns of Brazilian and South Korean bank stock prices as a proxy for the probability of bank runs. The second chapter analyzes the policy actions of Brazil and Chile between 2009 and the third quarter of 2011, when Brazil deployed capital account regulations and Chile intervened in its currency markets. I examine the effectiveness of each of these actions and the extent to which the actions of Brazil caused capital flow spillovers in the Chilean market. Consistent with the peer-reviewed literature on the subject, I find that capital account regulations had small but significant effects on the shifting the composition of capital inflows toward longer-term investment, on the level and volatility of the exchange rate, on asset prices, and on the ability of Brazil to have independence in monetary policy. Brazil's regulations did also temporarily cause an increase in capital flows into Chile. Chile's interventions did not have a lasting impact on the Chilean exchange rate or on asset prices beyond the initial announcements of the policies. In Brazil's case we thus conclude that Brazil's regulations helped the nation 'lean against the wind,' but were not enough to tame the 'tsunami' of post-crisis capital flows. The third chapter uses a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model calibrated to late nineteenth century parameters to show that protectionism alleviated the skilled wage gap. Had the U.S. chosen free trade instead of protective tariffs, wage inequality generally would have been higher in the post-bellum era. The imposition of high tariffs after the Civil War may have dampened what some economic historians believe to have been a long-term upward trend in inequality--the rising portion of the American-Kuznets' curve.

In the following papers I propose to construct economic models that incorporate the disastrous effect of conflict. I model conflict theoretically in a Solow growth model and empirically in a GDP per worker growth model, in a civil war onset model and a model for civil war’s severity. The first chapter theoretically and empirically analyzes economic growth with conflict in the context of the Mankiw et al. (1992) adaptation of the Solow growth model and the natural resource growth model by Sachs and Warner (1995). I incorporate a variable of capital destruction in the physical and human capital accumulation equations and derive coherent theoretical and empirical results. The second chapter considers the onset of civil war across all countries and specific subsamples of countries from 1970 to 2007. The onset of war is modeled using economic and financial variables in addition to grievance variables from the political science literature to ascertain the extent to which financial crises and hyperinflation can bring about civil war. I estimate using panel time-series logistic regression techniques and discover the risk of conflict in Africa, Asia, highly-indebted poor countries, and low income countries. Some civil wars are fought for government control and others are fought over local issues - both types of war are controlled for with their own determinants. The third chapter determines factors that significantly affect the severity of civil wars from year to year. I employ the same IV/GMM estimation techniques from Chapter 1 to discover the role of financial crises, hyperinflation, unemployment, and development assistance and aid in the severity of war.

The thesis presents three papers in macroeconomics and monetary economics with an emphasis on financial instability and crises. The first paper, entitled "Interbank Market Crises and Financial Openness," studies the effect of financial openness on financial stability by extending a closed-economy DSGE model (Boissay, Collard and Smets, 2015) to an open economy in which banks are allowed to invest abroad. Financial internationalisation in the form of outward banking flows alters the behaviour of the economy in the run up to a typical interbank crisis, reducing the role played by domestic credit build ups. Prior to an interbank crisis, the level of assets typically builds up in an economy without access to international investment opportunities. In contrast, financial openness attenuates the build up of assets during productivity booms, which reduces the likelihood of financial overheating resulting in a banking crisis once productivity reverts to trend. Simulations of the model show that the open economy would generally experience fewer banking crises in the long run compared to an economy blocked from investing abroad. This finding may not obtain in the short run, however, should the economy be subject to large negative productivity shocks consequent upon a financial opening up to the external domain. The second paper, entitled "Unconventional Monetary Policy and Asset Allocation of International Mutual Funds," a joint work with Gino Cenedese and Menno Middeldorp (both at the Bank of England), analyses the spillovers of unconventional monetary policy from the US to the Rest of the World. Using panel regressions on a fund-level data-set of globally domiciled mutual funds, the study examines the degree to which the operations and surprises of US unconventional monetary policy prompt mutual fund managers to change their portfolio country weightings. Our study permits an analysis of the portfolio choice of mutual fund managers, as differentiated from the portfolio rebalancing behaviour of their underlying investors. It allows for a quantitative examination as to whether and to what extent fund managers undo or exacerbate the allocation decisions by their respective underlying investors. Unconventional monetary policy by the US Federal Reserve is found to induce fund managers to reduce their portfolio exposure to the US whilst increasing it to other countries in the Rest of the World. Specifically, the Fed's purchases of Treasury securities trigger portfolio rebalancing in equity funds, while its acquisition of mortgage backed securities and agency debt has a minimal effect on equity and bond fund portfolio allocations. Fed policy surprises do affect the portfolio allocations of equity funds. The main results continue to hold in a number of robustness checks. An extension of the study examines portfolio rebalancing effects of policy surprises by three other major monetary authorities, the ECB, BoJ and BoE. The main focus of the paper, however, is on the broader effects of US unconventional monetary policy on the asset allocation of international mutual funds. The third paper, entitled "Sovereign Debt Negotiations as a Macroeconomic Game with Strategic Interactions among Players," aims to show that existing methods analysing games with more than two players can be usefully applied to macroeconomic games involving strategic interactions among three or more players. This is shown in the context of sovereign refinancing negotiations which are modelled as a bargaining game between three players: a debtor country in need of finance (player 1); its creditors from the international official-sector (player 2); and its foreign private-sector creditors in the form of international banks (player 3). The presence of a third player has important effects on the distribution of the gains from trade and the stability of the game if one allows for the possibility that any two players may form a coalition against another player. After deriving these general results, the model is applied to the Greek sovereign debt crisis to provide an economic application and to show that the framework can be applied to a wide range of other macroeconomic games.