Many industrial control systems use programmable logic controllers (PLCs) since they provide a highly reliable, off-the-shelf hardware platform. On the programming side, function blocks (FBs) are reusable PLC components that can be composed to implement the required system behaviour. A higher quality system may be realized if the FBs are pre-certified to be compliant with an international standard such as IEC 61131-3. Unfortunately, the set of programming notations defined in IEC 61131-3 lack well-defined formal semantics. As a result, tool vendors and users of PLCs may have inconsistent interpretations of the expected system behaviour. To address this issue, we propose an engineering method for formally verifying the conformance of candidate implementations of FBs (and their compositions) to their high-level, input-output requirements. The proposed method is sufficiently general to handle FBs supplied by IEC 61131-3, and industrial FB applications involving real-time requirements. Our method involves several steps. First, we use tabular expressions to ensure the completeness and disjointness of the requirements for the FB. Second, we formalize the candidate implementation(s) of the FB in question. Third, we state and prove theorems regarding the consistency and correctness of the FB. All three steps are performed using the Prototype Verification Systems (PVS) proof assistant. As a first case study, we apply our approach to the IEC 61131-3 standard to examine the entire library of FBs and their supplied implementations described in structured text (ST) and function block diagrams (FBDs). As a second case study, we apply our approach to two realistic sub-systems taken from the nuclear domain. Applying the proposed method, we identified three kinds of issues: ambiguous behavioural descriptions, missing assumptions, and erroneous implementations. Furthermore, we suggest solutions to these issues. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / A formal verification approach for the function block based control systems

Submitted by JÚLIO HEBER SILVA (julioheber@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-04-11T19:28:47Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Nayara de Souza Silva - 2017.pdf: 2066646 bytes, checksum: 95e09b89bf69fe61277b09ce9f1812a6 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2017-04-12T14:32:03Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Nayara de Souza Silva - 2017.pdf: 2066646 bytes, checksum: 95e09b89bf69fe61277b09ce9f1812a6 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-04-12T14:32:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Nayara de Souza Silva - 2017.pdf: 2066646 bytes, checksum: 95e09b89bf69fe61277b09ce9f1812a6 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-07 / Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de Goiás - FAPEG / The process of developing computer systems takes into account many stages, in which some are more necessary than others, depending on the purpose of the application. The implementation stage is always necessary, indisputably. Sometimes the requirements analysis and testing phases are neglected. And, generally, the part of formal verification correctness is intended for few applications. The use of model checkers has been exploited in the task of validating a behavioral specification in its appropriate level of abstraction, notably specifications validation of critical systems, especially when they involve the preservation of human life, when the existence of errors entails huge financial loss or when deals with information security. Therefore, it proposes to apply formal verification techniques in the validation of the vehicular safety system Avoiding Doored System, considered as critical, in order to verify if the implemented system faithfully meets the requirements for it proposed. For that, it was used as a tool to verify its correctness the Specification and Verification System - PVS, detailing and documenting all the steps employed in the process of specification and formal verification. K / O processo de desenvolvimento de sistemas computacionais leva em conta muitas etapas, nos quais umas são tidas mais necessárias que outras, dependendo da finalidade da aplica- ção. A etapa de implementação sempre é necessária, indiscutivelmente. Por vezes as fases de análise de requisitos e de testes são negligenciadas. E, geralmente, a parte de verifica- ção formal de corretude é destinada a poucas aplicações. O uso de verificadores de modelos tem sido explorado na tarefa de validar uma especificação comportamental no seu nível adequado de abstração, sobretudo, na validação de especificações de sistemas críticos, principalmente quando estes envolvem a preservação da vida humana, quando a existência de erros acarreta enorme prejuízo financeiro ou quando tratam com a segurança da informa- ção. Diante disso, se propõe aplicar técnicas de verificação formal na validação do sistema de segurança veicular Avoiding Doored System, tido como crítico, com o intuito de atestar se o sistema implementado atende, fielmente, os requisitos para ele propostos. Para tal, foi utilizada como ferramenta para a verificação de sua corretude o Specification and Verification System - PVS, detalhando e documentando todas as etapas empregadas no processo de especificação e verificação formal. Pal

We study the problem of secure key establishment. We critically examine the security models of Bellare and Rogaway (1993) and Canetti and Krawczyk (2001) in the computational complexity approach, as these models are central in the understanding of the provable security paradigm. We show that the partnership definition used in the three-party key distribution (3PKD) protocol of Bellare and Rogaway (1995) is flawed, which invalidates the proof for the 3PKD protocol. We present an improved protocol with a new proof of security. We identify several variants of the key sharing requirement (i.e., two entities who have completed matching sessions, partners, are required to accept the same session key). We then present a brief discussion about the key sharing requirement. We identify several variants of the Bellare and Rogaway (1993) model. We present a comparative study of the relative strengths of security notions between the several variants of the Bellare-Rogaway model and the Canetti-Krawczyk model. In our comparative study, we reveal a drawback in the Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway (2000) model with the protocol of Abdalla and Pointcheval (2005) as a case study. We prove a revised protocol of Boyd (1996) secure in the Bellare-Rogaway model. We then extend the model in order to allow more realistic adversary capabilities by incorporating the notion of resetting the long-term compromised key of some entity. This allows us to detect a known weakness of the protocol that cannot be captured in the original model. We also present an alternative protocol that is efficient in both messages and rounds. We prove the protocol secure in the extended model. We point out previously unknown flaws in several published protocols and a message authenticator of Bellare, Canetti, and Krawczyk (1998) by refuting claimed proofs of security. We also point out corresponding flaws in their existing proofs. We propose fixes to these protocols and their proofs. In some cases, we present new protocols with full proofs of security. We examine the role of session key construction in key establishment protocols, and demonstrate that a small change to the way that session keys are constructed can have significant benefits. Protocols that were proven secure in a restricted Bellare-Rogaway model can then be proven secure in the full model. We present a brief discussion on ways to construct session keys in key establishment protocols and also prove the protocol of Chen and Kudla (2003) secure in a less restrictive Bellare-Rogaway model. To complement the computational complexity approach, we provide a formal specification and machine analysis of the Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway model using an automated model checker, Simple Homomorphism Verification Tool (SHVT). We demonstrate that structural flaws in protocols can be revealed using our framework. We reveal previously unknown flaws in the unpublished preproceedings version of the protocol due to Jakobsson and Pointcheval (2001) and several published protocols with only heuristic security arguments. We conclude this thesis with a listing of some open problems that were encountered in the study.