本文從保險學之角度出發，深入探討保險契約與保險詐欺之不可分割性，闡述保險概論，說明保險契約之原理、特性、要件與制度運作等情形，逐一分析保險制度上之設計與特性，如何有遭利用、濫用之可能性。第二步說明保險詐欺之定義、成因和特徵，詳細解釋保險詐欺於我國之發展。第三步說明保險詐欺在實務上之處理模式，並討論詐欺罪可否適用保險詐欺，並探討實務上對於公共危險、詐欺罪之保險詐欺如何進行判決與判決上是否有其侷限性。第四步借鏡國外制度，介紹國外對於保險詐欺之處理方式，並詳述在刑法典上有保險詐欺之法條，作為我國立法之參考。 / This article from the point of view of insurance and in-depth discussions of the indivisibility of the insurance contract and insurance fraud, elaborate introduction to insurance, description of insurance principles, such as elements, attributes, and the system was working, individually design and characteristics analysis system of insurance, has been used, the possibility of abuse. Step description definition, causes and characteristics of insurance fraud, detailed explanation of insurance fraud in the development of our country. Step instructions processing mode of insurance fraud in the practice, and discuss fraud insurance fraud will apply, for discussion and practice of public danger, fraud insurance fraud conviction and the judgement on whether there were limitations. Fourth step learn from foreign systems, introduces the various approaches of insurance fraud, and spelled out in the criminal code on the law of insurance fraud, as a reference of our legislation.

Abstract The government, in assisting Taiwanese enterprises to compete in increasing globalization environment, imitated the European and American countries in establishing stock market, helped corporate bond issuance to finance capital projects, and in the 80¡¦s, allowed foreign investments to enter Taiwanese economy and gradually relaxing regulation to allow greater flexibilities. Because of this policy, Taiwanese Stock Market began to grow exponentially. The number of corporate IPOs mushroomed in great numbers. After 1997 Asian financial and economic crash severely damaged the market and economy. The idea of ¡§Get Rich Quick¡¨ from the West began to invade Taiwan. Many corporate upper management, especially the second generation owners of family enterprises with higher education in international financial operations, broke away from their core business operations and traditional values and began to focus on high risk investment products and speculative investment vehicles. They even use cross-shareholding of stocks, stock speculations, illegal loans and profit sharing, misleading and fraudulent financial reporting to expand their businesses. As the result of their negligence of risk management and miscalculations of economic conditions, corporations experienced severe cash crunch from investment losses and were unable to cover the cash shortage through over-leveraged assets and illegal corporate financial schemes. Many corporations crumpled, causing wide spread lay-off and significant losses by investing public. It also affects many upper, middle, and lower stream merchants, vendors, and financial institutions. The resulting chain reactions from corporate bankruptcies, reorganizations, and stock de-listings caused major ramifications in Taiwan¡¦s social, political, economic, and financial systemsDuring the more than ten years of past criminal investigations of illegal activities in public companies, the media, financial, legal and accounting experts all provided their suggestions in how to prevent these cases. However, other than providing some tabloid news on newspapers, it regrettably has not helped in assisting the investigations or in preventing new cases. This thesis summarizes the major financial and money laundering activities preventive measures, and criminal investigations in Taiwan. It will compare and analyze the various case backgrounds, methods of operations, ramifications, and legal consequences in order to find similar characteristics of these cases from past investigative experiences, evidence gatherings, money trail tracings, and legal procedures. From these analyses, the thesis will make conclusions and suggestions in hope of shortening the investigative process in future cases, so that the investigation can start on the right track immediately to prevent the domino effects on the stock market and economy and minimize damage on economic conditions, and to reach the goal of ¡§To Detect is to Prevent¡¨.

The inside is controlled to want to reach enterprise's goal , improve business efficiency , strengthening enterprise's physique , promoting the mechanism with indispensable competitiveness of enterprises, Taiwan is going through August of 1995, staff's practicing fraud case at the basic level of maximum amount in a Taiwanese financial history --After country's ticket case causes great losses of country's ticket , ' the inside is controlled ' relevant topic boiling reporting , making a self-criticism without restraint. Several things of shaking compatriots will recur again in 2003 , will include: Incident of steal and sell customer's stock , the financial card of the bank happen in the same year and is stolen by side recording , national treasurying etc. that famous in October to speak to the staff of law office of law, the relevant newspapers and magazines mention the question that ' the inside is controlled ' again, this topic causes everybody's concern once again too. This research case company, in order to set up the reason law lawyer's office of remarkable reputation for many years in the bar , only because the inside controls and causes the fraud case of breaking into the staff to defalcate improperly. This research audits the criterion communique No. 99 with U.S.A. ' check the financial statemant to the doing in the test amount that is deceived ' Three risk factors that the composition pointed out in (Conskderations of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit ) practices fraud: Inducement and pressure (incentive/pressure), five major key elements of the attitude and rationalized (attitude/rationalization ) , and the chance (opportunity ) and composition that the inside control, control the environment , risk and assess , control the activity , information and communicate and supervise etc. to analyse the production reason of the incident and disappearance of controlling the system of inside that this case practice fraud. The result shows , an office lacks the system to restrain, totally places the control of different potential risks of the office on people's moral character , must examine the system in proper and management way again in fact.

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Diss. Karlstad : Karlstads universitet, 2007.

Thesis (M.S. in Operations Research)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): Samuel E. Buttrey, Lyn R. Whitaker. Includes bibliographical references (p. 147-148). Also available online.

The basic premise of risk-based auditing is that more (fewer) audit resources should be allocated to accounts that are more (less) likely to be misstated. However, financial reporting managers can exploit such allocations by intentionally misstating balances that are less likely to draw auditor attention. If auditors do not recognize this strategic implication of risk-based auditing, undetected misstatements among ostensibly low-risk accounts could be much more common than traditional risk assessment procedures suggest. The purpose of this study is to examine whether prompting auditors to form beliefs about managers’ expectations of, and responses to, audit strategies can enhance auditors’ sensitivity to the strategic risk of fraud among accounts typically considered low-risk. Using a multi-account audit game, I find that auditors do not naturally attune to strategic risks but instead tend to focus resources on “highrisk” accounts. However, when auditors are prompted to reason strategically, they utilize more resources and devote that increase almost entirely to “low-risk” accounts. I also find that, although increasing available resources does result in an overall increase in the amount of utilized resources, the relative effect of the strategic prompt is robust to the level of available audit resources. / text

Advertising plays a vital role in supporting free websites and smart- phone apps. Click-spam, i.e., fraudulent or invalid clicks on online ads where the user has no actual interest in the advertiser's site, results in advertising revenue being misappropriated by Click-spammers. This revenue also funds malware authors through adware and malware crafted specifically for click-spammers. While some ad networks take active measures to block Click-spam today, the effectiveness of these measures is largely unknown, as they practice security-through-obscurity for fear of malicious parties reverse-engineering their systems. Moreover, advertisers and third parties have no way of independently estimating or defending against Click-spam. This work addresses the click-spam problem in three ways. It proposes the first methodology for advertisers to independently measure Click-spam rates on their ads. Using real world data collected from ten ad networks, it validates the method to identify and perform in-depth analysis on seven ongoing Click-spam attacks not currently caught by major ad networks, high- lighting the severity of Click-spam. Next, it exposes the state of Click-spam defenses by identifying twenty attack signatures that mimic Click-spam attacks in the wild (from Botnets, PTC sites, scripts) that can be easily detected by ad networks, and implements these attacks, and shows that none of the ad networks protect against all the attacks. This also shows that it's possible to reverse engineer click-fraud rules employed by ad networks in spite of the security-through-obscurity practices prominent today. Finally, it shows that it is not just possible, but also desirable to create Click-spam algorithms that do not rely on security-through-obscurity but instead on invariants that are hard for click-spammers to defeat, as such algorithms are inherently more robust and can catch a wide variety of click-fraud attacks. / text

This study uses the principal-agent framework to investigate the trade-off between the benefits of internal control stemming from a reduction of the losses from inappropriate employee actions and the cost of implementing it brought about by the possibility of collusion that it creates. It is shown that, when the agents find it relatively easy to collude, implementing internal control reduces agency welfare, defined as the sum of expected payments accruing to the principal and the agents, even as, with positive transaction costs of collusion, it improves productive efficiency, defined as the expected output. As a result, the principal, under certain conditions, finds it in her best interest to use internal control as a threat instead of implementing it. When this is the case, the principal sometimes prefers to decrease the accuracy of the accounting information system. The analysis of the agents' side contracting indicates that, even if the principal can prevent explicit collusion, for some values of parameters the possibility of tacit collusion still results in a loss. The study also investigates the effect of the choice of organizational form on the value of internal control. The analysis of two different versions of the model demonstrates that, for a wide range of parameters, creating a hierarchical structure reduces, albeit does not eliminate, the loss from collusion -- i.e., internal control and hierarchical delegation are complementary instruments of organizational design. It is also shown that, when one agent is ex ante more likely to be efficient than the other, in most cases the principal optimally appoints to the supervisory position the one who is less likely to be efficient. As a result, the supervisor, in expectation, exerts a lower effort level than the subordinate and collects higher salary. / text

Authenticity in agriculture, food and resource markets has been an ongoing policy challenge to regulators and food industries, and a major concern to consumers given the complex nature of global food supply chains and the increasing spate of market fraud reports across the world. In a bid to boost their economic return, some firms may engage in illicit activities that comprise authenticity including: adulteration, substitution of substandard products, unapproved enhancements of food products, false and misleading quality claims. Such actions, often times, create negative reputation externalities for other agri-food firms in the sector, and may also result in trade conflicts and border rejections; while consumers incur transaction (search) costs in verifying product attributes due to quality uncertainty. This dissertation focuses on collective reputation and contributes to an understanding of authenticity issues in agri-food and resource markets. The analysis examines the role of industry-led quality assurance systems and evolving technologies in enhancing authenticity signals and reducing information asymmetry in the context of market fraud and collective reputation within food and resource supply chains. This dissertation consists of three papers. Paper 1 examines technological solutions to authenticity issues in the context of international trade. The paper explores the role of an emerging authenticity technology, International Barcode of Life (IBOL) in strengthening the enforcement of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of wild fauna and flora (CITES). The focus of the analysis is CITES restrictions on commercial trade in the endangered species tree of Brazilian rosewood (Dalbergia nigra). The first paper provides an overview of the applications of the IBOL technology in species identification to date. A graphical partial equilibrium trade model examines three scenarios consisting of adoption of IBOL authenticity technology by a single major importing country, multilateral adoption, and adoption by the exporting country. The scenarios suggest that a threat of multilateral testing for the authenticity of imported rosewood could eliminate cross border commercial trade in the endangered species. Upstream testing and certification of authenticity in the exporting country could increase importers’ confidence and the demand for legally harvested rosewood. The results suggest that technological solutions to authenticity issues in international markets have the potential to reduce quality uncertainty and could act as a complement to regulatory enforcement under CITES. Paper 2 explores the industry-led Vintners Quality Alliance (VQA) quality assurance system for Canadian wines to examine how an industry seeks to signal authenticity assurances to protect its collective reputation. Hedonic and Probit models are estimated using data on wine attributes sourced from the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO). Hedonic models examine whether VQA certification, versus other collective and individual reputation signals (region, winery), elicits a price premium. The Probit analysis examines factors that determine a winery’s decision to seek VQA certification for a specific wine. The results suggest that while a number of attributes including VQA certification, percentage alcohol content, sweetness (sugar level), volume of wine supplied and vintage, have a significant influence on the price of wine, VQA adds a premium beyond other signals of reputation (winery and region). The magnitude of the effect of individual and collective reputation on the price of wine differs for the different types/colours of wine. The Probit model results suggest that wineries that supply large volumes of wine (more than 1000 cases) in Ontario and produce icewine and non-blended wines have a higher tendency of seeking VQA status. The results imply that VQA could be used as a shorthand for quality, while premium and reputation driven by authenticity in the wine industry could serve as an incentive for other agri-food industries to establish similar quality assurance systems. Paper 3 examines the incidence of mislabelling and substitution in fish markets using supply, demand and welfare analysis. The paper focuses on incentives for the private sector (retailers) or a third party to adopt IBOL technology to protect their reputation and for supply chain monitoring. The feasibility of IBOL technology for a typical retail store in Canada is assessed using a simple simulation analysis. The analysis suggests that the costs of switching to the IBOL system, the number of retailers already using the technology and their market shares are likely to influence a retailer’s adoption of the technology. The ease of catching cheaters along the fish supply chain through third party monitoring is expected to depend on the accuracy of the technology in detecting fraud, the sampling frequency (rate) and rate of species substitution; while enforcement of legal penalties and other costs would serve as a disincentive to cheat as these costs negatively affect expected profit. The simulation analysis suggests that presently IBOL technology appears to be feasible for a typical retail store in Canada if testing is done in an external facility, but may not be feasible if fixed and other costs associated with the IBOL system are considered. The paper suggests that reducing the size of the technology to a hand-held tool and coordination of small scale retailers are potential ways to make the technology affordable and expand its use.