Thesis (M.A.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 66-68). / v, 68 leaves, bound 29 cm

This experiment investigated the effect of successive threats to the same attitudinal freedom on reactance arousal. Although the effect of repeated or successive threats to freedom was not considered in the original statement of reactance theory, later research suggests there will be special effects. A series of threats in close succession may arouse greater reactance than an additive model would predict. One possible explanation for such an increase in reactance is that the initial threat makes later threats more salient. Another possibility is that the later threat helps to clarify the individual's perception of the threatener's intention; that is, repeated threats imply that the behavior is directed toward the individual with a goal in mind. A second factor in the situation is whether the threatened individual has an opportunity to restore freedom between threats. Experiments on the prior exercise of freedom imply that an intervening reassertion of freedom will weaken the effect of subsequent threats by undermining their credibility. An experimental situation was created in which subjects were introduced to a (fictional) candidate for appointive office. After reading an initial description of the candidate and completing an initial preference rating, subjects received a pair of communications advocating his selection. Then a final rating of preference was made. The first communication always contained a threat to the freedom to reject the candidate. The first variable was the presence or absence of a threat in the second communication (Two vs. One Threat). The second variable was the presence or absence of an opportunity to restore freedom between the first and second communications (Forced Restoration vs. No Restoration), in the form of an essay pointing up reasons against the selection of the candidate. It was predicted that subjects' would exhibit greater negative change (in the direction of greater opposition to the candidate) after repeated threats than after a single threat when no intervening opportunity to restore freedom was permitted. No increase in negative change after successive threats v/as expected when an intervening restoration was allowed. A third variable, whether the second communication was attributed to the original communicator or a different one (Same vs. Different Source), was added to the design to gather support for either the salience or the perceived intent explanation for repeated threat effects. If the initial threat makes later ones more salient, the source of the later threat should make no difference. If the later threat clarifies the intent behind the first, then only repeated threats from the same source should produce an increase in negative change. The results of the experiment were not arrayed as expected. The only significant increase in negative change after repeated threats did occur when no restoration came between them. However, the increase appeared when the threats had different sources rather than the same source. This pattern of results supports neither the salience nor the perceived intent explanations. In addition, the intervening restoration had an unanticipated negative effect on change. These effects were considered as partial confirmation of the hypothesis, and it was proposed that threats from different sources aroused more reactance because they were perceived as different threats, while threats from the same source were viewed as a single, extended threat. Alternative explanations were discussed and issues for future research were raised. / This thesis was digitized as part of a project begun in 2014 to increase the number of Duke psychology theses available online. The digitization project was spearheaded by Ciara Healy.

Thesis advisor: Daniel McKaughan / Thesis advisor: Liane Young / The first two-thirds of this project is an in-depth analysis of the contemporary Free Will debate as it revolves around the Libet et al, Soon et al, and Wegner et al (“Helper Hands”) experiments. The last section of the thesis illustrates in detail the following suggestions regarding the future of the Free Will debate: that there be a shift in the fundamental question of the debate, a shift in the analysis of famous neuroscientific experiments, and a shift in the formation of future experiments that test potential elements of free will. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Scholar of the College. / Discipline: Philosophy.

In this essay I will investigate some different opinions about how or whether we should change our views concerning moral responsibility if neuroscience shows that contra-causal free will is implausible and also argue that holding people morally responsible is not the best method of making people act morally. A common approach is to argue that we can hold people responsible in a non-absolute sense and many argue that this has practical benefits (i.e. that people would act more morally). I evaluate different alternatives and conclude that there are different beliefs and opinions that cause disagreement in this question. I argue that moral responsibility is implausible without the existence of contra-causal free will (because it is then just a question of luck what actions you will perform) and that it is more practical to shift our focus to other ways of changing people and not blaming them.

Inaug.-diss.--Bonn. / Published in enlarged form in Renaissance und philosophie, hft. VII, 1914, with title: Die willensfreiheit bei Laurentius Valla und bei Petrus Pomponatius.

Consider this scenario: A terrorist just bombed the subway in London, which resulted in the casualties of numerous innocent people. His act can be considered well-planned for he fully knew what consequences his act would bring. If determinism is true, is it possible that the terrorist in question bombed the subway out of free will? An incompatibilist would respond to this question with a resounding “no”. A compatibilist, on the other hand, would answer yes, as long as the terrorist possessed certain psychological characteristics, causal histories, etc. This underlies the basis of disputes between the compatibilists and incompatibilists, who appear to hold opposite views on whether it is possible for someone to act out of free will if determinism is true. However, as I shall discuss in Chapter One, this disagreement is partly a verbal one that stems from the diverse meanings of the term “free will”. This thesis aims to transcend the verbal disagreement and explore where the deeper, more substantial disagreements may lie between compatibilists and incompatibilists. One possible sphere where substantial disagreements between compatibilists and incompatibilists may lie is the content of the ordinary concept of free will, or that of the strongest sense of control condition necessary for securing the ordinary concept of moral responsibility. On this view, the metaphysical question and the conceptual question about free will are inseparable; in order to find out the metaphysical satisfaction conditions of free will, one must first identify the conceptual satisfaction conditions of free will. Further, the latter is reflected in everyday free will/ moral responsibility ascriptions about hypothetical or real scenarios. In Chapter Two, I analyze how the recent experimental philosophy movement bears on this issue. By examining the findings of some current experimental philosophy studies, I argue that neither compatibilism nor incompatibilism can sufficiently capture the ordinary concept of free will or moral responsibility. In the light of my discussions in Chapter Two, I explain in Chapter Three why each of the various traditional accounts of free will (including compatibilism, libertarianism and hard incompatibilism) cannot independently provide an adequate “package deal” of solutions for the problem of free will. Near the end of the chapter, I propose a pluralistic, agnostic account of free will as an alternative solution. Despite its great instrumental value, experimental philosophy is not widely recognized as a philosophically significant methodology. Hence, Chapter Four is devoted to discussing the actual and potential values of experimental philosophy in the light of its contribution to the free will debate. I conclude that the encounter between the free will debate and the experimental philosophy movement is a fruitful one; the former proves the value of the latter by receiving helpful insights from it. / published_or_final_version / Philosophy / Master / Master of Philosophy

Thesis (PhD)--Macquarie University (Division of Society, Culture, Media & Philosophy, Dept. of Philosophy), 2006. / Bibliography: p. 218-228.

Thesis (S.T.M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [55]-60).

Thesis (S.T.M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 2008. / Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [55]-60).

Thesis (Th. M.)--Westminster Theological Seminary (Philadelphia, Pa.), 2008. / Typescript. Includes vita. Description based on Print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 227-241).