Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1980. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 130-139).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2005. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains x, 159 p.; also includes graphics. Includes bibliographical references (p. 148-159). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center

Thesis (M. Div. with Concentration : Christian Care and Counseling)--Emmanuel School of Religion, 2006. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 46-49).

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This project will contribute to our understanding of both Aristotle’s theory of friendship in particular and friendship as a philosophical topic in general. Chapter 1 focuses on explaining what Aristotle means when he says that friendship either is a virtue or is similar to virtue. Specifically, he claims that friendship is like a hexis prohairetikē (a state which chooses). This phrasing is remarkably similar to his description of the character virtues, and it invites comparison between the two kinds of states. In Chapter 2 I examine the common scholarly suggestion that Aristotle’s taxonomy of pleasure- utility- and virtue-based friendships is closely linked to the motivations that individuals have when they pursue friendship. By focusing on Aristotle’s remarks on the time it takes to properly establish a friendship, I develop a view of Aristotle on which the motivations that a person has for pursuing a friendship often uncouple from the kind of friendship they succeed in forming. In Chapter 3 I defend Aristotle’s account of friendship from three common contemporary objections. Some scholars believe that Aristotle is too strict in his account of friendship, that only truly good people can be friends, that many friendships on Aristotle’s account are not truly friendship, and that Aristotle is wrong about vicious peoples’ ability to form friendships. I reply to each objection. In chapter 4 I follow Aristotle in arguing that we should understand goodness of character as a necessary, grounding feature of friendship. In so doing, I disagree with those contemporary scholars who do not follow Aristotle on this point, insisting instead that two individuals can be friends without being good, and their friendship can be about bad or immoral things and activities. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / In this dissertation, I explore and defend underappreciated and misunderstood features of Aristotle’s theory of friendship. Aristotle’s account of friendship is one of the foundational texts for contemporary philosophical discussions of friendship. Understanding Aristotle on his own terms is therefore important to carrying on these discussions. Furthermore, I argue that when his view is understood in the ways that I suggest, it is more philosophically defensible and psychologically plausible than is often supposed. I show that, for Aristotle, friendship and virtue are importantly connected; that his view on friendship’s development tracks with many of our contemporary intuitions; and that his view is defensible against several common contemporary objections. Finally, I defend Aristotle’s claim that goodness of character is an essential aspect of friendship and highlight the advantages this view offers contemporary discussions of friendship.

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Thesis advisor: Daniel J. Daly / Thesis advisor: James F. Keenan / This thesis examines the concept of Fihavanana in Malagasy morality, characterized by the promotion of life in its fullness. Currently, global and local socio-political crises have resulted in significantly increased violence in Malagasy society. It reviews and examines the concept of Fihavanana through the lens of Christian friendship as expressed in scriptural and Christian tradition. The thesis endeavors to assess and guide the Malagasy response to the loss of social friendship and increase in deadly violence in the nation. It interprets Fihavanana through Christian friendship rooted in charity to arrive at a principle that can be embraced at the national level. Fihavanana thus interpreted is a norm of Christian ethics for life that can shape and guide Malagasy morality to build (re-build) a peaceful and harmonious society. / Thesis (STL) — Boston College, 2023. / Submitted to: Boston College. School of Theology and Ministry. / Discipline: Sacred Theology.

One of the problems in human relationships is to determine what factors enter into friendship. One method of investigating this is to study traits as compared between reciprocal and unreciprocal friendships. This present study is an effort to make contributions towards this problem.