Thesis (M.A.)--University of Buffalo. / Bibliography: p. [98]-100.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Virginia, 1932. / Without thesis note. Bibliography: p. 181-190.

Univ., Diss.-2005--Göttingen, 2004. / Literaturverz. S. 233 - 243.

Thesis--Wisconsin. / Title from title screen (viewed July 3, 2008). Includes bibliographical references (p. 59-64). Online version of the print original.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 1938. / Published also without thesis note. Bibliography: p. 92-113.

Thesis--Wisconsin. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 59-64).

No description available.

Texte remanié de: Thèse de doctorat--Architecture--Genève, 2003. Titre de soutenance : La maison Dymaxion de R. Buckminster Fuller et autres machines habitables du XXe siècle. / Bibliogr. p. 239-246. Index. Bibliogr.

This thesis offers a reading of the legal philosophy of the mid-twentieth century legal scholar, Lon L. Fuller. By illuminating how Fuller’s vision of law gravitates constantly to the relationship between the form of law and the status of the legal subject as an agent, this reading provides a basis for revisiting the issues in dispute in his famous exchanges with the legal positivist philosopher, H.L.A. Hart. The thesis as a whole seeks to meet two main objectives. First, I seek to demonstrate how Fuller’s persistent concern for the way that the form of law instantiates respect for the legal subject lends his legal philosophy a coherence that has been insufficiently appreciated to this point. Second, I seek to elaborate the claim that once we appreciate the centrality of the relationship between legal form and agency to Fuller’s thought, we come to understand why he insisted that law can and should be distinguished from other modes of ordering, and why it must also be regarded as distinctively moral.

This thesis offers a reading of the legal philosophy of the mid-twentieth century legal scholar, Lon L. Fuller. By illuminating how Fuller’s vision of law gravitates constantly to the relationship between the form of law and the status of the legal subject as an agent, this reading provides a basis for revisiting the issues in dispute in his famous exchanges with the legal positivist philosopher, H.L.A. Hart. The thesis as a whole seeks to meet two main objectives. First, I seek to demonstrate how Fuller’s persistent concern for the way that the form of law instantiates respect for the legal subject lends his legal philosophy a coherence that has been insufficiently appreciated to this point. Second, I seek to elaborate the claim that once we appreciate the centrality of the relationship between legal form and agency to Fuller’s thought, we come to understand why he insisted that law can and should be distinguished from other modes of ordering, and why it must also be regarded as distinctively moral.