Thesis advisor: Richard J. Arnott / This dissertation comprises three papers that are concerned with the implications of strategic interactions between a finite set of agents in private goods economies. One form of strategic behavior I consider arises in a social network when the consumption decisions of agents are influenced by those around them. The other form of strategic behavior I consider arises when agents bargain with one another. The first paper focuses on undirected networks in which consumers care about the average of their neighbors' consumption. The main contribution is to show how social networks affect equilibrium prices. I show that if every consumer has the same number of neighbors, then each consumer's influence on the market is independent of the number of neighbors. Due to the tradeoff between more neighbors responding and less sensitive responses, greater network intensity may not result in greater average influence of all consumers. In addition, I show that a consumer who is central in the network may not have the highest influence on the market because of the need to consider not only the number of neighbors that he has or his distances to other consumers, but also the number of neighbors that his neighbors have. The second paper examines strategic consumption in a directed network. The main contribution is to show how directed networks affect equilibrium outcomes. I show how the critical and promising links, and the key players in a social network can be identified. In doing so, I introduce the impact centrality and reaction centrality measures, and show how these measures are used to determine the effects on aggregate centrality of removing any agent from the network, and of removing or adding any directed link. The third paper considers bargaining under two-sided incomplete information in a market with multiple buyers and sellers, each with either high or low independent private values. I show that there exists a mechanism that guarantees efficient trading outcomes even when gains from trade are uncertain. The main contribution of this paper to show that a large number of traders is not necessary to guarantee efficient trading if there are at least as many sellers as there are buyers, and there is at least one low valuation buyer. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.

Chan King Pak Keven = 競爭性系統個體模型中的策略動態、決策及整體表現 / 陳景柏. / Thesis submitted in: August 2005. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves vii-viii (4th gp.)). / Text in English; abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chan King Pak Keven = Jing zheng xing xi tong ge ti mo xing zhong de ce lüe dong tai, jue ce ji zheng ti biao xian / Chen Jingbo. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Review on the Minority Game --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1 --- Background --- p.5 / Chapter 2.2 --- Model of MG --- p.6 / Chapter 2.3 --- Features --- p.7 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Phase Transition --- p.7 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Inefficient and Efficient Phase --- p.8 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- Anti-persistence --- p.9 / Chapter 2.3.4 --- Data Collapse --- p.10 / Chapter 2.4 --- Existing Theories --- p.10 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- Reduced Strategy Space --- p.11 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- The Crowd-Anticrowd Theory --- p.12 / Chapter 2.5 --- Summary --- p.13 / Chapter 3 --- Introduction to Strategy Ranking Theory --- p.15 / Chapter 3.1 --- Strategy Ranking Theory for Mean Success Rate --- p.15 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- Time evolution of Virtual Point Ranking --- p.15 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Winning Probability for m = 1 --- p.17 / Chapter 3.2 --- Calculation of Mean Success Rate --- p.21 / Chapter 3.3 --- "Size Dependence of weυen(K) (""Market Impact"" Effect)" --- p.23 / Chapter 3.4 --- Size Dependence of wodd、K) (Uneven Distribution of Agents into Split Ranks) --- p.25 / Chapter 4 --- Implementation of Strategy Ranking Theory --- p.30 / Chapter 4.1 --- Feature of wodd(k) for higher m --- p.30 / Chapter 4.2 --- Derivation of wodd(k) from Strategy Ranking Theory --- p.32 / Chapter 4.3 --- Proof of Eq. (4.14) --- p.36 / Chapter 4.4 --- Discussion on wodd(k) --- p.41 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- Asymptotic Behavior of wodd(k) --- p.42 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Finite size correction of wodd(k) --- p.43 / Chapter 5 --- Applications of Strategy Ranking Theory --- p.46 / Chapter 5.1 --- Probability Density Function of Agents Making a Particular Choice --- p.46 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- Odd time steps： k = 1 --- p.47 / Chapter 5.1.2 --- Odd time steps： k = 2 --- p.48 / Chapter 5.1.3 --- "Rodd,K" --- p.49 / Chapter 5.1.4 --- Even time steps --- p.51 / Chapter 5.1.5 --- Overall Attendance Distribution --- p.51 / Chapter 5.2 --- The Variance of the Attendance --- p.52 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Asymptotic behavior of the variance --- p.54 / Chapter 5.3 --- Anti-persistent Nature of Efficient Phase of MG --- p.55 / Chapter 5.4 --- Summary --- p.58 / Chapter 6 --- Strategy Ranking Theory and Crowd-Anticrowd Theory --- p.59 / Chapter 6.1 --- Introduction --- p.59 / Chapter 6.1.1 --- Strategy Ranking Theory --- p.60 / Chapter 6.1.2 --- Crowd-Anticrowd Theory --- p.61 / Chapter 6.2 --- Crowd-Anticrowd Theory with Ranking Patterns Characterized by k --- p.63 / Chapter 6.3 --- Variance: Crowd-Anticrowd Theory --- p.65 / Chapter 6.3.1 --- m = 1 --- p.65 / Chapter 6.3.2 --- m = 2 --- p.66 / Chapter 6.4 --- Variance： Modified Crowd-Anticrowd Theory for m̐ơح 1 --- p.66 / Chapter 6.4.1 --- k = 0 --- p.67 / Chapter 6.4.2 --- k = 1 --- p.67 / Chapter 6.4.3 --- k = 2 --- p.67 / Chapter 6.4.4 --- Sum over all k --- p.68 / Chapter 6.5 --- Variance: Modified Crowd-Ant icrowd Theory for m=2 --- p.68 / Chapter 6.5.1 --- k = 3 --- p.69 / Chapter 6.5.2 --- k = 4 --- p.70 / Chapter 6.5.3 --- Sum over all k --- p.71 / Chapter 6.6 --- "Strategy Ranking Theory Expressed in (Nkl-Nk,(l)" --- p.71 / Chapter 6.7 --- Summary --- p.73 / Chapter 7 --- Variance of the Attendance in MG: Data Collapse --- p.75 / Chapter 7.1 --- Previous Studies --- p.75 / Chapter 7.2 --- Attempt 1 --- p.76 / Chapter 7.2.1 --- Understanding from the Existing Theories --- p.76 / Chapter 7.2.2 --- Numerical Results --- p.79 / Chapter 7.3 --- Attempt 2 --- p.80 / Chapter 7.3.1 --- Modification Based on αc ß 1/2 --- p.81 / Chapter 7.3.2 --- Numerical Results --- p.81 / Chapter 7.4 --- Summary --- p.82 / Chapter 8 --- Minority Game in Networked Population --- p.83 / Chapter 8.1 --- Introduction --- p.83 / Chapter 8.2 --- Model --- p.84 / Chapter 8.3 --- Numerical Results --- p.85 / Chapter 8.4 --- Classification of Predictors --- p.86 / Chapter 8.4.1 --- Major Classification of Predictors - Hamming Distance D --- p.87 / Chapter 8.4.2 --- "Minor Classification of Predictors - Dynamical Ranking (k,1)" --- p.88 / Chapter 8.4.3 --- "Using the Classification (k,l, D)" --- p.89 / Chapter 8.5 --- "Winning Probability of a Predictor (wk,l,d)" --- p.89 / Chapter 8.5.1 --- "Odd Steps, k = 1" --- p.90 / Chapter 8.5.2 --- "Odd Steps, k = 2" --- p.91 / Chapter 8.6 --- Number of Predictors --- p.93 / Chapter 8.7 --- Mean Success Rate of Non-networked MG： m = 1 --- p.93 / Chapter 8.8 --- "Cluster Size of a Predictor (sk,l,D)" --- p.95 / Chapter 8.9 --- Mean Success Rate of Networked MG --- p.97 / Chapter 8.9.1 --- With wK(even)=0.5 --- p.97 / Chapter 8.9.2 --- "Modification of wK(even) Using skl,D" --- p.98 / Chapter 8.9.3 --- Modification of Using Modified wK(even) --- p.100 / Chapter 8.10 --- Variance of the Attendance in Networked MG --- p.101 / Chapter 8.11 --- Attendance Distribution --- p.103 / Chapter 8.12 --- A Network-type Independent Approach --- p.104 / Chapter 8.12.1 --- Degree Depending Success Rate --- p.104 / Chapter 8.12.2 --- Evaluating w(k) --- p.107 / Chapter 8.12.3 --- Application on Random Graph as Underlying Network --- p.108 / Chapter 8.13 --- The Position of the Minimum Variance --- p.108 / Chapter 8.14 --- Summary --- p.110 / Chapter 9 --- Conclusion --- p.111 / Bibliography --- p.115

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 130-135).

Multicast is a bandwidth efficient mechanism to provide wireless services for a group of nodes. Providing reliable wireless multicast is challenging due to channel fading. This thesis investigates cooperation among receiving nodes to enhance the reliability of wireless multicast. A time division based cooperative multicast strategy is proposed, and the optimal scheduling scheme is found to maximize the system throughput. It is shown that the optimal relay number is bounded by a threshold, and the optimal time allocation can be found using an efficient algorithm. Numerical results show that the proposed strategy can enhance network performance when the average channel condition between receiving nodes is better than that of the direct link. To provide incentive for cooperation, this thesis further studies the interactions among selfish nodes using game theoretic approaches. The cooperative multicast process is modeled as a repeated game and the desired cooperation state which satisfies the absolute fairness and the Pareto optimality criteria is found. A Worst Behavior Tit-for-Tat incentive strategy is designed to enforce cooperation and its effectiveness is studied under both the perfect and the imperfect monitoring scenarios. To address the issue of imperfect monitoring, an interval based estimation method is proposed. Simulation results show that the proposed strategy can enforce cooperation efficiently even the monitoring is imperfect. / Signal and Image Processing

Automated devices enabled by wireless communications are deployed for a variety of purposes. As they become more ubiquitous, their interaction becomes increasingly important for coexistence when sharing a scarce resource, and for leveraging potential cooperation to achieve larger design goals. This thesis investigates the use of game theory as a tool for design and analysis of networked systems of automated devices in the areas of naval defence, wireless environmental monitoring through sensor networks, and cognitive radio wireless communications. In the first part, decentralized operation of naval platforms deploying electronic countermeasures against missile threats is studied. The problem is formulated as a stochastic game in which platforms independently plan and execute dynamic strategies to defeat threats in two situations: where coordination is impossible due to lack of communications, and where platforms hold different objectives but can coordinate, according to the military doctrine of Network Enabled Operations. The result is a flexible, robust model for missile deflection for advanced naval groups. Next, the problem of cooperative environmental monitoring and communication in energy-constrained wireless sensor networks is considered from a game-theoretic perspective. This leads to novel protocols in which sensors cooperatively trade off performance with energy consumption with low communication and complexity overhead. Two key results are an on-line adaptive learning algorithm for tracking the correlated equilibrium set of a slowly varying sensor deployment game, and an analysis of the equilibrium properties of threshold policies in a game with noisy, correlated measurements. Finally, the problem of dynamic spectrum access for systems of cognitive radios is considered. A game theoretic formulation leads to a scheme for competitive bandwidth allocation which respects radios' individual interests while enforcing fairness between users. An on-line adaptive learning scheme is again proposed for negotiating fair, equilibrium resource allocations, while dynamically adjusting to changing conditions.

Corruption is an important social and ethical problem / fight with it requires changes in values, norms and behavioral patterns of the society. This is usually a long and difficult process. Decades should pass to change deep values of a society. In the mean time, it is possible to combat corruption by changing incentive structures in the economy. If deep causes of the problem are analyzed carefully, a new system of governance can be established, such that, even most opportunist individuals do not find getting involved in corrupt practices profitable. Aim of this thesis is to examine characteristics of the system providing a fertile environment for corruption and to figure out factors stimulating corrupt transactions using game theoretical models. The first two models examine corruption as a kind of transaction between the briber and the bribee. In the models, it is shown that intermediaries sector occur from the profit maximization behavior of agents. This sector, by establishing long term, trust based relationships with bureaucrats, decreases risks occurring from the fact that the two parties involved in a corrupt transaction do not know each other perfectly. This sector, by reducing the likelihood of detection, serves corrupt transactions, and in return for the service it provided, takes commission, so gets benefit. Third model examines a strange type of corruption, a case of (spurious) middlemen obtaining bribe from the public service bureaucrats give, by pretending that he has influence on the acceptance or speed of it. The model tries to detect the characteristics of the environment making such a deception process persistent.

We study the connectivity properties of the Internet graph and its impact on its structure.

The fundamental objective of sensor networks underpinning a variety of applications is the collection of reliable information from the surrounding environment. The correctness of the collected data is especially important in applications involving societal welfare and safety, in which the acquired information may be utilized by end-users for decision-making. The distributed nature of sensor networks and their deployment in unattended and potentially hostile environments, however, renders this collection task challenging for both scalar and visual data. In this work we propose and address the twin problem of carrying out and defending against a stealthy attack on the information gathered by a sensor network at the physical sensing layer as perpetrated by a competing hostile network. A stealthy attack in this context is an intelligent attempt to disinform a sensor network in a manner that mitigates attack discovery. In comparison with previous sensor network security studies, we explicitly model the attack scenario as an active competition between two networks where difficulties arise from the pervasive nature of the attack, the possibility of tampering during data acquisition prior to encryption, and the lack of prior knowledge regarding the characteristics of the attack. We examine the problem from the perspective of both the hostile and the legitimate network. The interaction between the networks is modeled as a game where a stealth utility is derived and shown to be consistent for both players in the case of stealthy direct attacks and stealthy cross attacks. Based on the stealth utility, the optimal attack and defense strategies are obtained for each network. For the legitimate network, minimization of the attacker’s stealth results in the possibility of attack detection through established paradigms and the ability to mitigate the power of the attack. For the hostile network, maximization of the stealth utility translates into the optimal attack avoidance. This attack avoidance does not require active communication among the hostile nodes but rather relies on a level of coordination which we quantify. We demonstrate the significance and effectiveness of the solution for sensor networks acquiring scalar and multidimensional data such as surveillance sequences and relate the results to existing image sensor networks. Finally we discuss the implications of these results for achieving secure event acquisition in unattended environments.

This dissertation is a compilation of essays highlighting the usefulness of game theory in understanding socio-economic phenomena. The second chapter tries to provide a reason for the strict codes of conduct that have been imposed on unmarried girls in almost every society at some point of time in its history using tools from classical game theory. If men prefer to marry submissive women, then parents of girls will have an incentive to signal the submissiveness of their daughters in various ways in order to attract better matches. At the same time, parents will find it costlier to signal the submissiveness of girls who are not really submissive. This line of reasoning thus helps us interpret phenomena such as veiling, footbinding, and sequestration of women in general as signals of submissiveness. The third chapter attempts to rationalize some of the ad hoc rules proposed for dividing a bankrupt estate using tools from evolutionary game theory. The ad hoc rules differ from each other because of the axioms that are imposed in addition to efficiency and claims boundedness. Efficiency requires that the estate be completely divided between the claimants, and claims boundedness requires that no claimant be awarded more than her initial contribution. This dissertation tries to show that an ad hoc rule can be rationalized as the unique self-enforcing long run outcome of Young's [46] evolutionary bargaining model by using certain intuitive rules for the Nash demand game. In the fourth chapter I present a simple model of conflict over inputs in an economy with ill-defined property rights. Agents produce output from the land they hold, which in turn can be allocated to consumption or the production of guns. There is no agency to enforce rights over the initial land holdings, and the future holdings of land are determined using a contest success function that depends on the guns produced by both agents. I characterize the equilibria in which only one, both, and none of the agents produce guns, as a function of the total land and the inequality of initial land holdings for general forms of utility, production, cost, and contest success functions.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009. / Thesis Advisor: Bordetsky, Alex. Second Reader: Greenshields, Brian. "December 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 27, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Teaming and collaboration of manned and unmanned aircraft. Includes bibliographical references (p. 59-61). Also available in print.