Zugl.: Bochum, Universiẗat, Diss., 1997.

Inaugdiss. rer. pol. Bern, 1992. / Erschien ebenfalls in der Schriftenreihe "Berner Beiträge zur Nationalökonomie ; Bd. 66. Literaturverz.: S. 213-225.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität St. Gallen, 1998.

Erasmus Univ., Diss.--Rotterdam, 2006. / Zsfassung in niederländ. und pol. Sprache.

Univ., Diss.--St. Gallen, 2004.

Zugleich: Diss. Mannheim, 2001. / Literaturverz.

China’s monetary policy aims to reach two final targets: a paramount economical target (i.e. price stability) and a less important political target (i.e. economic growth). The main actor of monetary policy is the central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBC). But the PBC is a non-independent central bank. The State Council approves the goals of monetary policy. Very limited instrument independence means that interest rates cannot be set at the PBC’s discretion, and in-sufficient personal independence fails to insulate central bank officials from political influence. Monetary policy in China applies to two sets of monetary policy instruments: (i) instruments of the PBC; and (ii) non-central bank policy instruments. The instruments of the PBC include price-based indirect and quantity-based direct instruments. Non-central bank policy instruments include price and wage controls. The simultaneous usage of all these instruments leads to various distortions that ultimately prevent the interest rate channel of monetary transmission from functioning. Moreover, the strong influences of quantity-based direct instruments and non-central bank policy instruments bring into question the approach of indirect monetary policy in general. The PBC officially follows the monetary targeting approach with monetary aggregates as intermediate targets. Domestic loan growth and the exchange rate are defined as additional intermediate targets. In an in-depth analysis of the intermediate targets two main issues are primarily explored: (i) Are the intermediate targets of the Chinese monetary policy controllable? (ii) Is a sufficient relationship between these targets and the inflation rate observable? It is then shown that monetary aggregates are very difficult to control, but they have a satisfactory relationship with the inflation rate. Similarly, domestic loan growth is difficult to control – a fact largely attributed to the interest rate elasticity of loans – while there is a particularly close relationship between credit growth and the inflation rate. The exchange rate as an intermediate target can be controlled through foreign exchange market interventions; at the same time the exchange rate appears to have a significant relationship to the domestic inflation rate. Discussing the special issue of sterilizing foreign exchange inflows, the study concludes that between 2002 and 2008 not only no costs were incurred by sterilization operations, but that the central bank was actually able to realize a profit through foreign exchange market interventions. Based on this, it is concluded that the exchange rate target has not adversely affected the domestic orientation of monetary policy on the whole. The final part of the study examines whether there are any alternative monetary policy approaches that may be able to describe the policy approach in China; special focus is placed on nominal GDP targeting, the Taylor rule, and inflation targeting. A literature review reveals that the concept of nominal GDP targeting may be able to detect inflationary tendencies in the economy and, in combination with other indicators, it could be a suitable concept to assess the overall economic situation. The author calculates a Taylor rule for China from 1994 to 2008 and concludes that there is no close relationship between the PBC lending and the Taylor rate. The author then designs an augmented Taylor rule expanded to include a credit component (credit-augmented Taylor rule). The study shows that the augmented Taylor rule does not perform much better than the original one, but that it maps high inflationary periods relatively well. This is attributed to direct interventions into the credit markets, which have played a major role in combating inflationary cycles over the past decades. The analysis ends with an introduction of the concept of inflation targeting and an examination of whether this could describe monetary policy in China. It is clear that the PBC does not currently follow the inflation targeting approach, although the Chinese authorities could actually be able to influence inflation expectations effectively, not least through direct instruments such as price controls. The author notes that the PBC indeed had a good track record of fighting inflation between 1994 and 2008, and that this may now indicate a good time to think about introducing inflation targeting in China. The central conclusion of the study is that the proven gradual approach to economic and monetary reforms in China is reaching its limit. To break the vicious cycle that relies on the continuous use of quantity-based instruments to compensate for the ineffective price-based instruments – which in turn arises from the simultaneous use of both types of instruments – a complete shift away from quantity-based instruments is needed. Only then the approach of indirect monetary policy, which was officially introduced in 1998, could come into full play. / Chinas Geldpolitik verfolgt zwei Endziele: Ein alles überragendes wirtschaftliches Ziel (d.h. Preisstabilität) und ein weniger wichtiges politisches Ziel (d.h. Wirtschaftswachstum). Der Hauptakteur der Geldpolitik ist die Zentralbank, die People's Bank of China (PBC). Aber die PBC ist eine nicht-unabhängige Zentralbank. Der Staatsrat genehmigt die Ziele der Geldpolitik, und eine sehr begrenzte Instrumenten-Unabhängigkeit bedeutet, dass die Zinsen nicht vollständig nach dem Ermessen der PBC festgelegt werden können. Die ungenügende personelle Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbank schafft es nicht, die Amtsträger dem politischen Einfluss zu entziehen. Der Geldpolitik in China stehen zwei Arten von geldpolitischen Instrumenten zur Verfügung: (i) Instrumente der PBC; und (ii) Politische nicht-Notenbank Instrumente. Die Instrumente der PBC beinhalten preis-basierte indirekte und quantität-basierte direkte Instrumente. Zu den politischen nicht-Notenbank Instrumenten zählen Preis- und Lohnkontrollen. Die gleichzeitige Nutzung dieser Instrumente führt zu vielerei Verzerrungen, die letztlich verhindern, dass der Zinskanal des monetären Transmissionsmechanismus funktionieren kann. Darüber hinaus stellen die starken Einflüsse der quantität-basierten direkten Instrumente und der politischen nicht-Notenbank Instrumente den Ansatz der indirekten Geldpolitik im Allgemeinen in Frage.

This dissertation studies the interrelations between housing markets and monetary policy from three different perspectives. First, it identifies housing finance specific shocks and analyzes their impact on the broader economy and, most importantly, the systematic monetary policy reaction to such mortgage sector disturbances. Second, it investigates the implications of the institutional arrangement of a currency union for the potential buildup of a housing bubble in a member country of the monetary union by, inter alia, fostering border-crossing capital flows and ultimately residential investment activity. This dissertation, third, quantifies the effects of autonomous monetary policy shifts on the macroeconomy and, in particular, on housing markets by conditioning on financial sector conditions. From a methodological perspective, the dissertation draws on time-series econometrics like vector autoregressions (VARs) or local projections models. / In dieser Dissertation werden die Wechselwirkungen zwischen Geldpolitik und Immobilienmärkten empirisch untersucht. Hierbei beleuchtet die Arbeit potentielle Interaktionen aus drei unterschiedlichen Perspektiven: Erstens wird die systematische Reaktion von Geldpolitik auf veränderte Immobilienfinanzierungskonditionen untersucht. Zweitens wird der Einfluss des institutionellen Rahmens einer Währungsunion auf die Entstehung von Immobilienblasen in Teilen der Währungsunion analysiert und drittens werden die Effekte exogener Zinsimpulse auf die Makroökonomie und vor allen Dingen auf Häusermärkte quantifiziert, wobei für die Analyse solcher Effekte explizit Interdependenzen mit Finanzmarktkonditionen Berücksichtigung finden. Methodisch kommen zum Zwecke dieser Analysen vor allem zeitreihenökonometrische Ansätze wie Vektor-Autoregressionen (VAR) oder lokale Projektions-Modelle zur Anwendung.

Zugl.: Eichstätt, Ingolstadt, Univ. Diss., 2009

Teilw. zugl.: Wien, Univ., Magisterarbeit, 2001