Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references. / This thesis contains two chapters. Chapter One provides definitive evidence about the effect of discretionary current accruals on the pricing of IPOs. Specifically, I seek to discriminate between two alternative explanations for the prior findings: 1) behavioral biases coupled with limited arbitrage; and 2) the sample- and period-specific nature of the results in the prior literature. Using hand-gathered accrual data for all IPOs from 1926 to 1961 and machine-readable accrual data for all IPOs from 1962 to 1998, I obtain the following results. First, I fail to observe a negative association between discretionary current accruals and subsequent price performance for the 1926 to 1971 period. Second, my analysis reveals that the pattern of cross-sectional evidence is inconsistent with the predictions made by behavioral theories. Third, in the 1972 to 1998 period, evidence of predictable negative performance attributable to IPO discretionary current accruals is limited to NASDAQ firms. Overall, these findings are difficult to reconcile with mispricing as an outcome of investor behavioral biases correlated across individuals. Chapter Two examines how financial statement informativeness, analyst following, and company news relate to the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Corporations' timely disclosures of value relevant information and information collection by outsiders reduce information asymmetry, limiting insiders' ability to trade profitably on private information. We use the profitability and intensity of insider trades to proxy for information asymmetry. We find that increased analyst following is associated with reduced profitability of insider trades and reduced insider purchases. Financial statement / (cont.) informativeness is negatively associated with the frequency of insider purchases. However, company news, good or bad, is positively associated with insider purchase frequency. / by Xu Li. / Ph.D.

This study provides a test of the proposition that a unique agency cost (induced by windfall interest earnings) has a significant impact on both the money left on the table and underpricing costs of initial public offerings (IPOs) of China-related enterprises (H-shares and Red-chips). This arises from the advanced payment, non-discretionary allocation mechanism adopted by HKEx. The agency cost stems from an asymmetry in the accounting treatment of the reporting of interest income (if any) generated from the public subscribers' application fund, and the often significant, but unreported, underpricing cost. This important point appears to have been first pointed out by Ritter and Welch (2002). For Chinese state enterprises the manager who is overseeing the listing process has little (if any) incentive to maximize the offer price or new equity capital from an IPO but may benefit directly and/or indirectly from the significant interest earnings that can be generated from public subscribers' monies. This occurs when the controlling shareholder (the State) is either uninformed about the true value of the firm and/or due to other considerations allows the manager to offer a deeply discounted offer price. The deep discount raises the public subscription rate and increases the interest income from the application funds. Using the prolonged zero interest rate regime following the bankruptcy of Lehman, the study finds strong support for the proposition and shows that H-shares and Red-chips have offered significantly less money on the table and hence incurred substantially lower underpricing costs relative to Other categories of shares. This is in marked contrast to the pre-global financial crisis period when there were significant interest rates on deposits. The study contributes to the literature on the differential concerns of managers and owners in the IPO process.

Thesis (LL.M. (Labour Law))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2008.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 108-125).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, 2006. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains v, 163 p. : ill. (some col.). Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, June 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2008. Graduate Programme in Administration. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 147-150). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:NR45994

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Lehigh University, 2004. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 98-109).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, December 2003. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2003. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 44-46).