Conn., University, Diss--New Haven.

Thesis--Wisconsin. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 221-228).

Originally presented as the author's thesis (Ph. D.)--Yale. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 169-200) and index.

Thesis--University of Wisconsin--Madison. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 323-342).

Thesis (M.A.)--Scarman Centre for the Study of Public Order, University of Leicester in association with School of Professional and Continuing Education, University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 90-95) Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 241-246).

Thesis (M. P. A.)--Texas State University-San Marcos, 2004. / "Fall 2004." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 83-86).

Thesis (Ph. D.) -- University of New Mexico, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 170-183).

No description available.

Is there a general moral duty to obey the law because it is the law? This is the question of political obligation. The issue of political obligation is allegedly a central topic of political philosophy, because political obligation is often assumed to be necessary for state legitimacy; that is to say, for a state to be legitimate, it must be capable of imposing political obligation on the governed. Nonetheless, the literature has indicated that it is enormously difficult, at least within the liberal doctrine that many find most attractive, to justify political obligation. Given that political obligation is viewed as an indispensable part of state legitimacy, skepticism about political obligation points to a seemingly inescapable yet disturbing conclusion: no existing liberal state is legitimate, no matter how just it is. This skeptical position is also known as philosophical anarchism. This study aims to show that philosophical anarchism is not as irresistible as it appears. But I do not take the traditional approach of refuting philosophical anarchism by defending or developing theories of political obligation. On the contrary, I devote the first part of my thesis to consolidating the skepticism about political obligation. The approach I favor is to argue that political obligation is not necessary for state legitimacy. If this point can be established, then even if political obligation is unjustified, it will not automatically lead to philosophical anarchism. This constitutes the second part of my thesis, where I develop a conception of “legitimacy without political obligation” and defend it against the objection that it is either conceptually or morally wrong to claim that a legitimate state need not impose political obligation on its subjects. / published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy