This thesis examines the debate between the auctioning of green house gas permits vs. the free distribution of green house gas permits, also known as grandfathering. The authors’ purpose is to discover which allocation system is more suited under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). To help draw the conclusion, data and views have been collected from different known researchers within the emission trading field and – compared to different theories and the view of the authors. Evidence suggested that auctioning as an allocation system is more efficient than a system based solely on free allocation (e.g. grandfathering). Evidence of this can be found in the electricity sector by comparing the electricity prices the consumer stand to pay before and after the producing firm receives there emission rights for free. When the producing firms receive their emission rights free of charge they stand with the option to sell their rights or to use them in their production. By selling its electricity the producers wants to recover their forgone opportunity and can do so via the price paid for by the consumer. By also looking at the two systems under distribution one can also see that auctioning is more efficient since under this system, the polluters end up buying the right to pollute from the public. With a system based on grandfathering, the affected firms under EU ETS will receive windfall profits when given the emission rights for free as they can choose to store and sell the rights at a later date. / Denna kandidatuppsats undersöker debatten kring auktionering vs. gratis tilldelning av utsläppsrätter även kallat grandfathering. Målet med uppsatsen är att fastslå vilket tilldelningssystem som är bättre anpassat för användning i Europeiska Unionens handelssystem med utsläppsrätter, (EU ETS). För att komma fram till en slutsats, har författarna samlat data och teori från diverse kända forskare inom området och jämfört dessa med sina egna ekonomiska teorier och tankar. I rapporten framgår det att auktionering som tilldelningssystem är sannolikt mer effektivt än ett tilldelningssystem baserat enbart på gratis tilldelning. Detta går att påvisa bland annat genom att jämföra priset av elektricitet som konsumenten får betala både innan och efter att företagen erhållit gratis utsläppsrätter. När företagen som verkar inom energisektorn får sina utsläppsrätter gratis står de med möjligheten att sälja dem vidare eller att använda sig av dem. På så vis om företagen väljer att producera elektricitet kan de inte längre sälja sina utsläppsrätter och måste på så sätt kompensera detta beslut, vilket de ofta gör via en höjning av priset för konsumenten. Ser man även till själva tilldelningssystemet är auktionen av utsläppsrätter ett bättre val då det gör så att de företag som släpper ut växthusgaser även får stå för notan. Vid gratis tilldelning får företagen som är berörda av EU ETS en oväntad inkomst som de kan spara eller använda när de behagar.

<p>This thesis examines the debate between the auctioning of green house gas permits vs. the free distribution of green house gas permits, also known as grandfathering. The authors’ purpose is to discover which allocation system is more suited under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).</p><p>To help draw the conclusion, data and views have been collected from different known researchers within the emission trading field and – compared to different theories and the view of the authors.</p><p>Evidence suggested that auctioning as an allocation system is more efficient than a system based solely on free allocation (e.g. grandfathering). Evidence of this can be found in the electricity sector by comparing the electricity prices the consumer stand to pay before and after the producing firm receives there emission rights for free. When the producing firms receive their emission rights free of charge they stand with the option to sell their rights or to use them in their production. By selling its electricity the producers wants to recover their forgone opportunity and can do so via the price paid for by the consumer.</p><p>By also looking at the two systems under distribution one can also see that auctioning is more efficient since under this system, the polluters end up buying the right to pollute from the public. With a system based on grandfathering, the affected firms under EU ETS will receive windfall profits when given the emission rights for free as they can choose to store and sell the rights at a later date.</p> / <p>Denna kandidatuppsats undersöker debatten kring auktionering vs. gratis tilldelning av utsläppsrätter även kallat grandfathering. Målet med uppsatsen är att fastslå vilket tilldelningssystem som är bättre anpassat för användning i Europeiska Unionens handelssystem med utsläppsrätter, (EU ETS).</p><p>För att komma fram till en slutsats, har författarna samlat data och teori från diverse kända forskare inom området och jämfört dessa med sina egna ekonomiska teorier och tankar.</p><p>I rapporten framgår det att auktionering som tilldelningssystem är sannolikt mer effektivt än ett tilldelningssystem baserat enbart på gratis tilldelning. Detta går att påvisa bland annat genom att jämföra priset av elektricitet som konsumenten får betala både innan och efter att företagen erhållit gratis utsläppsrätter. När företagen som verkar inom energisektorn får sina utsläppsrätter gratis står de med möjligheten att sälja dem vidare eller att använda sig av dem. På så vis om företagen väljer att producera elektricitet kan de inte längre sälja sina utsläppsrätter och måste på så sätt kompensera detta beslut, vilket de ofta gör via en höjning av priset för konsumenten.</p><p>Ser man även till själva tilldelningssystemet är auktionen av utsläppsrätter ett bättre val då det gör så att de företag som släpper ut växthusgaser även får stå för notan. Vid gratis tilldelning får företagen som är berörda av EU ETS en oväntad inkomst som de kan spara eller använda när de behagar.</p>

El estudio de la retroactividad y de sus límites constituye un tema clásico y fundamental de Derecho tributario, sometido en la actualidad a un intenso debate, como demuestra la abundante jurisprudencia constitucional y europea existente sobre el tema. En este trabajo se lleva a cabo un análisis sistemático del principio de irretroactividad en Derecho tributario en los planos de la aplicación y la producción de normas tributarias - como regla general supletoria y como principio constitucional vinculante para leyes y reglamentos -, distinguiendo en función del carácter sustantivo, procedimental o sancionador de la norma. La investigación - de marcado carácter interdisciplinar y de Derecho comparado - se ocupa de la noción de retroactividad, el Derecho transitorio y los límites constitucionales a la retroactividad tributaria, completándose con un análisis de la retroactividad de actos y sentencias, con especial referencia a los efectos en el tiempo de las declaraciones de inconstitucionalidad de leyes tributarias.. / The study of retroactivity and its boundaries constitutes a classic and fundamental issue in Tax Law. Nowadays, this topic is subject to an intensive debate regarding how it proves the prolific constitutional and European case law related to the matter. This study carries out a systematic analysis of the non-retroactive principle in Tax Law, in the fields of application and production of tax norms - as a general supplementary rule and as a constitutional principle - whilst at the same time distinguishing between the substantive, procedural and penal character. The investigation (which has an interdisciplinary and internationally comparative law nature) deals with the retroactivity notion, grandfathering and with the constitutional boundaries of the tax retroactivity effect. Concurrently, the study is complemented with the analysis of the retroactivity of administrative acts and court decisions, with special reference to the temporal effects of the declaration of an anti-constitutional character of tax laws

The shifting topography of contemporary Japanese society is engendering a significant reorientation of men’s family relations. However, exactly how Japanese men are adapting to these broad-based trends, including parent-child relations, demographics, marriage norms, care provision, residential choices, and gender roles, as well as in the decline of Confucian worldviews, remains relatively obscure. In this dissertation, I explore men’s everyday practices underpinning their family relations as husbands, fathers, sons-in-law, and grandfathers. I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in the summers of 2013 and 2014 in Hyogo, through narrative interviews and participant-observation. I find husbands’ view of their wives transitioning from having a culturally prescribed duty to perform domestic matters to simply having responsibility for domestic matters. This opens up space for negotiation within married couples, with my informants providing what I refer to as additional help, which offers new insight into charting the evolution of hegemonic masculinity. I evidence relatedness founded on exchange as an approach to understand relations across the extended family, which importantly involves additional help, financial resources, and intimacy. I underscore how men selectively seek intimacy in some family relations, notably as fathers and grandfathers. Provision of additional help and seeking of intimacy lead to men’s (re)construction of masculinities differing across family relations, with an important reason for men to select their practices so as to craft their family relations is to address their sense of well-being. Further, the pattern of men’s family relations reveals the emergence of substantially novel sons-in-law relations, as compared to that found in ie patriarchal norms. This evidence suggests a fundamental shift from a vertically-dominated set of family relations, as in the ie household, to a more horizontal, fluid set of relations across the extended family.

Thesis Abstract: Chapter I: Regional burden sharing of GHG mitigation policies – A Canadian perspective. The distribution of the burden of cost arising from the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is a contentious issue in policy discussions; more so among regional jurisdictions in the federalist countries with decentralized authorities over environmental regulations. In this setting, often the policy discussions are focused on the distribution of regional emission reduction targets that, in turn, entails negotiations over the distribution of the scarcity rents and the regional transfers of wealth. The allocation of regional emission entitlements is thus a key factor that could hinder the political feasibility of a national GHG mitigation policy. In this paper, we build a multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Canadian economy to assess the implications of different burden sharing rules governing the national GHG abatement policy with a cap-and-trade system of emission permits. In addition to assessing the impacts of traditional regional emissions allocation rules that involve intra-regional transfers of wealth, we consider a particular emission allocation that avoids such transfers, which may be a more palatable option given the context of likely fierce negotiations over the issue. Our results indicate to differing outcomes depending on the allocation policy in use. The CGE framework is also able to shed light on the transmission mechanisms that drive the results underlying the policy options. Chapter II: Endogenous technological change and emission allowances. Given the imminent threat of global warming due to GHG emissions, a number of emission mitigation policies have been proposed in the literature. However, they generally suffer from the classical equity-efficiency trade-off. High costs from equity concerns often render environmental policies politically unattractive and thus hard to implement. Recent advancement in the climate policy modeling literature that incorporates endogenous technological change (ETC) into the framework can potentially bring new insights into this debate. Using an inter-temporal, multi-sector CGE approach with ETC incorporated into the framework, this paper builds a model that focuses on the equity-efficiency debate for the policymakers. Canada is chosen as the country of investigation for this purpose. The paper provides a new welfare ranking of four permit allocation policies that address the equity-efficiency trade-off. In a second-best setting with pre-existing distortions, output-based allocation (OBA) of emission permits is compared to three other policy options: (i) an emissions trading system with grandfathered allocation (GFA), (ii) an auction permit trading system where permit revenue is recycled to lower payroll taxes (RPT), and (iii) a hybrid of OBA and R&D subsidy (O-R&D). We find that adapting OBA, as well as O-R&D, is welfare improving over GFA. The implicit output subsidy, entailed in the OBA policy, mitigates against the rising cost effect in the GFA policy. This is reinforced through added investment incentive in R&D when ETC in incorporated into the framework. With O-R&D, since the R&D subsidy corrects for market imperfections in the knowledge accumulation process, the effect is further bolstered, culminating into mitigation of uneven distributional outcome for energy-intensive industries as a whole. Contrary to previous results, we also find that, in terms of the welfare metric, OBA unequivocally improves the distributional outcome across sectors as compared to the RPT policy. Inclusion of ETC also unequivocally generates a higher welfare ranking for all permit policy schemes. Chapter III: Emission permit banking and induced technological change. This paper attempts to undertake an exploratory research by integrating two themes in the emission mitigation policy literature, which include: the inter-temporal emission permit banking and borrowing and the role of induced technological change in emission mitigation. Using a simple optimal control approach, we construct a unified framework that evaluates the optimal path of emissions and the optimal trajectory of permit price when both inter-temporal banking and borrowing of permits and the effects of induced technological change (ITC) are present. We find that ITC leads to a declining emission trajectory over time. The effect of ITC on the optimal permit price path, however, is ambiguous and critically depends on the extent of marginal cost saving that emanates from emission-saving technological innovation.

Thesis Abstract: Chapter I: Regional burden sharing of GHG mitigation policies – A Canadian perspective. The distribution of the burden of cost arising from the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is a contentious issue in policy discussions; more so among regional jurisdictions in the federalist countries with decentralized authorities over environmental regulations. In this setting, often the policy discussions are focused on the distribution of regional emission reduction targets that, in turn, entails negotiations over the distribution of the scarcity rents and the regional transfers of wealth. The allocation of regional emission entitlements is thus a key factor that could hinder the political feasibility of a national GHG mitigation policy. In this paper, we build a multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Canadian economy to assess the implications of different burden sharing rules governing the national GHG abatement policy with a cap-and-trade system of emission permits. In addition to assessing the impacts of traditional regional emissions allocation rules that involve intra-regional transfers of wealth, we consider a particular emission allocation that avoids such transfers, which may be a more palatable option given the context of likely fierce negotiations over the issue. Our results indicate to differing outcomes depending on the allocation policy in use. The CGE framework is also able to shed light on the transmission mechanisms that drive the results underlying the policy options. Chapter II: Endogenous technological change and emission allowances. Given the imminent threat of global warming due to GHG emissions, a number of emission mitigation policies have been proposed in the literature. However, they generally suffer from the classical equity-efficiency trade-off. High costs from equity concerns often render environmental policies politically unattractive and thus hard to implement. Recent advancement in the climate policy modeling literature that incorporates endogenous technological change (ETC) into the framework can potentially bring new insights into this debate. Using an inter-temporal, multi-sector CGE approach with ETC incorporated into the framework, this paper builds a model that focuses on the equity-efficiency debate for the policymakers. Canada is chosen as the country of investigation for this purpose. The paper provides a new welfare ranking of four permit allocation policies that address the equity-efficiency trade-off. In a second-best setting with pre-existing distortions, output-based allocation (OBA) of emission permits is compared to three other policy options: (i) an emissions trading system with grandfathered allocation (GFA), (ii) an auction permit trading system where permit revenue is recycled to lower payroll taxes (RPT), and (iii) a hybrid of OBA and R&D subsidy (O-R&D). We find that adapting OBA, as well as O-R&D, is welfare improving over GFA. The implicit output subsidy, entailed in the OBA policy, mitigates against the rising cost effect in the GFA policy. This is reinforced through added investment incentive in R&D when ETC in incorporated into the framework. With O-R&D, since the R&D subsidy corrects for market imperfections in the knowledge accumulation process, the effect is further bolstered, culminating into mitigation of uneven distributional outcome for energy-intensive industries as a whole. Contrary to previous results, we also find that, in terms of the welfare metric, OBA unequivocally improves the distributional outcome across sectors as compared to the RPT policy. Inclusion of ETC also unequivocally generates a higher welfare ranking for all permit policy schemes. Chapter III: Emission permit banking and induced technological change. This paper attempts to undertake an exploratory research by integrating two themes in the emission mitigation policy literature, which include: the inter-temporal emission permit banking and borrowing and the role of induced technological change in emission mitigation. Using a simple optimal control approach, we construct a unified framework that evaluates the optimal path of emissions and the optimal trajectory of permit price when both inter-temporal banking and borrowing of permits and the effects of induced technological change (ITC) are present. We find that ITC leads to a declining emission trajectory over time. The effect of ITC on the optimal permit price path, however, is ambiguous and critically depends on the extent of marginal cost saving that emanates from emission-saving technological innovation.

Thesis Abstract: Chapter I: Regional burden sharing of GHG mitigation policies – A Canadian perspective. The distribution of the burden of cost arising from the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is a contentious issue in policy discussions; more so among regional jurisdictions in the federalist countries with decentralized authorities over environmental regulations. In this setting, often the policy discussions are focused on the distribution of regional emission reduction targets that, in turn, entails negotiations over the distribution of the scarcity rents and the regional transfers of wealth. The allocation of regional emission entitlements is thus a key factor that could hinder the political feasibility of a national GHG mitigation policy. In this paper, we build a multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Canadian economy to assess the implications of different burden sharing rules governing the national GHG abatement policy with a cap-and-trade system of emission permits. In addition to assessing the impacts of traditional regional emissions allocation rules that involve intra-regional transfers of wealth, we consider a particular emission allocation that avoids such transfers, which may be a more palatable option given the context of likely fierce negotiations over the issue. Our results indicate to differing outcomes depending on the allocation policy in use. The CGE framework is also able to shed light on the transmission mechanisms that drive the results underlying the policy options. Chapter II: Endogenous technological change and emission allowances. Given the imminent threat of global warming due to GHG emissions, a number of emission mitigation policies have been proposed in the literature. However, they generally suffer from the classical equity-efficiency trade-off. High costs from equity concerns often render environmental policies politically unattractive and thus hard to implement. Recent advancement in the climate policy modeling literature that incorporates endogenous technological change (ETC) into the framework can potentially bring new insights into this debate. Using an inter-temporal, multi-sector CGE approach with ETC incorporated into the framework, this paper builds a model that focuses on the equity-efficiency debate for the policymakers. Canada is chosen as the country of investigation for this purpose. The paper provides a new welfare ranking of four permit allocation policies that address the equity-efficiency trade-off. In a second-best setting with pre-existing distortions, output-based allocation (OBA) of emission permits is compared to three other policy options: (i) an emissions trading system with grandfathered allocation (GFA), (ii) an auction permit trading system where permit revenue is recycled to lower payroll taxes (RPT), and (iii) a hybrid of OBA and R&D subsidy (O-R&D). We find that adapting OBA, as well as O-R&D, is welfare improving over GFA. The implicit output subsidy, entailed in the OBA policy, mitigates against the rising cost effect in the GFA policy. This is reinforced through added investment incentive in R&D when ETC in incorporated into the framework. With O-R&D, since the R&D subsidy corrects for market imperfections in the knowledge accumulation process, the effect is further bolstered, culminating into mitigation of uneven distributional outcome for energy-intensive industries as a whole. Contrary to previous results, we also find that, in terms of the welfare metric, OBA unequivocally improves the distributional outcome across sectors as compared to the RPT policy. Inclusion of ETC also unequivocally generates a higher welfare ranking for all permit policy schemes. Chapter III: Emission permit banking and induced technological change. This paper attempts to undertake an exploratory research by integrating two themes in the emission mitigation policy literature, which include: the inter-temporal emission permit banking and borrowing and the role of induced technological change in emission mitigation. Using a simple optimal control approach, we construct a unified framework that evaluates the optimal path of emissions and the optimal trajectory of permit price when both inter-temporal banking and borrowing of permits and the effects of induced technological change (ITC) are present. We find that ITC leads to a declining emission trajectory over time. The effect of ITC on the optimal permit price path, however, is ambiguous and critically depends on the extent of marginal cost saving that emanates from emission-saving technological innovation.

Thesis Abstract: Chapter I: Regional burden sharing of GHG mitigation policies – A Canadian perspective. The distribution of the burden of cost arising from the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is a contentious issue in policy discussions; more so among regional jurisdictions in the federalist countries with decentralized authorities over environmental regulations. In this setting, often the policy discussions are focused on the distribution of regional emission reduction targets that, in turn, entails negotiations over the distribution of the scarcity rents and the regional transfers of wealth. The allocation of regional emission entitlements is thus a key factor that could hinder the political feasibility of a national GHG mitigation policy. In this paper, we build a multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Canadian economy to assess the implications of different burden sharing rules governing the national GHG abatement policy with a cap-and-trade system of emission permits. In addition to assessing the impacts of traditional regional emissions allocation rules that involve intra-regional transfers of wealth, we consider a particular emission allocation that avoids such transfers, which may be a more palatable option given the context of likely fierce negotiations over the issue. Our results indicate to differing outcomes depending on the allocation policy in use. The CGE framework is also able to shed light on the transmission mechanisms that drive the results underlying the policy options. Chapter II: Endogenous technological change and emission allowances. Given the imminent threat of global warming due to GHG emissions, a number of emission mitigation policies have been proposed in the literature. However, they generally suffer from the classical equity-efficiency trade-off. High costs from equity concerns often render environmental policies politically unattractive and thus hard to implement. Recent advancement in the climate policy modeling literature that incorporates endogenous technological change (ETC) into the framework can potentially bring new insights into this debate. Using an inter-temporal, multi-sector CGE approach with ETC incorporated into the framework, this paper builds a model that focuses on the equity-efficiency debate for the policymakers. Canada is chosen as the country of investigation for this purpose. The paper provides a new welfare ranking of four permit allocation policies that address the equity-efficiency trade-off. In a second-best setting with pre-existing distortions, output-based allocation (OBA) of emission permits is compared to three other policy options: (i) an emissions trading system with grandfathered allocation (GFA), (ii) an auction permit trading system where permit revenue is recycled to lower payroll taxes (RPT), and (iii) a hybrid of OBA and R&D subsidy (O-R&D). We find that adapting OBA, as well as O-R&D, is welfare improving over GFA. The implicit output subsidy, entailed in the OBA policy, mitigates against the rising cost effect in the GFA policy. This is reinforced through added investment incentive in R&D when ETC in incorporated into the framework. With O-R&D, since the R&D subsidy corrects for market imperfections in the knowledge accumulation process, the effect is further bolstered, culminating into mitigation of uneven distributional outcome for energy-intensive industries as a whole. Contrary to previous results, we also find that, in terms of the welfare metric, OBA unequivocally improves the distributional outcome across sectors as compared to the RPT policy. Inclusion of ETC also unequivocally generates a higher welfare ranking for all permit policy schemes. Chapter III: Emission permit banking and induced technological change. This paper attempts to undertake an exploratory research by integrating two themes in the emission mitigation policy literature, which include: the inter-temporal emission permit banking and borrowing and the role of induced technological change in emission mitigation. Using a simple optimal control approach, we construct a unified framework that evaluates the optimal path of emissions and the optimal trajectory of permit price when both inter-temporal banking and borrowing of permits and the effects of induced technological change (ITC) are present. We find that ITC leads to a declining emission trajectory over time. The effect of ITC on the optimal permit price path, however, is ambiguous and critically depends on the extent of marginal cost saving that emanates from emission-saving technological innovation.