- About
-
The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers
to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is
provided by the
Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
Search results
Showing 1 to 4 of 4 (0.067 seconds)Spelling suggestions: "subject:"suctioning"" "subject:"auctioning""
| 1 |
Emission Trading : Auctioning vs. GrandfatheringLiljenberg, Johan, Rudman, Willy January 2009 (has links)
This thesis examines the debate between the auctioning of green house gas permits vs. the free distribution of green house gas permits, also known as grandfathering. The authors’ purpose is to discover which allocation system is more suited under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). To help draw the conclusion, data and views have been collected from different known researchers within the emission trading field and – compared to different theories and the view of the authors. Evidence suggested that auctioning as an allocation system is more efficient than a system based solely on free allocation (e.g. grandfathering). Evidence of this can be found in the electricity sector by comparing the electricity prices the consumer stand to pay before and after the producing firm receives there emission rights for free. When the producing firms receive their emission rights free of charge they stand with the option to sell their rights or to use them in their production. By selling its electricity the producers wants to recover their forgone opportunity and can do so via the price paid for by the consumer. By also looking at the two systems under distribution one can also see that auctioning is more efficient since under this system, the polluters end up buying the right to pollute from the public. With a system based on grandfathering, the affected firms under EU ETS will receive windfall profits when given the emission rights for free as they can choose to store and sell the rights at a later date. / Denna kandidatuppsats undersöker debatten kring auktionering vs. gratis tilldelning av utsläppsrätter även kallat grandfathering. Målet med uppsatsen är att fastslå vilket tilldelningssystem som är bättre anpassat för användning i Europeiska Unionens handelssystem med utsläppsrätter, (EU ETS). För att komma fram till en slutsats, har författarna samlat data och teori från diverse kända forskare inom området och jämfört dessa med sina egna ekonomiska teorier och tankar. I rapporten framgår det att auktionering som tilldelningssystem är sannolikt mer effektivt än ett tilldelningssystem baserat enbart på gratis tilldelning. Detta går att påvisa bland annat genom att jämföra priset av elektricitet som konsumenten får betala både innan och efter att företagen erhållit gratis utsläppsrätter. När företagen som verkar inom energisektorn får sina utsläppsrätter gratis står de med möjligheten att sälja dem vidare eller att använda sig av dem. På så vis om företagen väljer att producera elektricitet kan de inte längre sälja sina utsläppsrätter och måste på så sätt kompensera detta beslut, vilket de ofta gör via en höjning av priset för konsumenten. Ser man även till själva tilldelningssystemet är auktionen av utsläppsrätter ett bättre val då det gör så att de företag som släpper ut växthusgaser även får stå för notan. Vid gratis tilldelning får företagen som är berörda av EU ETS en oväntad inkomst som de kan spara eller använda när de behagar.
|
| 2 |
Emission Trading : Auctioning vs. GrandfatheringLiljenberg, Johan, Rudman, Willy January 2009 (has links)
<p>This thesis examines the debate between the auctioning of green house gas permits vs. the free distribution of green house gas permits, also known as grandfathering. The authors’ purpose is to discover which allocation system is more suited under the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS).</p><p>To help draw the conclusion, data and views have been collected from different known researchers within the emission trading field and – compared to different theories and the view of the authors.</p><p>Evidence suggested that auctioning as an allocation system is more efficient than a system based solely on free allocation (e.g. grandfathering). Evidence of this can be found in the electricity sector by comparing the electricity prices the consumer stand to pay before and after the producing firm receives there emission rights for free. When the producing firms receive their emission rights free of charge they stand with the option to sell their rights or to use them in their production. By selling its electricity the producers wants to recover their forgone opportunity and can do so via the price paid for by the consumer.</p><p>By also looking at the two systems under distribution one can also see that auctioning is more efficient since under this system, the polluters end up buying the right to pollute from the public. With a system based on grandfathering, the affected firms under EU ETS will receive windfall profits when given the emission rights for free as they can choose to store and sell the rights at a later date.</p> / <p>Denna kandidatuppsats undersöker debatten kring auktionering vs. gratis tilldelning av utsläppsrätter även kallat grandfathering. Målet med uppsatsen är att fastslå vilket tilldelningssystem som är bättre anpassat för användning i Europeiska Unionens handelssystem med utsläppsrätter, (EU ETS).</p><p>För att komma fram till en slutsats, har författarna samlat data och teori från diverse kända forskare inom området och jämfört dessa med sina egna ekonomiska teorier och tankar.</p><p>I rapporten framgår det att auktionering som tilldelningssystem är sannolikt mer effektivt än ett tilldelningssystem baserat enbart på gratis tilldelning. Detta går att påvisa bland annat genom att jämföra priset av elektricitet som konsumenten får betala både innan och efter att företagen erhållit gratis utsläppsrätter. När företagen som verkar inom energisektorn får sina utsläppsrätter gratis står de med möjligheten att sälja dem vidare eller att använda sig av dem. På så vis om företagen väljer att producera elektricitet kan de inte längre sälja sina utsläppsrätter och måste på så sätt kompensera detta beslut, vilket de ofta gör via en höjning av priset för konsumenten.</p><p>Ser man även till själva tilldelningssystemet är auktionen av utsläppsrätter ett bättre val då det gör så att de företag som släpper ut växthusgaser även får stå för notan. Vid gratis tilldelning får företagen som är berörda av EU ETS en oväntad inkomst som de kan spara eller använda när de behagar.</p>
|
| 3 |
Robust and cheating-resilient power auctioning on Resource Constrained Smart Micro-GridsMarufu, Mufudzi Anesu Chapman 24 August 2018 (has links)
The principle of Continuous Double Auctioning (CDA) is known to provide an efficient way of matching supply and demand among distributed selfish participants with limited information. However, the literature indicates that the classic CDA algorithms developed for grid-like applications are centralised and insensitive to the processing resources capacity, which poses a hindrance for their application on resource constrained, smart micro-grids (RCSMG). A RCSMG loosely describes a micro-grid with distributed generators and demand controlled by selfish participants with limited information, power storage capacity and low literacy, communicate over an unreliable infrastructure burdened by limited bandwidth and low computational power of devices. In this thesis, we design and evaluate a CDA algorithm for power allocation in a RCSMG. Specifically, we offer the following contributions towards power auctioning on RCSMGs. First, we extend the original CDA scheme to enable decentralised auctioning. We do this by integrating a token-based, mutual-exclusion (MUTEX) distributive primitive, that ensures the CDA operates at a reasonably efficient time and message complexity of O(N) and O(logN) respectively, per critical section invocation (auction market execution). Our CDA algorithm scales better and avoids the single point of failure problem associated with centralised CDAs (which could be used to adversarially provoke a break-down of the grid marketing mechanism). In addition, the decentralised approach in our algorithm can help eliminate privacy and security concerns associated with centralised CDAs. Second, to handle CDA performance issues due to malfunctioning devices on an unreliable network (such as a lossy network), we extend our proposed CDA scheme to ensure robustness to failure. Using node redundancy, we modify the MUTEX protocol supporting our CDA algorithm to handle fail-stop and some Byzantine type faults of sites. This yields a time complexity of O(N), where N is number of cluster-head nodes; and message complexity of O((logN)+W) time, where W is the number of check-pointing messages. These results indicate that it is possible to add fault tolerance to a decentralised CDA, which guarantees continued participation in the auction while retaining reasonable performance overheads. In addition, we propose a decentralised consumption scheduling scheme that complements the auctioning scheme in guaranteeing successful power allocation within the RCSMG. Third, since grid participants are self-interested we must consider the issue of power theft that is provoked when participants cheat. We propose threat models centred on cheating attacks aimed at foiling the extended CDA scheme. More specifically, we focus on the Victim Strategy Downgrade; Collusion by Dynamic Strategy Change, Profiling with Market Prediction; and Strategy Manipulation cheating attacks, which are carried out by internal adversaries (auction participants). Internal adversaries are participants who want to get more benefits but have no interest in provoking a breakdown of the grid. However, their behaviour is dangerous because it could result in a breakdown of the grid. Fourth, to mitigate these cheating attacks, we propose an exception handling (EH) scheme, where sentinel agents use allocative efficiency and message overheads to detect and mitigate cheating forms. Sentinel agents are tasked to monitor trading agents to detect cheating and reprimand the misbehaving participant. Overall, message complexity expected in light demand is O(nLogN). The detection and resolution algorithm is expected to run in linear time complexity O(M). Overall, the main aim of our study is achieved by designing a resilient and cheating-free CDA algorithm that is scalable and performs well on resource constrained micro-grids. With the growing popularity of the CDA and its resource allocation applications, specifically to low resourced micro-grids, this thesis highlights further avenues for future research. First, we intend to extend the decentralised CDA algorithm to allow for participants’ mobile phones to connect (reconnect) at different shared smart meters. Such mobility should guarantee the desired CDA properties, the reliability and adequate security. Secondly, we seek to develop a simulation of the decentralised CDA based on the formal proofs presented in this thesis. Such a simulation platform can be used for future studies that involve decentralised CDAs. Third, we seek to find an optimal and efficient way in which the decentralised CDA and the scheduling algorithm can be integrated and deployed in a low resourced, smart micro-grid. Such an integration is important for system developers interested in exploiting the benefits of the two schemes while maintaining system efficiency. Forth, we aim to improve on the cheating detection and mitigation mechanism by developing an intrusion tolerance protocol. Such a scheme will allow continued auctioning in the presence of cheating attacks while incurring low performance overheads for applicability in a RCSMG.
|
| 4 |
Johann Friedrich von Uffenbach. Sammler – Stifter – Wissenschaftler / Johann Friedrich von Uffenbach. Collector - Donor - ScientistMeyerhöfer, Dietrich 28 January 2020 (has links)
No description available.
|
Page generated in 0.077 seconds