What determines the value an MNC's headquarters adds to its own affiliates? In this paper, we shed light on this question by linking the embeddedness view of the multinational corporation to the literature on parenting advantage. We test our hypotheses on an original dataset of 124 manufacturing subsidiaries located in Europe. Our results indicate that the external embeddedness of the MNC is an antecedent to headquarters' value creation. We find that headquarters' investments into their own relationships with the subsidiaries' contexts are positively related to the value added by headquarters. Furthermore, this relationship is stronger when the subsidiary itself is strongly embedded. We discuss implications for the MNC literature, embeddedness research, and the literature on parenting and headquarters' roles. (authors' abstract)

As a part of multinational corporations (MNCs), subsidiaries operate in distinct host countries and have to deal with their external context. Host country political embeddedness, in particular, helps subsidiaries to obtain knowledge and understanding of the regulatory and political context, and to get access to local networks. Moreover, they get some guidance and support from their headquarters. Distance between MNC home and host countries, however, alienates subsidiaries from the MNC and influences the extent of subsidiary host country political embeddedness. We suggest that the host country political and regulatory context moderates the effect of distance on subsidiary host country political embeddedness by reducing the need and/or value of headquarters support. Using a sample of 124 European manufacturing subsidiaries, we find that distance (space) and context (place) matter jointly: the impact of distance is stronger for subsidiaries that operate in host countries with low governance quality and low political stability in place.

Integrating distance research with the behavioral strategy literature on MNC headquarters-subsidiary relations, this paper explores how the distance between headquarters and subsidiaries relates to value added by the headquarters. We show for 124 manufacturing subsidiaries in Europe that, on average, distance is unrelated to value added by headquarters but that this effect is contingent upon the extent to which the subsidiary is locally embedded. Only after a certain threshold level of subsidiary embeddedness, distance is negatively related to headquarters value added. This effect is more pronounced for cultural, economic, and administrative distances than for pure geographic distance, highlighting the critical role of contextual variation for MNCs.

This paper proposes an agency model for headquarters subsidiary relationships in multinational organizations with headquarters as the principal and the subsidiary as the agent. As a departure from classical agency theory, our model is developed for the unit level of analysis and considers two root causes of the agency problem - self-interest and bounded rationality. We argue that in the organizational setting, one cannot assume absolute self-interest and perfect rationality of agents (subsidiaries) but should allow them to vary. We explain subsidiary level variation through a set of internal organizational and external social conditions in which the headquarters-subsidiary agency dyad is embedded. We then discuss several agency scenarios reflecting various levels of selfinterest and rationality that lead to different manifestations of the agency problem. The proposed framework can inform more relevant applications of the agency perspective in organizational studies and motivate future research.

In the past several decades research has emphasized innovation development and transfer as key issues when investigating the multinational enterprise (MNE). This thesis focuses on the question of what factors make headquarters involve itself in innovation transfer projects taking place between a sending and a receiving subsidiary within the MNE. This relates to headquarters active participation and role in the organization of resources (structure) and flows (processes) within the MNE. Using a database covering 169 innovation transfer projects the empirical analysis reveals that distances influence headquarters involvement, albeit in different directions. Systematic differences based on subsidiary and innovation characteristics and headquarters involvement is found. Not only subsidiary characteristics are of importance for headquarters involvement, but also the embeddedness of the subsidiary hosting the innovation transfer project. More specifically, physical and cultural distance between the sending and receiving subsidiaries influence headquarters involvement in the transfer negatively, whereas linguistic and economic distance between the subsidiaries conducting the transfer have a positive influence on headquarters involvement in innovation transfer. Looking more closely at the innovations subject to transfer the results suggests that innovations perceived as complex and important are favored for headquarters support. The same is true for innovations that are related to the core business of the subsidiary. At a subsidiary level, powerful subsidiaries initially receive more of headquarters support, but as subsidiary power increase, headquarters becomes less involved, i.e., a curvilinear effect of power is found. Acquired subsidiaries tend to become favored for headquarters involvement in transfer relative to greenfield subsidiaries. Finally, the results indicate that headquarters involves itself in transfer projects when the subsidiaries hosting the transfer projects have been relationally embedded during the innovation development phase. Theoretically, headquarters involvement can be conceptualized as orchestration of innovations within the MNE, and as a form of resource allocation. Thus, this thesis contributes to the understanding of what influences intra-MNE resource allocation, as well as what factors capture the attention of headquarters leading to innovation orchestration. Headquarters involvement in innovation transfer has implications for setting subsidiaries on evolutionary trajectories.