Thesis (MPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Based on the significant evidence from the three African randomized controlled trials, the WHO and UNAIDS recommended in 2007 that medical male circumcision should be a priority HIV prevention intervention. The three randomized trials in Africa demonstrated that adult male circumcision decreases the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) acquisition in men between 51% to 60%, with long-term protective efficacy. This study intends to document and analyze the effectiveness of three communication interventions used in transferring knowledge about medical male circumcision as an HIV preventative strategy. Furthermore it also aims to determine which communication intervention will have the greatest effect in improving knowledge and understanding about medical male circumcision as an HIV preventative measure for implementation in future health promotion programmes. The research in this comparative study was conducted on a farm in the Overstrand sub-district of the Western Cape Province in South Africa, Haygrove Haven. A total of 30 male employees aged 18 to 45 was randomly selected to participate in the study. The data was collected using a self-administered pre-test questionnaire. In order to compare the pre- and post-test answers, the questions were repeated to determine the knowledge transfer after the respective information and training sessions. Analysis of the data was a simple process and limited to the necessary information to graph the required conclusions by using the computer programme Microsoft Excel 2010. The study looked at the statistical indicators of knowledge, perception and awareness of participants with regards to medical male circumcision as an HIV and AIDS prevention strategy. The findings exhibited that most people knew about MMC but very few had knowledge of the protective effect of the procedure against HIV acquisition and transmission. The study concluded that providing accurate information with fitting communication material at the right literacy levels, peoples’ knowledge of the benefits of medical male circumcision does increase. This will contribute to change the perception and therefore increase the acceptability of the procedure. This conforms to the subject of the WHO and UNAIDS 2007 study and can improve their findings. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In 2007 het die WGO en UNAIDS aanbeveel dat mediese manlike besnydenis ‘n prioriteit MIV-voorkomings program moet raak, wat gebaseer is op die beduidende bewyse van drie Afrika gerandomiseerde gekontroleerde proewe. Die drie gerandomiseerde proewe in Afrika toon dat volwasse manlike besnydenis verminder die menslike immuniteitsgebreksvirus (MIV) in mans met 51% tot 60%, met 'n lang-termyn beskermende doeltreffendheid. Hierdie studie is van voorneme om die doeltreffendheid van drie kommunikasie-intervensies wat gebruik word in die oordrag van kennis oor mediese manlike besnydenis as 'n MIV-voorkomende strategie, te dokumenteer en te analiseer. Verder stel dit ook ten doel om te bepaal watter kommunikasie-intervensie die grootste invloed in die verbetering van kennis en begrip oor mediese manlike besnydenis as 'n MIV-voorkomende maatreël, vir implementering in toekomstige gesondheidsbevorderingsprogramme. Die navorsing in hierdie vergelykende studie is uitgevoer op 'n plaas in die Overstrand-sub-distrik van die Wes-Kaap in Suid-Afrika, Haygrove Haven. 'n Totaal van 30 manlike werknemers tussen die ouderdomme 18 tot 45 is lukraak gekies om deel te neem aan die studie. Die data is ingesamel met behulp van 'n self-geadministreerde vraelys waar die pre-toets vrae in die post-toets herhaal word, om die antwoorde met mekaar te vergelyk, om sodoende te bepaal watter opleidingsessie die grootste kennis oordrag laat plaasvind. Ontleding van die data is beperk en so eenvoudig as moontlik om die gevolgtrekkings te maak en grafies deur te gee deur gebruik te maak van die rekenaarprogram Microsoft Excel 2010. Die studie kyk na die statistiese aanwysers van kennis, persepsie en bewustheid van die deelnemers met betrekking tot mediese manlike besnydenis as 'n MIV-en VIGS-voorkoming strategie. Die bevindinge van die studie is dat die meeste mense bewus is van mediese manlike besnydenis, maar baie min kennis gehad het van die beskermende effek van die prosedure teen MIV verkryging en oordrag. Die studie het bevind dat die verskaffing van akkurate inligting met gepaste kommunikasie materiaal op die regte geletterdheidsvlakke, mense se kennis van die voordele van mediese manlike besnydenis kan laat toeneem. Dit is bydraend om ‘n individu se persepsie te verander en dus die aanvaarbaarheid van die prosedure te verhoog. Dit voldoen aan die onderwerp van die WHO en UNAIDS 2007 studie en kan sodoende hul bevindings verbeter.

This study endeavours to elucidate the journal of Captain Hermanus Hofmeijer of the Dutch man 0' war, Amsterdam, which has been transcribed from the original script, translated from Dutch into English and interpreted from a contemporary viewpoint. It offers an opportunity to evaluate a unique primary historical document which records an important historical event. An attempt has been made to contextualise the incident in the light of the early history of the Dutch people. The contribution of the Dutch East India Company (VaC) to the trade and commerce of the Netherlands during the 17th and 18th centuries has been assessed together with the shipbuilding techniques that served to make the Dutch a major seafaring nation. The significance of Texel and Nieuwediep has been examined and the sea route and navigational instruments placed in perspective. The voyage has been analysed in some detail. The background of Captain Hermanus Hofmeijer has proved especially interesting. Although he pursued his career with the Dutch Navy, he was born and spent his early years in Cape Town, South Africa. The time spent by the Amsterdam in Batavia, Samaraog and Sourabaya gives an insight into the Dutch possessions overseas. The return voyage, storms and ultimate grounding are of special interest as Hofmeijer records the journey and events on a daily basis. The impact and significance of 217 extra people in the Eastern Cape area did not go unnoticed, and although the event was not well documented, an attempt at some contextualisation has been made. Finally a short overview of maritime archaeology in South Africa and its significance as a relatively new discipline has been included. The study of the material remains of the wreck of the Amsterdam has resulted in a new understanding of wooden ships built in the early 19th century.

Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk are the largest disasters suffered by South Africa in its military history. Yet, despite their enormity, Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk are little understood and hardly remembered. South Africa declared war on Germany on the 6 September 1939, after a bitter internal debate, amounting to a conflict between Afrikaner nationalists and those who supported the British Empire. South Africa’s political ambivalence and disunity ran parallel to her unpreparedness for war in every important department from the lack of vital coastal defences to the miniscule size of her army and air force and complete lack of a navy. The first six months of 1941 saw the South Africans play a significant part in completely defeating the Italian colonial forces in East Africa. However, the campaign was poor preparation for what the South Africans were to encounter in the North African Desert months later. South African troops spent their time rebuilding fortifications in Egypt rather than in essential training to acclimatise this “bush war” army to harsh desert conditions. In a reluctant political decision, the unprepared South Africans were committed to Operation Crusader. The inexperienced South Africans met up with the battle hardened Afrika Korps at Sidi Rezegh on 23 November 1941 and were annihilated in the face of overwhelming odds. In revisiting this forgotten battle, it has been found, using primary and secondary sources, that the South Africans extracted an enormous price on the German armour in what may have been the true turning point of Operation Crusader. In May 1942, Rommel’s Afrika Korps sallied forth in a series of lightning moves that demonstrated the Axis grip on combined operations and managed to isolate the vital port of Tobruk commanded by an inexperienced South African, Major General H. B. Klopper. His surrender in one day is often compared to the previous siege endured under similar circumstances, where the Australians managed to hold Rommel at bay for 244 days until the siege was lifted. Klopper’s surrender of Tobruk resulted in a political crisis for Winston Churchill and for Jan Smuts, as the fiasco caused considerable tension within the Allied camp and within South Africa. On re-examination, interesting facts have emerged from the primary source material, as to the state of the Tobruk defences and of its unfortunate commander and how the United Kingdom, acting in concert with South Africa, sought to suppress the true facts. Immediate post-war memory has been shaped and distorted by sensitive political considerations that affected relations between South Africa and the United Kingdom. Thereafter, the memory of Sidi Rezegh and Tobruk was relegated first by a nationalistic Afrikaner government and then since by a democratically elected government, both of which have seen very little use in incorporating these two milestones into the national memory. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Sidi Rezegh en Tobruk is die grootste nederlae wat Suid-Afrika in sy militêre geskiedenis ervaar het. Ten spyte van hul omvang, word daar min van Sidi Rezegh en Tobruk verstaan of onthou. Na ‘n hewige interne debat wat tot konflik tussen Afrikanernasionaliste en pro-Britse Suid-Afrikaners gelei het, het Suid-Afrika op 6 September 1939 oorlog teen Duitsland verklaar. Suid-Afrika se politieke verdeeldheid het saamgeval met die Unie se totale onvoorbereidheid vir oorlog, wat gestrek het van kritieke tekortkominge in kusverdediging, tot die ontoereikende grootte van die leër en lugmag en die totale afwesigheid van ‘n vloot. Gedurende die eerste ses maande van 1941 het Suid-Afrika ‘n beduidende rol gespeel om die Italiaanse koloniale magte in Oos-Afrika te verslaan. Dié veldtog was egter nie effektiewe voorbereiding vir die uitdagings waarteen die Suid-Afrikaners kort daarna in Noord-Afrika te staan sou kom nie. Die Suid-Afrikaanse troepe het daarby hul tyd daaraan bestee om vestings in Egipte te herbou in plaas daarvan om noodsaaklike opleiding te ondergaan om hul “bosoorlog”-leër vir ruwe woestynoorlogvoering voor te berei. ‘n Huiwerige, teensinnige politieke besluit het die onvoorbereide Suid-Afrikaners tot Operasie Crusader verbind. Die onervare Suid-Afrikaners het op 23 November 1941 by Sidi Rezegh teen die geharde Afrika Korps te staan gekom, waar oorweldigende magte hulle verpletter het. ‘n Heroorweging van hierdie vergete veldslag aan die hand van primêre en sekondêre bronne het aan die lig gebring dat die Suid-Afrikaners ‘n hoë tol van die Duitse pantser geëis het, wat besmoontlik die ware keerpunt in Operasie Crusader gebring het. In Mei 1942 het Rommel se Afrika Korps deur ‘n reeks blitsige bewegings wat die greep van die Spilmagte op gekombineerde operasies gedemonstreer het, daarin geslaag om die kritiese hawe van Tobruk, waar die onervare Suid Afrikaanse generaal-majoor H.B. Klopper in bevel was, te isoleer. Sy oorgawe binne ‘n enkele dag word dikwels vergelyk met die vorige beleg van Tobruk toe die Australianers Rommel onder vergelykbare omstandighede vir 244 dae teruggehou het totdat die beleg opgehef is. Klopper se oorgawe het ‘n politieke krisis vir Winston Churchill en Jan Smuts geskep, deurdat dit aansienlike spanning binne sowel die Gealieerde kamp as Suid-Afrika veroorsaak het. Die herevaluering van die gebeure het interessante feite uit die primêre bronne na vore gebring ten opsigte van die toestand van Tobruk se verdedigingstellings, die ongelukkige bevelvoerder, en hoe die Verenigde Koninkryk in samewerking met Suid-Afrika die ware feite wou toesmeer. Die onmiddellike naoorlogse geheuebeeld van die gebeure by Sidi Rezegh en Tobruk is geskep en verwring deur sensitiewe politieke oorwegings wat die verhouding tussen Suid-Afrika en die Verenigde Koninkryk beïnvloed het. Sedertdien het ‘n nasionalistiese Afrikaner-regering en daarna ook die demokraties-verkose, post-apartheid-regering die herinneringe aan Sidi Rezegh en Tobruk tot die vergetelheid verdoem; nie een van die twee het die nut daarvan gesien om dié twee mylpale in die nasionale geheue te verewig nie. 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