In his article What is it like to be a bat? Thomas Nagel defines consciousness by subjective character of experience. An organism is conscious if there is something that it is like to be that organism. Science describes the world objectively, from the third person perspective. That is the reason why it fails to cope with consciousness - it misses the subjective character of experience. In spite of that, Nagel proposes a new method for studying subjectivity of consciousness, which he calls "objective phenomenology". In my thesis, I want to find out if Daniel Dennett's heterophenomenology is or could be that method. Key words: Nagel, Dennett, consciousness, subjective character of experience, heterophenomenology.

This thesis analyses the long-distance control of the environmentally-situated imagination, in both spatial and temporal dimensions. Central to the project is what I call the extended social brain hypothesis. Grounded in the Peircean conception of 'pragmaticism‘, this re-introduces technical intelligence to Dunbar‘s social brain—conceptually, through Clark‘s 'extended mind‘ philosophy, and materially, through Callon‘s 'actor–network theory‘. I claim that: There is no subjectivity without intersubjectivity. That is to say: as an evolutionary matter, it was necessary for the empathic capacities to evolve before the sense of self we identify as human could emerge. Intersubjectivity is critical to human communication, because of its role in interpreting intention. While the idea that human communication requires three levels of intentionality carries analytical weight, I argue that the inflationary trajectory is wrong as an evolutionary matter. The trend is instead towards increasing powers of individuation. The capacity for tool-use is emphasized less under the social brain hypothesis, but the importance of digital manipulation needs to be reasserted as part of a mature ontology. These claims are modulated to substantiate the work-maker, a socially situated (and embodied) creative agent who draws together Peircean notions of epistemology, phenomenology and oral performance.

Topic of this thesis is Dennett's criticism of the philosophical notion of qualia. First, the notion of qualia and the meaning it acquires within philosophy are introduced. Then, four thought experiments are presented to serve as an argument in favor of existence of qualia along with Dennett's reaction to these thought experiments. After that, Dennett's criticism of qualia as immediately apprehensible, ineffable, intrinsic and private properties of conscious mental states is introduced while one of the most common objections to this criticism is emphasized - Dennett's conception of qualia is too narrow and we can preserve it in a moderate way. Subsequently, the thesis outlines such a modest concept - the concept of phenomenal consciousness. This thesis attempts to show that there is no place for phenomenal consciousness in Dennett's heterophenomenology and Multiple Drafts model and that Dennett is as skeptical about this term as he is about the notion of qualia. In the end, the thesis asks the question whether it is really necessary to give up the concept of phenomenal consciousness if we want to study consciousness scientifically - from the third-person point of view.