Global ETD Search

1	Efficiency and redistribution in economies with hidden action Panaccione, Luca 05 September 2006 (has links) In this thesis, we study how the efficiency of competitive equilibrium in a pure exchange economy with hidden action depends on the market structure. We consider both competitive anonymous markets, where consumers make their choices taking as given some relevant economic parameters, and competitive strategic markets, where consumers interact with financial intermediaries who explicitly take into account the choices of other economic agents. In the first chapter, we review some known results on the efficiency of competitive equilibrium under different market structures. In the second chapter, we assume that there are multiple consumption goods and that the level of action affects the marginal benefit consumers get from consumption. We consider two different market structures: a complete set of contingent-commodity markets, and a complete set of financial markets, together with spot markets for consumption goods. The main result we provide in this chapter is that under more general hypothesis than those usually considered in the literature, the equilibrium with financial markets is not efficient. In the third chapter, we assume that consumers can insure themselves by voluntarily committing to deliver part of their endowment to a common pool in exchange for a sure return from the pool itself. We show that an equilibrium with pool of promises exists, and we characterize it. Hidden Action Competitive equilibrium Efficiency
2	Efficiency and redistribution in economies with hidden action Panaccione, Luca 05 September 2006 (has links) In this thesis, we study how the efficiency of competitive equilibrium in a pure exchange economy with hidden action depends on the market structure. We consider both competitive anonymous markets, where consumers make their choices taking as given some relevant economic parameters, and competitive strategic markets, where consumers interact with financial intermediaries who explicitly take into account the choices of other economic agents. In the first chapter, we review some known results on the efficiency of competitive equilibrium under different market structures. In the second chapter, we assume that there are multiple consumption goods and that the level of action affects the marginal benefit consumers get from consumption. We consider two different market structures: a complete set of contingent-commodity markets, and a complete set of financial markets, together with spot markets for consumption goods. The main result we provide in this chapter is that under more general hypothesis than those usually considered in the literature, the equilibrium with financial markets is not efficient. In the third chapter, we assume that consumers can insure themselves by voluntarily committing to deliver part of their endowment to a common pool in exchange for a sure return from the pool itself. We show that an equilibrium with pool of promises exists, and we characterize it. Hidden Action Competitive equilibrium Efficiency
3	Determinants for the effective provision of public goods by honduran hometown associations in the United States: the Garífuna case Zavala, Carlos Gustavo Villela January 2006 (has links) Magister Artium - MA / The study concludes that the existence of HTAs in the USA is explained by the socially enforced institution of the hijos del pueblo (sons of the town) having a duty to help their hometowns, as well as the private benefits of preserving Garífuna traditions and the possibility of helping repatriate dead immigrants. Fulfilling this duty (and the consequent prestige attained) provides the incentives to send CRs home. In the cases studied, CRs were used to partly finance potable water projects, electricity projects, road paving, a community centre and the construction of a Catholic temple. In most of the cases HTAs worked with a local development organisation, known as Patronato, which formed specific committees for executing projects, for example the water and the electricity committees. For the construction of the temple, a religious organisation known as Pastoral was the local partner. The term Collective Remittances (CRs) refers to the money sent by migrant associations, known as Hometown Associations (HTAs), to Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) in their hometowns for financing public works projects. Few cases of CR are known in Honduras. The only ones reported are among the Garífunaethnic group living on the Caribbean Coast, and with a large migrant community in New York City (NYC). This mini-master’s thesis is the first study written on CRs in Honduras. It studies CR experiences in four Garífuna hometowns and their corresponding HTAs in NYC. It answers three questions: How do CRs work in each case? What are the determinants for HTAs to provide CRs to the hometowns? And what are the determinants for local CBOs in the hometowns to use the CRs effectively to provide public goods in the hometowns? CR is conceptualised as a that chooses which local group and project to finance, and the local CBO, which is the agent Migration Honduras United States of America Garífuna Morenales Remittances Collective remittances Hometown associations Community-based development Community-based organisations Patronatos Public goods New institutional economics Institutions Transaction costs Bounded rationality Information asymmetry Contracts Implicit contracts Agency Incentives Principal-agent approach Principal Agent Information economics Search and information costs Monitoring costs Opportunism Adverse selection Moral hazard Hidden action Effectiveness

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