This dissertation deals with the moral permissibility of abortion. It is argued that abortion is morally justifiable when the pregnancy is a result of rape (but only during the first trimester of pregnancy), when the pregnancy threatens the woman's life or long-term health, or when tests indicate to a high degree of scientific certainty that the foetus will be abnormal to such an extent, so as never to be capable of acquiring any human characteristics other than basic biological properties. Potential is adopted as a suitable criterion by which a being acquires a serious right to life. Rationality is examined closely, but shown to be inadequate since it leads to inconsistencies and does not accord with our general belief and sentiments. It is argued that all living beings have some right to life, but that sentient beings have more moral standing than nonsentient ones. Potential is argued to be the suitable comparison criterion when comparing beings of different species, and sentience when comparing beings of the same species. The dissertation is rights-oriented and reasons are given why this approach was adopted in favour of a virtue-oriented one. It is argued that a rights-oriented approach is more precise. / Philosophy, Practical and Systemic Theology / M.A. (Philosophy)

This dissertation deals with the moral permissibility of abortion. It is argued that abortion is morally justifiable when the pregnancy is a result of rape (but only during the first trimester of pregnancy), when the pregnancy threatens the woman's life or long-term health, or when tests indicate to a high degree of scientific certainty that the foetus will be abnormal to such an extent, so as never to be capable of acquiring any human characteristics other than basic biological properties. Potential is adopted as a suitable criterion by which a being acquires a serious right to life. Rationality is examined closely, but shown to be inadequate since it leads to inconsistencies and does not accord with our general belief and sentiments. It is argued that all living beings have some right to life, but that sentient beings have more moral standing than nonsentient ones. Potential is argued to be the suitable comparison criterion when comparing beings of different species, and sentience when comparing beings of the same species. The dissertation is rights-oriented and reasons are given why this approach was adopted in favour of a virtue-oriented one. It is argued that a rights-oriented approach is more precise. / Philosophy, Practical and Systemic Theology / M.A. (Philosophy)