Between 1961 and 1976 Häi Hung province -- present day Häi Duong and Hung Yên -- lost the equivalent of two entire districts of agricultural land. How could so much land be abandoned under a collectivised agriculture system? And what role did poor water control infrastructure play in creating such a situation?¶ I answer these questions by examining the historical patterns of hydraulic development in northern Vietnam from the beginning of the 19th century until the introduction of the Production Contract system in 1981. Underlying both the French colonial and communist visions of modernity and economic development was a belief that improving agricultural productivity, of which large-scale hydraulic infrastructure was an important component, could catalyse growth in the rural economy, which could then finance industrialisation. I argue throughout this thesis that developing large-scale hydraulic infrastructure in the Red River delta has relied upon the creation of a hydraulic bargain between the state and water users. This is in contrast to Wittfogel's theory of the hydraulic state, insofar as developing hydraulic infrastructure has depended upon the active political and economic participation and support of water users, and not the absolute power of the state. The political economic history of the hydraulic bargain highlights the relative power of peasants to influence the direction of large-scale hydraulic development and, as such, the shape of the Red River delta's wet-rice economy.