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The relationship between r&d investment and dividend payment tax incentives and their role in the dividend tax puzzleCleaveland, Mary Catherine. January 2006 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2006. / Ernest R. Larkins, committee chair; Fred A. Jacobs, Detmar W. Straub , Sally Wallace, committee members. Electronic text (100 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Aug. 9, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 78-85).
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Tournament Incentives vs. Equity Incentives of CFOs: The Effect on Firms' Risk Taking and Earnings ManagementHan, Feng 05 1900 (has links)
My dissertation consists of two essays on CFOs' promotion-based tournament incentives and performance-based equity incentives. The first essay examines the joint implications of CFOs' tournament incentives and equity incentives for firms' risk-taking. With the pay gap between the CEO and the CFO as the proxy for the CFO's tournament incentives, I find that the relationship between a firm's risk taking and the CFO's tournament incentives is non-monotonic. In particular, I show that below a certain level, increase in pay gap is associated with increase in firm risk taking (e.g., higher leverage, lower cash holding balance and higher R&D intensity). However, after reaching a certain level, the CEO-CFO pay gap negatively impacts risk-taking, as increase in pay gap is associated with lower leverage, higher cash holding balance and lower R&D intensity. With the CFO's pay-performance sensitivity as the proxy for the CFO's equity incentives, I find that the CFO's equity incentives negatively impact firm's R&D intensity, but have no significant impact on broader financial decisions such as capital structure and cash policy. Collectively, my findings indicate that CFO incentives play an important role in firm's risk-taking behaviors, and the effect of the CFO's tournament incentives is more pronounced. The second essay studies the impact of tournament incentives and equity incentives for CFOs on firms' earnings management, including accrual-based earnings management (e.g., total accruals, abnormal accruals) and real activities manipulation (e.g., abnormal discretionary expenditures, abnormal production costs). Measuring the CFO's tournament incentives as the pay gap between the CEO and the CFO, I show that the CFO's tournament incentives positively influence total accruals and abnormal accruals. Meanwhile, the CFO's equity incentives, measured as the CFO's pay-performance sensitivity, are found positively related to real activities manipulation proxies and total accruals. My findings show a consistent pattern before and after the passage of SOX (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), but the incentives' effects on earnings management have become less significant in the post-SOX period. Overall, the CFOs' tournament and equity incentives both play an important role in earnings management, but their relative importance lies in different earnings management techniques.
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Incentive payment schemes: an investigation of diversity, sources of diversity and implications for management andcomparative management researchGray, M. E. January 1983 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Business Administration / Master / Master of Business Administration
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Community management of rural water supplies in ZimbabweCleaver, Frances January 1996 (has links)
No description available.
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Analyzing the efficacy of early retirement incentives in the private sectorCline, Linda K. Mason, Laura L. January 2009 (has links) (PDF)
"Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Program Management from the Naval Postgraduate School, December 2009." / Advisor(s): Petross, Diana ; Naegle, Brad. "December 2009." "Joint applied project"--Cover. Description based on title screen as viewed on January 28, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: N/a Includes bibliographical references (p. 43-47). Also available in print.
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Incentives and competition for information in CongressLewallen, Jonathan Daniel 16 April 2013 (has links)
Policymakers need a wide array of information for multiple purposes. Acquiring information often is costly, so it is assumed that incentives must be provided to overcome these costs and stimulate information gathering. It is further assumed that increasing the number of actors engaged in acquiring information creates free-rider problems. In 2007 the U.S. House of Representatives created a select committee to address energy and environment issues, but did not give that committee legislative authority. The new committee could not compete with others for the ability to write or amend legislation, so its presence should not have changed the standing committee’s information gathering patterns. In fact, committees did alter their hearing patterns in response to the select committee’s work. Information has jurisdictional and reputational value to policymakers in addition to the incentives it can help them obtain, and policymakers will act to acquire information even without explicit incentives to do so. / text
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What makes the younger generation of executive officers work orshirk?: using the framework of Brehm andGates, a case study on the working incentive of executive officersrecruited after 2000Ng, Kai-yue, Eliza., 吳啟裕. January 2011 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration
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A literature study of renewable energy tax incentivesNortje, Dola. January 2009 (has links)
Thesis (M.Com.(Taxation)) -- University of Pretoria, 2009. / Summary in English and Afrikaans. Includes bibliographical references.
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Material and moral incentives in Communist ChinaKinmonth, Earl Henry, January 1970 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1970. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record.
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Prepaid monetary incentive effects on mail survey responseJobber, David, Saunders, J., Mitchell, V. January 2004 (has links)
No / Increasing mail survey response using monetary incentives is a proven, but not always cost-effective, method in every population. This paper tackles the questions of whether it is worth using monetary incentives and the size of the inducement by testing a regression model of the impact of prepaid monetary incentives on response rates in consumer and organizational mail surveys. The results support their use and show that the inducement value makes a significant impact on the effect size. Importantly, no significant differences were found between consumer and organizational populations.
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