Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (doctoral)--Oestrich-Winkel, European Business School, 2008. / Includes bibliographic references (p. 269-313).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2005. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains x, 102 p.; also includes graphics (some col.) Includes bibliographical references (p. 100-102). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Economics, August 2002. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (MS)--Montana State University--Bozeman, 2009. / Typescript. Chairperson, Graduate Committee: Robert K. Fleck. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 38-39).

Thesis, PlanB (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Stout, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2005. / Supervisor: Laura Starks. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

M.Com. (Business Management) / Introduction to the study Short-term incentives for managers generate interest among employees and executives in South Africa. In the health care industry competency-based performance systems for enhancing both individual and organisational performance have been growing in popularity in the last decade, as they are linked to the quality of diagnosis-specific services. Objectives of the study The objective of the study is to identify the nature of the main components of an appropriate short-term incentive scheme for private hospital managers. Are these schemes in place? If so, how do they work? The study seeks to delve into the experiences of hospital managers regarding their awareness of short-term incentive strategies by researching their views, attitudes and feelings regarding short-term incentives. Literature review The review of the literature indicates that the health care industry faces pressure to balance the quality of health care, on the one hand, with the escalating costs of health care and efforts to motivate hospital managers, on the other. Done correct ly short - term incent ive schemes are a powerful mot ivat ion tool if the intr insic and ext rinsic mot ivators are balanced adequately especially in a hospital set t ing where incor rect implementat ion can lead to unintended consequences. Research methodology The study utilises a qualitative strategy to provide an in-depth description of hospital managers‟ perceptions, understanding, and experiences of short-term incentives. The participatory approach reduces mistrust between subjects and researchers. Main findings The study found that the hospital managers are sharply aware and have a well developed understanding of the short-term incentives practiced in the private hospital sector. Short-term incentives may not be the major motivator but they are critical in ensuring that hospital managers stay motivated. Conclusion Providing a proper balance between intrinsic and extrinsic motivators is crucial in designing a framework that will keep hospital managers motivated and performing their work better.

This research focussed on the performance of individuals in work teams. The purpose of this study was to investigate the nature of the team processes which could explain time-associated differences, in the performance outcomes of individuals within work teams, in teams whose members had moderately interdependent tasks and received hybrid pay incentives. The extant literature has a large body of work on teams in general; there also exists a large amount of work on currently understood relationships between task-interdependence, pay incentives, team processes, and performance. However, although task-interdependent work teams with hybrid pay incentives are common in many labour-intensive business environments, the current literature is thin on the identification of specific team processes which link long-term performance differences in comparable teams. Secondly, few studies on work-team performance, in the current literature, incorporate time as a predictor variable. This research investigated the effects of the introduction of performance-based hybrid pay incentives to members of work teams; the research also investigated the nature of explanatory, time-linked team processes which could be associated with performance variances between these work teams. A review of the literature on work team effectiveness, pay incentives and performance in work teams, resulted in hypothesised relationships between the interdependent tasks of work team members, hybrid pay incentives for supervisors, and overall team performance over time. The research focussed on variances between the team processes for good and poor teams to design a work team process and performance model, which could be used to predict performance variance between teams over time in the field. The study was conducted on bulk-cash deposit processing teller work teams. These work teams were located at geographically dispersed processing centres (18 cash centres), where each work team was composed of an average of 6 members, comprising a team supervisor, and a combination of permanently employed tellers (regular tellers) and tellers on renewable fixed term contracts (contract tellers), in a financial services firm. Using a longitudinal research design, the study used mixed methods, incorporating a control group time-series design. Quantitative performance data included the number and accuracy of deposits processed and attendance records; the data also included ratings on behavioural measures for professionalism. Individual and team-level performance related data was collected from over 480 individuals, in monthly buckets over a period of thirty four months (N=16,358 teller data months), during which a pay incentive for performance was introduced as the first intervention (IV1), followed - after eight months - by a second intervention (IV2), which was the allocation of tellers into teams, whose supervisors received hybrid pay incentives. Using a multiple case study approach, qualitative data was collected using semi-structured individual and group interviews incorporating rating scales, for individuals and focus groups, in two phases of data collection periods. The interviews were lagged to findings from analyses performed on the quantitative data collected. Using a combination of repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) for the quantitative component of the study, emerging-themes analysis for the qualitative component, and structural modelling techniques, 1) as expected, the introduction of pay incentives for regular tellers was associated with statistically significant increases in the volumes of deposits processed per unit time, with a large effect size; 2) the introduction of individual pay incentives for regular tellers was associated with statistically significant increases in overall individual performance, with a medium effect size; 3) the combination of the introduction of individual and hybrid incentives, and the allocation of supervisors to teams, was associated with statistically significant additional increases in the volumes of deposits processed per unit time and accuracy of deposit processing for both regular and contract tellers, within high performing teams; 4) internal team processes (intra-team communication, target-setting and coaching, progress monitoring and feedback) explained the variance in inter-team performance over time; 5) team coordination and target-setting were the intervening variables in the relationship between pay incentives and team performance. A predictive performance model for performance in interdependent work teams with a combination of individual and hybrid pay incentives was developed, based on the quantitative and qualitative findings from this study. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / pagibs2014 / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / MBA / Unrestricted