Representation is the foundation of modern democracy. In Sweden the representatives in the parliament are elected through their parties. However there is still a possibility for members of the parliament to leave or become excluded from their parties and still remain in duty - thus becoming an independent member of parliament, or so-called ‘political maverick’. The considerably rare feature in the party-focused parliament seems to grow into a more common phenomenon, yet there is a lack of research on the subject. The aim of this study is therefore to examine the conditions of Swedish independent members to fulfill their mandate and represent the people. With basis in the theoretical framework, the method applied is semi-structured interviews with four current or former independent members of parliament. The results show that while the effect on resources of becoming independent depends on the person’s individual situation, there is evidence that parliament conditions are affected. A pattern of two kinds of independent members is recognized: the classic maverick and the independent party-friend. The conclusion that parliament conditions can be destabilized by independence has implications for the functioning of Swedish democracy. Hence, there is a need for further studies concerning independent members, the resources in parliament and the conflict between party discipline and member autonomy.