<p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk., 1996</p>

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1967. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

This research examines the role played by Open Access entry as a strategy for promoting competition in UK rail freight markets. The theoretical basis for such an investigation is that associated with contestable markets in Economics and more specifically in the promotion of competition in related markets. The overall aims of the research are to first understand the contestability of the UK rail freight market against the background of its underlying market conditions. Secondly, the research compares the experience of Open Access rail freight operators in an international context in order to confirm or reject the explanatory relevance of key variables, as postulated by economists. The research aims have been satisfied in each case through the attainment of a number of specific objectives. These objectives include gaining a wider understanding of the theory of contestable markets, identifying and evaluating a range of barriers to entry faced by Open Access operators (and the strategies they have employed to overcome them), and an appreciation of the factors and processes that determine Open Access activity. The qualitative line of enquiry adopted by the research has produced a review of relevant literature sources and a series of preliminary interviews with industry experts. The former facilitated an in - depth understanding of the characteristics of UK rail freight markets and of the theory of contestability, with a priori reasoning being employed to highlight key issues and controversies. The interviews with key industry experts formed the basis for a subsequent questionnaire survey of members of the Rail Freight Group and other rail industry members. Although most respondents believed that a significant number of barriers to entry existed (with EW&S' first choice over traction being regarded as the most important both in terms of citations and barrier height), 68% of those surveyed thought that there would be some Open Access entry in the first eighteen months after the privatisation of British Rail's trainload freight 1 operations. Sub - contracting of rail haulage was regarded as the most likely modus operandi for new market entrants. This survey was followed up by case studies of the first two instances of Open Access entry (National Power and BNFL), which had both shown considerable interest in the issues raised by the earlier industry survey. These case studies resulted in the identification of a range of similarities and contrasts in barriers encountered and entry strategies, and provided valuable information about the rail freight operations of the two companies. Further analysis has compared entry in an international context and identified strategies that could complement existing practice in the UK. For this purpose, an analytical framework based on a number of themes of Open Access is adopted. Perceptions of regulatory effectiveness in promoting contestable outcomes are also established through a series of in - depth interviews with key industry players. The research project has generated a number of successful outcomes relating to its aims. Markets are not contestable and contestability should not be regarded as an appropriate framework for analysing industry behaviour. This outcome is the result of an awareness of those factors representing barriers to entry and of those structural complexities accounting for a lack of Open Access entry. An understanding of the relative significance of entry barriers and of strategies adopted by operators has also been achieved, along with awareness of those factors and strategies regarded by them as important. The extent to which certain Open Access variables retain their explanatory power in a global context and the scope for utilising entry strategies used elsewhere (such as short - lines) has also been established, along with an awareness of the opinions of key industry players as to the effectiveness of regulatory intervention in the promotion of greater contestability. 11 Overall, this research project has provided valuable insight into the likelihood of Open Access competition in rail freight markets. In addition, it has led to a recognition of the considerable opportunities that now exist for further work on Open Access entry in rail freight markets, both domestically and internationally.

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This thesis presents four largely independent essays on industrial organisation. The first three essays examine how search and switching costs distort competitive markets, whilst the fourth essay studies how firms themselves might eliminate competition by agreeing to fix the market price. The key insight from the first two essays is that by choosing to pay a search cost, a consumer reveals to a retailer some private information about their product valuations. In this context the first essay re-examines the well-known theoretical Diamond Paradox in which markets completely break down if firms sell only a single product. I demonstrate that multiproduct retailers offer an elegant and realistic way of overcoming this Paradox, and then apply the model to supermarkets. In particular, this essay provides new insights into why convenience stores charge high prices and why grocery stores use selected loss-leaders. The second essay looks at internet search and therefore focuses on the special case in which search frictions become very small. It seeks to explain why retailers pay so much for online advertising, when consumers can easily click on whichever links they like. I show that if consumers have prior information about products, their search behaviour is limited but very informative about their preferences. This places prominent firms in a privileged position, and makes them substantially more profitable. The third essay provides a simple model in which small switching costs are pro-competitive and beneficial to consumers. This challenges the conventional wisdom, but also argues that switching costs should be less of a policy priority than search costs. The final essay examines a game in which two firms bargain over a collusive price. It is shown that entry into such a market may make collusion easier, and may increase price.

The efficient operation and expansion of utilities in developing countries is crucial for growth and poverty reduction. However, recent reforms aimed at improving the performance of these sectors through privatization and the introduction of new regulatory regimes have had limited success. This thesis aims to consider the most pertinent problems for utility regulation in developing countries and how policy may need to be adapted appropriately. The thesis begins by surveying the most recent empirical and theoretical work on the area. I argue that four key institutional limitations commonly found in developing countries must be considered when designing regulatory policy: Limited capacity, limited accountability, limited commitment and limited fiscal efficiency. The remainder of the thesis then focuses on two of these weaknesses – limited commitment and limited accountability – to develop further insights into how regulatory policy may be most suitably adapted. In considering the effect of limited commitment, I pursue a theoretical approach. I first focus on the relationship between the government and the utility operator when the government cannot commit to a time-inconsistent policy of not expropriating investment. After building a model where reputation is used to sustain investment in equilibrium, I consider the model’s implications for policy. The thesis then builds a different model to consider the impact of governments’ inability to commit when trading electricity internationally. I focus on the resulting hold-up problem and the impact this has on investment levels within trading countries. The effect of limited accountability is then investigated empirically through the analysis of data on electricity firms and regulators in Latin America. In particular, I consider how firms’ performance is affected by corruption, ownership and regulatory governance, looking in detail at interactions between these variables and attempting to break down regulatory governance into its various components.