Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2003. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains xiv, 169 p.; also includes graphics (some col). Includes abstract and vita. Advisor: David E. Hahn, Dept. of Agricultural, Environmental & Development Economics. Includes bibliographical references (p. 164-169).

This dissertation analyzes the sources of price dispersion due to the price discrimination in the U.S. airline industry. Using the multi-stage budgeting approach with the almost ideal demand system (AIDS) specification, we estimate demand for air travel at the airline level, and empirically decompose an airline’s own price elasticity into cross-price elasticity vis-à-vis other airlines and an industry elasticity. Conceptually, cross-price elasticity measures the responsiveness of quantity demanded of airline service offered by an airline to a unilateral change in the firm’s own price with total expenditures given, whereas the industry elasticity measures the responsiveness of total quantity of airline travel demanded to a change in the overall price of air travel. Then, we investigate the determinants of price dispersion induced by discriminatory pricing across airline routes. Our results show that cross-price elasticity of demand for air travel, reflecting competitive-type discrimination, is the key factor affecting price dispersion in the airline industry. This result is consistent with the earlier findings of Borenstein and Rose (1994), but is based on a direct test of the underlying theory of Holmes (1989).