1 |
Epistemic circularity and non-inferential justificationSosna, Ryan 04 March 2022 (has links)
This dissertation motivates and defends what I call non-inferential epistemic circularity. Traditionally epistemic circularity is understood to be a property of arguments, where justification to believe these arguments’ premises depends upon the truth of their conclusions. I argue that epistemically circular arguments face a dilemma. If the conditions for non-inferential justification to believe their premises are too weak, these arguments are either indiscriminate or permit one to bootstrap trivially to higher-order justification. If to avoid these problems the conditions for non-inferential justification are strengthened on the basis of evidence, then epistemically circular arguments beg the question because they collapse into logical circularity. To address these problems I argue that an account of non-inferential justification should be developed that limits the role of evidential grounds and finds room instead for non-evidential sources of justification. I conclude that epistemic circularity is constitutive of non-inferential justification because it is a property of the intentional acts in virtue of which this justification is earned.
|
2 |
MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE GIVEN: EXTERNALIST ELEMENTS IN BONJOUR’S INTERNALIST FOUNDATIONALISM.Korankye, Kobina Oduro 18 May 2023 (has links)
No description available.
|
Page generated in 0.1604 seconds