The historiography of philosophy presents many difficulties to anybody addressing its more general features. How easy it would be if we had only one skeptic philosopher - who calls himself a skeptic or is believed to be one - and just one 'other' philosopher who is not a skeptic or at least does not want be known as such. The third person would be the historian of philosophy who informs us about what befalls the skeptic philosopher and his skepticism. Does be have many followers or many critics or both? Does he stick to his opinions throughout his life or does he change them? ls he ignored by the other philosopher or rather criticized by him? The historian would report all of this to us; we would read his story and be in a position to discuss it, to compare it with the skeptic''s own writings and with those of his opponent, and so on. Unfortunately, this ideal constellation does not exist. History is more complex; the historians of philosophy reporting on skepticism have to deal with several skeptical philosophers - self-declared or suspected - from ancient and modern times, and with various theories of skepticism - apologetic and polemic, prompted by religious, scientific or other considerations. Most importantly, historians of philosophy are not a third party. This can be learned from Stäudlin''s History of Skepticism.