The primary aim of this research is to investigate whether the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO) which were completed in 2011 are an effective means of making IOs accountable for international wrongdoing. In order to determine this a hypothetical case was created based on the imaginary scenario that the IMF required its member states to eliminate capital controls as a condition for obtaining loans from the organization. This hypothetical case is argued on behalf of the borrowing states and thus the thesis in part has the form of a legal pleading. This approach was deliberately taken in order to provide a practical example of how the ARIO could be applied to any case related to the responsibility of IOs, not just the one under consideration here. The case is first used to illustrate how the ARIO might be applied in order to determine whether an IO’s conduct amounts to international wrongdoing and results in international responsibility. Secondly, the case is employed to demonstrate whether the ARIO provide remedies for parties injured as a result of international wrongdoing committed by IOs thereby bringing the latter to accountability. At the end of the investigation it is apparent that conduct such as the IMF’s fictional conduct in relation to its policy would amount to international wrongdoing by an IO in light of the ARIO and would incur international responsibility. However, in the course of applying the ARIO to this fictional case, it becomes evident that although the ARIO are effective for establishing the international responsibility of IOs, they are ineffective as a means of making them accountable for any responsibility they incur because they provide various escapes from the legal consequences for international responsibility. It is therefore concluded that IOs are free to continue to engage in international wrongdoing with impunity despite the creation of the ARIO.