We re-examine the determinants of institutional ownership (IO) from a segmentation perspective -- i.e. accounting for a hypothesized systematic exclusion of stocks that cause high implementation or agency costs. Incorporating segmentation effects substantially improves both explained variance in IO and model parsimony (essentially requiring just one input: market capitalization). Our evidence clearly establishes a role for both implementation costs and agency considerations in explaining segmentation effects. Implementation costs bind for larger, less diversified, and higher turnover institutions. Agency costs bind for smaller institutions and clienteles sensitive to fiduciary diligence. Agency concerns dominate; characteristics relating to the agency hypothesis have far more explanatory power in identifying the cross-section of segmentation effects than characteristics relating to the implementation hypothesis. Importantly, our study finds evidence for interior optimum with respect to the institution's scale, due to the counteracting effect between implementation and agency frictions. We then explore three implications of segmentation for the equity market. First, a mass exodus of publicly listed stocks predicted to fall outside institutions' investable universe helps explain the listing puzzle. There has been no comparable exit by institutionally investable stocks. Second, institutional segmentation can lead to narrow investment opportunity sets, which limit money managers' ability to take advantage of profitable opportunities outside their investment segment. In this respect, we construct pricing factors that are feasible (ex-ante) for institutions and benchmark their performance. We find evidence consistent with the demand-based asset pricing view. Specifically, IO return factors yield higher return premia and worsened institutional performance relative to standard benchmarks in an expanding institutional setting (pre-millennium). Third, we use our logistic model and examine the effect of aggregated segmentation on the institutions' portfolio returns. Our findings suggest that investment constraints cut profitable opportunities and restrict institutions from generating alpha. In addition, we find that stocks with abnormal institutional ownership generate significant positive returns, suggesting institution actions are informed. / Doctor of Philosophy / We demonstrate that implementation and agency frictions restrict professional money managers from ownership of particular stocks. We characterize this systematic exclusion of stocks as segmentation and show that a specification that accommodates the segmentation effect substantially improves the empirical fit of institutional demand. The adjusted R-squared increases substantially; the residuals are better behaved, and the dimensionality of institutions' demands for stock characteristics reduces from a list of 8-10 standard characteristics (e.g., market cap, liquidity, index membership, volatility, beta) to just one: a stock's market capitalization. Our evidence identifies a prominent role for both implementation costs and agency costs as determinants of institutional segmentation. Implementation costs bind for larger, less diversified, and higher turnover institutions. Agency costs bind for smaller institutions and clienteles sensitive to fiduciary diligence. In fact, we find that segmentation arises from a trade-off between implementation costs (which bind for larger institutions) and agency considerations (which bind for smaller institutions). Agency concerns dominate; characteristics relating to the agency hypothesis have far more explanatory power in identifying the cross-section of segmentation effects than characteristics relating to the implementation hypothesis. More importantly, we find evidence for interior optimum with respect to the institution's scale, due to the counteracting effect between implementation and agency frictions. This conclusion is important to considerations of scale economies/diseconomies in investment management. The agency story goes in the opposite direction to the conventional wisdom underlying scale arguments. We then explore three implications of segmentation for the equity market. First, our evidence suggests that institutional segmentation coupled with growing institutional dominance in public equity markets may have had a truncating effect on the universe of listed stocks. Stocks predicted to fall outside of institutions' investable universe were common prior to the 1990s, but are now almost nonexistent. By contrast, stocks predicted to fall within institutions' investable universe have not declined over time. Second, institutional segmentation can lead to narrow investment opportunity sets, which limit money managers' ability to take advantage of profitable opportunities outside their investment segment. In this respect, we construct pricing factors that are feasible (ex-ante) for institutions and benchmark their performance. We find evidence consistent with the demand-based asset pricing view. Specifically, feasible return factors yield higher return premia and worsened institutional performance relative to standard benchmarks in an expanding institutional setting (pre-millennium). Third, we use logistic specification and examine the effect of aggregated segmentation on the institutions' portfolio returns. Our findings suggest that investment constraints cut profitable opportunities and restrict institutions from generating alpha. In addition, we find that stocks with high (low) abnormal institutional ownership generate significant positive (negative) returns, suggesting institution actions are informed.

Abstract This doctoral thesis aims to contribute to the literature on hedge fund performance in three interrelated essays. The first essay uses a novel database aggregation and a comprehensive analysis of differences between the main commercial databases exploring the effects of different databases on previously documented stylized facts, including the (1) average risk-adjusted performance; (2) the persistence of that performance; (3) and the cross-sectional relation between fund-characteristics and risk-adjusted returns. The main finding is that several previously documented stylized facts about hedge fund performance are sensitive to database selection and associated biases. Differences in conclusions stem from database differences in defunct coverage, survivorship and backfill biases, and the completeness of assets under management information. The second essay examines the effect of frictions on the returns that investors can earn from investing in hedge funds. The study focuses on size and redemption restrictions that are key investment constraints in practice. The size–performance relationship is positive (negative) when past (future) performance is used. The negative size–performance relationship is consistent with theories suggesting a decreasing returns-to-scale in the active management industry. Differences in attrition rates and risk taking as well as the relative importance of management fees and capacity constraints between small and large funds are consistent with an equilibrium in which investors and hedge funds optimally respond to incentives subject to constraints. Performance persistence decreases along with the fund size but concentrated hypothetical Fund-of-Fund portfolios outperform. The third essay examines hedge funds' ability to enhance their performance through leverage. The essay explicitly shows that leverage enhances risk-adjusted performance and risk of investment programs. The main finding is that the average high-leverage fund class underperforms its low-leverage counterpart of the same investment program after their returns are appropriately adjusted to the same level. The finding is consistent with the predictions of leverage aversion theories suggesting that leverage constraints and costs of leverage have a negative impact on risk-adjusted returns. / Tiivistelmä Tämä väitöskirja sisältää kolme artikkelia, joissa tutkitaan hedge-rahastojen menestystä. Ensimmäisessä artikkelissa rakennetaan yhdistelmäaineisto päätietokannoista ja tutkitaan tietokantojen eroavaisuuksien vaikutuksia keskeisiin kirjallisuudessa esitettyihin tutkimustuloksiin hedge-rahastojen riskikorjatun tuoton tasosta ja tuoton pysyvyydestä sekä rahastokohtaisten ominaispiirteiden ja riskikorjatun tuoton välisestä relaatiosta. Tutkimuksessa havaitaan että tutkimusaineiston valinta vaikuttaa merkittävästi aikaisemmassa kirjallisuudessa esitettyihin tutkimustuloksiin. Merkittävimmät erot tutkimustuloksissa eri tietokantojen välillä selittyvät tietokantojen eroavaisuuksissa toimintansa lopettaneiden rahastojen kattavuudessa ja näin ollen eloonjäämis- ja backfilling-harhan tasossa sekä rahastojen markkina-arvoa kuvaavan aineiston määrässä ja laadussa. Toinen artikkeli tarkastelee rajoitteita, joita sijoittajat kohtaavat sijoittaessaan hedge-rahastoihin. Päähuomio on koko- ja lunastusrajoitteissa, jotka ovat käytännössä merkittävimmät rajoitteet hedge-rahastosijoittajalle. Rahastojen markkina-arvon ja riskikorjatun tuoton välillä on negatiivinen (positiivinen) relaatio kun tarkastellaan rahastojen tulevaa (historiallista) menestystä. Tulokset tukevat teoreettisia esityksiä, joiden mukaan rahastojen kasvu heijastuu menestykseen negatiivisesti. Markkina-arvoltaan pienissä rahastoissa on huomattavasti enemmän riskiä kuin markkina-arvoltaan suurissa rahastoissa. Korkeampi riski pienissä rahastoissa lisää tuotto-perusteisten palkkioiden merkitystä palkkiorakenteissa kun taas suurilla rahastoilla on kannustimet maksimoida markkina-arvon mukaan määriteltyjä hallinnointipalkkioita. Tulokset tukevat talousteoriaa, jonka mukaan riski ja tuoton taso pienevät rahastojen markkina-arvojen kasvaessa. Tuoton pysyvyys pienenee rahaston markkina-arvon kasvaessa. Kuitenkin hypoteettiset rahastot, jotka on hajautettu aikaisempiin menestyjiin keskeiset sijoittajien rajoitteet huomioiden, menestyvät riskikorjatusti. Kolmannessa artikkelissa tutkitaan hedge-rahastojen kykyä lisätä riskikorjatun tuoton tasoa velkavivun avulla. Velkavivun käyttö kasvattaa sijoitusstrategian tuoton ja riskin tasoa alhaisemman velkatason osuuslajeihin verrattuna. Päätuloksena havaitaan, että tyypillinen sijoitusstrategian korkean velkatason osuuslajin tuoton taso on merkittävästi alhaisempi matalan velkatason osuuslajiin nähden kun molempien osuuslajien tuottoaikasarjat ovat asetettu samalle tasolle. Talousteoriaa ennustaa, että sijoittajien rajoitteet käyttää velkavipua ja velkavivun käyttöön liittyvät kustannukset heijastuvat salkun tuoton tasoon negatiivisesti.