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The privations suffered by Iraqis between the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars attracted world attention and from many, condemnation. This was because the legacy of the 1991 war, of sanctions, loss of infrastructure and punitive coalition air-strikes combined to subject most Iraqis to effects that included chronic malnutrition, epidemics of waterborne diseases, and total destruction such as one writer described as Iraq having been 'relegated to the pre-industrial age' Saddam's leadership was also a source of anguish for the majority of Iraqis. A provocative and intriguing question that follows from this actual Iraqi suffering is the focus question of this thesis 'would Iraq and its population have been better off under a coalition occupation in 1991 compared to the events and conditions that actually effected them from 1991 to 2003?

Thesis (M.A.)--West Virginia University, 2008. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 78 p. : ill. (some col.). Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 70-78).

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Supervisor: James W. Tankard, Jr. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / France opposed the US-led intervention in Iraq in March 2003 while Italy supported it. Domestic dynamics, including popular opinion and growing concern for Muslim sentiment, exerted a secondary influence on those decisions. Other factors that influenced the leaders of France and Italy to take opposing stances on the prospective intervention included security and threat assessments. Discord in US-French relations was exacerbated by disagreements over other international issues, especially the role of the UN Security Council. This thesis assesses the relative weight of these various factors in the French and Italian decisions, and examines the interplay of the key national decisions made by American, French and Italian leaders. The thesis concludes that French and Italian decisions were influenced by factors in addition to the issues in question-that is, whether the Iraqi regime had complied with the UN Security Council resolutions calling for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and certain delivery means and, if not, whether the use of force was an appropriate and justified course of action. It also concludes that the severe damage to US-French relations may be overcome as Paris and Washington cooperate in meeting international security responsibilities. The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy may face greater challenges, owing to the significant intra-EU differences revealed during the Iraq crisis. / Major, United States Air Force

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited / The violent and diffuse nature of the Iraqi insurgency has become a major obstacle to reconstruction and the withdrawal of coalition military forces. The central problem with the coalition's counterinsurgency strategy is that it fails to take into account the diverse goals and historical motivations of the groups involved. A coalition counterinsurgency strategy flexible enough to deal with Iraq's insurgent groups differently as opposed to monolithically will be more effective in achieving stability in Iraq. This thesis argues that the Iraqi insurgency can be disaggregated into categories that will better assist policy makers in identifying and understanding insurgent groups. Sunni, Shi'ite, and transnational categories are used to divide insurgents, showing each to have specific traits. Categories of insurgents are further divided, where insurgent groups are examined in more detail. Based on the disaggregation, recommendations for counterinsurgency strategy orientations are proposed. America's longterm legacy in the Middle East will depend on the conditions of our departure from Iraq. It is only through a more thorough understanding of Iraq's insurgent groups and the proper application of a counterinsurgency strategy which accounts for the differences between groups that America will be able to make this legacy a positive one.

The Iraq War was an era of crisis and change within the U.S. Army. The failure of the army to adapt to the war revealed the obsolescence of post Vietnam army culture. Innovation experiences in the war were directionless and a new intellectual framework was required to deal with warfare that the army had long disliked: counterinsurgency. Major organizational change was accomplished by a coalition of generals led by Generals David Petraeus, Jack Keane, and Ray Odierno. These officers established a new intellectual framework with FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency. They challenged institutional military orthodoxy in Washington by proposing a renewed commitment to victory. Finally, they demonstrated the efficacy of counterinsurgency theory through a military campaign that “proved” FM 3-24. This major, yet limited, change in service culture fractured the consensus of the post Vietnam narrative and initiated an ongoing reinterpretation of the army’s philosophy of war.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2007. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 223-241). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

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