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The special role courts play in a democracy requires designers of constitutions to consider the delicate trade-offs between democratic accountability and judicial independence. This dissertation analyzes the decisional consequences of state supreme court institutional structures. States utilize several types of election and elite reconfirmation, and each method carries a systematically different risk of incumbent defeat. My theory predicts that as reappointment uncertainty increases, judicial independence decreases. I define judicial independence as decisions made by judges using only considerations that are internal to the rule of law. I measure judicial independence by quantifying the external influence of partisan, elite, popular, and economic pressures applied to judges. I conclude by considering the normative implications of the empirical findings. Because judicial independence is a problem of optimization, not maximization, constitutional designers hope to strike a balance between some form of judicial accountability, popular constitutionalism, and judicial independence. / text

abstract: I examine how gender stereotypes influence the campaign advertisements utilized by candidates for state supreme court and how these gender stereotypes influence how voters react to these advertisements. Gender stereotypes have been found to have a profound impact in races for other offices (e.g., legislative, executive), but there is a lack of research on the role of gender stereotypes in state court elections. In my present research, I first conduct a content analysis of state supreme court advertisements over the course of four election years, looking specifically at how the candidates describe themselves in their advertisements. Based on these findings, I create advertisement scripts where I vary the gender of the candidate and the type of message employed by the candidate in order to test how the gender of the candidate and the content of the messages influences voter impressions of judicial candidates. In a second experiment, I create video advertisements based on these scripts and test how the video advertisements, as well as the candidate’s gender, affect impressions of these candidates. My analyses indicate that not only gender stereotypes play a role in the way judicial candidates create their advertisements, but they also impact the way voters form opinions about candidates running in judicial races. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Political Science 2017

This research explains the variance in voter turnout and ballot roll-off in county and circuit nonpartisan judicial elections in Florida from 2014 and 2016. Based on theory, a collection of constituent (demographic and socioeconomic), candidate, competition, and contextual variables is gathered to construct four regression models. Two full regression models were constructed for turnout and roll-off and analyzed using SPSS software, in addition to two best regression models analyzing five statistically significant variables found within each full model. Presidential year elections and higher populations age 65 and up had positive impacts on voter turnout, while primary elections, campaign expenditures, and populations of minor (other) party registered voters had statistically significant negative effects on turnout. Increases in ballot roll-off were associated with presidential year elections, and populations with more college degrees, higher median household income, and higher percentages of voters registered with no party affiliation or minor political parties. Roll-off decreased in primary elections. While various contextual, competition, and constituent variables had significant impact on both turnout and roll-off in Florida judicial elections, candidate characteristic variables had no significant impact on differences in voter turnout and ballot roll-off.

In recent years, judicial elections have undergone a transformation: races once characterized by low levels of competition, interest and participation are now comparable, in some states, to races for governor or senator. Elections for the bench as a whole are now more expensive, competitive and politicized than ever before. Arguably the most influential change in the last ten years has been the emergence of independent expenditures by political action committees and other groups in races for seats on state supreme courts. Despite the growth of this type of spending, our understanding of independent expenditures is rather limited, as the distinction between independent expenditures and direct contributions to candidates is rarely made clear.I address this in this dissertation by examining the patterns of independent spending in states with elected supreme courts. In doing so, I develop a theoretical framework to explain the decision of individual groups to support a judicial candidate independently. I argue that this decision is shaped largely by the campaign regulations imposed on judicial candidates and their potential supporters. Expectations from this theory are tested throughout the remainder of the dissertation using an original set of data drawn directly from state disclosure records. I find that independent expenditures have been concentrated in only a few states in recent years and that campaign regulations are influential in shaping this aggregate behavior. Contribution limits, in particular, redirect money from candidates' campaigns to independent expenditures. This is particularly significant due to the unique nature of judicial elections and the role of a judge in American politics. The results of the statistical and case study analyses should give pause to participants in the normative debates regarding campaign finance and judicial reform as they suggest that regulations can have unintended, but important consequences.