An increasing number of empirical investigations have demonstrated that a wide variety of extra-legal factors are influential in the jury deliberation process and in the verdicts rendered. The purpose of this investigation was to determine if mock jurors possessing high levels of self-actualization would be more resistant to the biasing effects of the courtroom. One hundred eighty subjects were selected on the basis of their scores on the Personal Orientation Inventory (POI). Subjects were divided into two groups, those scoring within the high self-actualized range, and those scoring within the low self-actualized range. From this subject pool, thirty six-person juries were selected; ten high self-actualized simulated juries (HSA), ten mixed self-actualized simulated juries (MSA), composed of fifty percent high and fifty percent low self-actualized subjects, and ten low self-actualized simulated juries (LSA). Statistical analyses of the five hypotheses produced the following results. Hypothesis 1, HSA juries make more pertinent legal evidence remarks than LSA juries, was not supported. Hypothesis 2, HSA juries make more accurate legal evidence statements than LSA juries, was not supported. Hypothesis 3, HSA juries would render more relevant punishment than the LSA juries, was not supported. Hypothesis 4, HSA juries would require less deliberation time than LSA juries, was not supported. Hypothesis 5, HSA and MSA juries would make an equivalent number of remarks regarding pertinent legal evidence, was supported.

If Aristotle was right in claiming that the aim of moral philosophy is to help us determine how we ought to live, then part of the aim of moral philosophy must be to help us improve our prescriptive accounts of moral decision making--our accounts of how we should make moral decisions. In my dissertation I examine implications of empirical research in cognitive science, social psychology, and decision theory for issues in moral decision making. I argue that empirical evidence suggests that principled guidance is in fact beneficial for decision making, which calls into question particularist prescriptive accounts. I also argue that contrary to the prevailing view, research suggests that taking a first-person perspective when making judgments about what we ought to do might actually help us make better moral judgments. Additionally, I argue that jurors will be more likely to make fairer and more accurate judgments by taking the perspective of the defendant than by trying to maintain a detached and 'objective' point of view.