<p> This dissertation continues the tradition of identifying the unintended consequences of the US health insurance system. Its main contribution is to estimate the size of the distortions caused by the employer-based system and regulations intended to fix it, while using methods that are more novel and appropriate than those of previous work. </p><p> Chapter 1 examines the effect of state-level health insurance mandates, which are regulations intended to expand access to health insurance. It finds that these regulations have the unintended consequence of increasing insurance premiums, and that these regulations have been responsible for 9&ndash;23% of premium increases since 1996. The main contribution of the chapter is that its results are more general than previous work, since it considers many more years of data, and it studies the employer-based plans that cover most Americans rather than the much less common individual plans. </p><p> Whereas Chapter 1 estimates the effect of the average mandate on premiums, Chapter 2 focuses on a specific mandate, one that requires insurers to cover prostate cancer screenings. The focus on a single mandate allows a broader and more careful analysis that demonstrates how health policies spill over to affect the labor market. I find that the mandate has a significant negative effect on the labor market outcomes of the very group it was intended to help. The mandate expands the treatments health insurance covers for men over age 50, but by doing so it makes them more expensive to insure and employ. Employers respond to this added expense by lowering wages and hiring fewer men over age 50. According to the theoretical model put forward in the chapter, this suggests the mandate reduces total welfare. </p><p> Chapter 3 shows that the employer-based health insurance system has deterred entrepreneurship. It takes advantage of the natural experiment provided by the Affordable Care Act's dependent coverage mandate, which de-linked insurance from employment for many 19&ndash;25 year olds. Difference-in-difference estimates show that the mandate increased self-employment among the treated group by 13&ndash;24%. Instrumental variables estimates show that those who actually received parental health insurance as a result of the mandate were drastically more likely to start their own business. This suggest that concerns over health insurance are a major barrier to entrepreneurship in the United States.</p>

Thesis (PH.D.) -- Syracuse University, 2007. / "Publication number AAT 3266289"

abstract: This dissertation consists of three chapters. The first two explore the impact of government policies on human capital accumulation. Chapter one makes two novel contributions related to the two workhorse models in the human capital literature: Learning by Doing (LBD) and Ben-Porath (BP). First, I show that BP is much more consistent with empirical life-cycle patterns related to individual earnings growth rates relative to LBD. Second, I show that the same model features that generate different life-cycle predictions between models also generate different policy implications. In particular, increasing the top marginal labor tax rate, relative to the current US level, generates much larger reductions in lifetime human capital accumulation in the BP model versus the LBD model. Chapter two examines reforms to the Social Security taxable earnings cap in the context of a human capital model. Old age Social Security benefits in the US are funded by a 10.6% payroll tax up to a cap of $118,500. There has been little work examining the likely outcomes of such a policy change. I use a life-cycle BP human capital model with heterogeneous individuals to investigate the aggregate and distributional steady state impacts of several policy changes the earnings cap. I find that when I eliminate the cap: (1) aggregate output and consumption fall substantially; (2) the role of endogenous human capital is first order; (3) total federal tax revenues are lower or roughly unchanged; (4) about 1/3 of workers are made worse off. The final chapter studies the existence and optimality of equilibria in the presence of asymmetric information. I develop an equilibrium concept which corresponds to the presence of mutual insurance organizations for a class of adverse selection economies which includes the Spence (1973) signaling and Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) insurance environments. The defining features of a mutual insurance organization are that policy holders are also the owners of the organization, and that the organization can write policies for which the terms depend on the experience of the mutual members. In general the equilibrium exists and is weakly Pareto optimal. Further, all equilibria have the same individual type utility vector. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Economics 2016

<p> Human capital is an important mechanism that influences both the migration decisions of immigrants and the rate at which immigrants assimilate in the host country. Returns to human capital could be correlated with difficult-to-observe factors such as self-selection, and legal status, and these unobservables can affect the economic assimilation of immigrants into the host country differently. The objective of this dissertation is to investigate the returns to human capital for refugees and other immigrants during the first two decades after they come to the U.S. Refugees are a subset of immigrants who have different characteristics and face different constraints than other immigrants. For example, while refugees have greater legal access to the labor market, non-refugees benefit from greater ability to self-select into both migration and (pre-migration) human capital, and those relative advantages change during the years after individuals migrate. </p><p> The empirical results show that non-refugees receive a much larger crude wage return for human capital both at arrival and over time. Although the refugees&rsquo; return grows over time, they do not catch up with that of non-refugees. These findings confirm that non-refugees are not only selected on observable characteristics (as already documented in the literature) but on unobservables as well, and that the initial selection on unobservables will matter for their differential returns to human capital even after they remain a long time in the U.S. In other words, many refugees might not be well-suited for the U.S. labor market for some permanent but unobservable reasons, whereas this may not be the case for non-refugees because they would less likely move to a country for which they are poorly-suited.</p><p>

In academia, after a reasonable probationary period of service and upon the achievement of tenure, the recipients of tenure are entitled to a continuing appointment at an institution without mandatory retirement and with only limited grounds for revocation. Advocates of tenure argued that it protected academic freedom through economic security. Opponents of tenure argued that it fostered inefficient and unproductive behavior. This dissertation developed a framework for examining academic tenure in U.S. economics departments. I constructed a dataset of tenured U.S. economics professors who were Ph.D. recipients between 1990 and 2006 and tracked their publications. In the first chapter, based on difference-in-difference analysis I found that tenure has a direct effect on the choice of research direction/focus. In general, tenured groups had a higher degree of specialization than non-tenured groups after they received tenure. For some tenured groups, even if their extent of specialization decreased after tenure, when I controlled for unobserved heterogeneity, tenure still had a positive effect on extent of specialization. This result suggested that the job security provided by tenure made tenured faculty more narrowly focused on their research. Using path analysis in the second chapter, my finding suggested that the extent of specialization was one of the key factors which might influence a scholar’s productivity. In addition, the extent of specialization helped explain gender differences in academic productivity. The results revealed that the effect of gender on productivity through the degree of specialization was more notable among older generations, and in most fields, gender differences in extent of research specialization mediated gender difference in research performance; although there were some fields in which gender difference in the research process could not explain gender difference in research performance. The third chapter expanded our understanding of advancement in academics by exploring a new dimension of inquiry: whether the extent of specialization in scholars’ research programs improved promotion prospects. Using discrete event analysis, my research showed that the extent of research specialization contributed to career acceleration, although gender difference on the prospects of advancement in academics was not significant.

Since inception of the Manpower Consultative Service in mid-1964 about twenty programs of manpower adjustment to technological change have been initiated under its auspices. This report reviewed recent literature on manpower adjustment requirements to provide a framework within which to evaluate the effectiveness of the Manpower Consultative Service in enhancing an active national manpower policy. Selected cases were examined for any emerging patterns amenable for use In future adjustment procedures; for strengths and/or weaknesses in the Service's methodology; and for providing an evaluation of the achievements of the Service in its enhancement of the nation's manpower policies. The examination exposed areas of weakness in the current rationale of the Manpower Consultative Service. Suggested improvements were recommended on the basis of the established framework. The findings of this report indicate that: 1. A broad pattern is identifiable from the case studies that reveals the approach most likely to evolve in the disposition of manpower adjustment programs under the auspices of the Manpower Consultative Service, 2. The program offered by the Service, analyzed in the light of this pattern, is unduly restricted in its range of applicability by virtue of its current methodology. Specifically, (a) Advance notice of impending changes that will result in the displacement of workers is prerequisite to the effective disposition of manpower adjustment programs. It cannot be left to the limited efficacy of collective bargaining and will be ventured by few firms caught up in an ever-increasing competitive environment. Legislation is required to provide for minimum advance notice of worker lay-off as a statutory right, (b) Current emphasis on joint labour-management cooperation limits the range of applicability of the Manpower Consultative Service and clearly duplicates the current function of the Labour-Management Consultation Branch of the federal Department of Labour. This principle should be subordinated in the Service's basic rationale such that it becomes only a complementary function. (c) Co-ordination of the federal counselling, placement, training, retraining and mobility services has been ineffective and inadequate. Efforts should be focussed on strengthening the co-ordination of these services and priority given to their utilization by actively promoting an atmosphere conducive to manpower adjustment. (d) The research and/or committee chairmen of the Joint Consultative Committees have evolved into third-party problem-solvers in contravention of the principles of the Service and, apparently, to the detriment of a widespread use of its co-ordinating facilities. A researcher's duties in the development of an adjustment plan should be reappraised and more clearly defined. 3. The basic rationale of the Manpower Consultative Service is not clear and, therefore, its resulting implementation lacks organizational commitment to a discipline that dominates its structure and processes. A revitalization and reorganization of the Service's basic rationale is required to promote the maximum utilization of the nation's manpower resources. Examination of many aspects pertinent to the operation of the Manpower Consultative Service was beyond the scope of this report. A number of worthwhile areas for further study have been introduced. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

The equal split is a widely observed outcome in experimental studies of two-person bargaining. We report on an experiment that controls for the preferences of subjects and therefore sheds light on the social orientation of those proposers who offer the equal split. The data suggest that when the bargaining environment is personal and the cost of conflict is high, both egoists and fairmen (i.e. bargainers that demonstrate other-regarding preferences) make 50–50 proposals. However, as the interaction becomes more anonymous and as the cost of conflict falls, egoists experiment with more demanding proposals while fairmen stick to the equal split. When responding to offers, the data suggest that egoistic and competitive individuals are responsible for most rejections. Chapter three develops a model of the egalitarian conventions seen regularly in field studies of sharecropping contracts, in more general ethnographic reports on small-scale political structures, and in the experimental lab. We develop an evolutionary bargaining model incorporating systemic perturbations to derive stable equilibria in an environment where agents are allowed to experiment with different demands. The first major result is that using a minimal set of assumptions, the only systemically stable bargaining convention is the equal split. The second result demonstrates that other unequal conventions are also robust to systemic perturbations if the asymmetry of equilibrium demands is great enough. Monitoring by peers in work teams, local commons situations, and residential neighborhoods is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems. Most explanations of the incentives to engage in mutual monitoring rely either on small group size or on a version of the Folk theorem. In chapter four we provide an explanation of mutual monitoring in single shot interactions among members of large teams. A key element of our approach is that when team members are residual claimants, some members are motivated by reciprocity to punish fellow members that shirk. To test the model's predictions about the role of reciprocity and the informational effects of team size we conduct an experiment that varies the residual claim of teams and information about other members of the team.

This dissertation analyzes the relationship between law and the rise of capitalism in the U.S. First, I analyze the changing relationship between labor productivity and pay at the Lawrence #2 textile mill in Massachusetts between 1834 and 1855. I estimate a model of productivity under a piece rate contract. Results show that the relationship between changes in the wage and changes in productivity was negative in the 1830s, slightly positive in the 1840s, and strongly positive in the late-1840s to 1850s. I argue that changes in relative worker bargaining power, the intensification of work flow, and the importance of liquidity constraints due to the decline of agriculture in the Northeast are the main factors underlying this shift. Second, I study the impact of contract law on state-level economic performance. Using the contrasting cases of Connecticut and Vermont I find that the development of legal thought on contracts was not composed of a single path toward ``modernity'', as the legal historiography suggests. The Vermont legal system developed outside of the mainstream framework. Using census statistics and histories of labor and manufacturing in the two states, I then argue that this difference had an impact on the nature of state-level economic growth. Finally, I provide the first economic history of the antebellum ten hour movement. I study the historical background as well as the quantitative effects of the movement via the ten hour statutes that were passed in select states between 1847 and 1855. Using historical accounts, I first give an overview of each state's ten hour movement. Using the historical analysis as a light to shed on each state, I then use a difference-in-differences identification strategy to consider whether states that passed more stringent laws (which did not allow workers and employers to ``contract out'' of the ten hour law) saw a greater reduction in hours worked. I do find that the ten hour laws had an impact, but I suggest that the movement's effects were either amplified or tempered according to the strength and tactics of a state's labor movement.

How have the neoliberal concept of "comparative advantage" and the neostructuralist concept of "systemic competitiveness" interacted with State and capitalist efforts to exert control over labor during the transition from ISI to export-oriented accumulation? How have neoliberal and neostructuralist modes of conceptualizing export competitiveness impacted upon the organization of production, the labor process and the reproduction of labor power in Chile? Grounded on these questions, this dissertation examines how these two schools conceive export-competitiveness and make it operational through different export-promotion policies. Particular attention is placed on the neostructuralist claim that there exist two distinct and separate paths to reach competitiveness: a spurious form attained at the expense of workers' wages and a genuine form rooted in the absorption of technical change. Based on aggregate macroeconomic and macrosocial data, ISIC data at the 3 digit level for manufacturing, as well as three case studies--in textile and metal-working--this dissertation examines whether productive efficiency and export-competitiveness has been attained through a reduction of labor costs, technological innovation, or a combination of both that defies the clear-cut dichotomy posited by neostructuralism. Based on the study of manufacturing exports--where allegedly a 'virtuous circle' would allow for concomitant increases in wages, productivity and the establishment of social accords at the enterprise-level--this dissertation concludes that export competitiveness is rooted in socially constructed relations of power ignored by both neoliberal and neostructuralist theories.

Why do some workers who apparently perform similar tasks and exercise similar job skills get paid very different wages? And, why do firms have the boundaries we observe; in particular, why do firms using closely related production technologies and serving closely related markets specialize instead of merging? That is, how do labor and product market segments emerge, and why might they persist in a competitive economy? I offer an integrated explanation for the striking case of the emergence of such market segments in for-hire motor freight, after its deregulation in 1980. Using firm-level data, I provide econometric evidence of the survival value of carrier specialization, as a result of either original status or strategic change, into one of two types. I also document the associated bimodal segmentation of the labor market for drivers/freight handlers. I argue that a difference in optimal human resource policies between the two types of firms is an important cause of the parallel segmentations. Differences in how similar production technologies are used to serve the two markets mean that firms have different optimal solutions to the agency problem they face in motivating employees, leading to high powered incentives at reservation wages in one case, and low powered incentives with positive rents in the other. But this difference in compensation schemes sharply increases the agency or transaction costs involved in bringing both types of production under common hierarchical control, due to pay equity effects, while the corresponding benefits are modest, leading most firms to specialize. To formalize this account, I extend a simple version of the standard “risk-sharing” principal agent framework by adding a reciprocity component, producing a new model with endogenous segmentation of the specified type. The new model also provides new hypotheses about the source of union wage differentials, and details a mechanism by which technological change can lead to increasing inequality in labor incomes that is distinct from the usual differential returns to skills account.