The right to belong and participate in some form of political community is the most fundamental social right there is. This dissertation argues that social rights have not been understood broadly enough, that there has not been enough attention paid to their historical roots, and that they must not be viewed as being simply passive welfare rights. Rather, they must be seen in their historical context, and they must be seen for what they are: a much larger and more substantive phenomenon than what liberal theory has projected: both theoretically and empirically. I am calling this body of discourse “the social citizenship tradition.” This dissertation hopes to show that there was more than one definition of social citizenship historically and that social rights are certainly not “new.” In surveying a vast literature in Britain, the United States, and Canada, it points to places where alternative social rights claims have entered politics and society. By looking at writings from these three countries over three centuries, the evidence points to some similarities as well as differences in how scholars approached questions of economic and social rights. In particular, similar arguments over labour and property figured prominently in all three countries. The contextual ground of right was different in each country but the voice of social action was similar. The objective here is to reunite this common tradition of social citizenship with its past. It is because of classical liberalism that social right has lost focus and power, and a whole tradition of political thinking has been lost.This tradition has been narrowed to the point that it might be unrecognizable to the more radical forces, those who also fought for it, in the American, Canadian and British pasts.

The right to belong and participate in some form of political community is the most fundamental social right there is. This dissertation argues that social rights have not been understood broadly enough, that there has not been enough attention paid to their historical roots, and that they must not be viewed as being simply passive welfare rights. Rather, they must be seen in their historical context, and they must be seen for what they are: a much larger and more substantive phenomenon than what liberal theory has projected: both theoretically and empirically. I am calling this body of discourse “the social citizenship tradition.” This dissertation hopes to show that there was more than one definition of social citizenship historically and that social rights are certainly not “new.” In surveying a vast literature in Britain, the United States, and Canada, it points to places where alternative social rights claims have entered politics and society. By looking at writings from these three countries over three centuries, the evidence points to some similarities as well as differences in how scholars approached questions of economic and social rights. In particular, similar arguments over labour and property figured prominently in all three countries. The contextual ground of right was different in each country but the voice of social action was similar. The objective here is to reunite this common tradition of social citizenship with its past. It is because of classical liberalism that social right has lost focus and power, and a whole tradition of political thinking has been lost.This tradition has been narrowed to the point that it might be unrecognizable to the more radical forces, those who also fought for it, in the American, Canadian and British pasts.