Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:26:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ricardo Rossetti.pdf: 1266712 bytes, checksum: 2a56c3eb5610d07f284a30e545417971 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-10-25 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This work deals with the in Paul Ricoeur developed Justice philosophy theory based in the hermeneuthics of judge decisions. The understanding of such concept leads to the investigation of man s ability to judge (decide) on the basis of ethical values and trustful behaviour as well. The Thesis main purpose is the identification of the three levels of elements that contribute to bring the sense of justice s goodness forward. Therefore, it s necessary to observe the justice making process, ie, the judge as a man able to recognizes his act as one among the possibles good-will acts. Further, the ethic component to be considered and pursued through a sense of life s virtue among individuals categorizeds in and of fair institutions posted as turning points to identify who is the righteous man no matter the level of eveness and uniqueness of one who decides. This quest is justified by logical and dialogical processes focused in the awareness of how a decision act (judgement act) can be recognized as a fair or unfair. Paul Ricoeur philosophy especially his latest years issues reflects his concern in the urgency to unveil the mechanism of judicial decision making, whose consequences go far beyond someone ordinary life. Paul Ricoeur thought emerges the discussion of an ultimate men s justice as a result of a complex (social, economic, political, cultural etc) system, which core is haunted by the inherent human weakness and vicious narroness to capture the essence of God s justice creation / Esta tese fala de uma hermenêutica do homem justo a partir de uma teoria da justiça presente na filosofia de Paul Ricoeur. Trata-se da compreensão da figura do homem capaz de julgar o outro a partir de parâmetros éticos fundados na solicitude, no respeito e na responsabilidade. O objetivo é o de estabelecer os sentidos da justiça nos três planos de compreensão da individualidade humana do sujeito que julga, a partir da compreensão do eu julgador enquanto um sentido próprio do ato de julgar. Então, a visada ética de uma vida boa com e para os outros em instituições justas torna-se a pedra fundamental para identificação de quem é o homem justo, tanto no plano da mesmidade, como no plano da ipseidade e da alteridade do sujeito que julga uma ação. Essa busca encontra sua justificativa na necessidade lógica e dialógica de compreender como se dá o julgamento de uma ação quando o que está em jogo é saber quando ela será considerada injusta ou justa. Para tanto, segue-se a leitura dos textos ricoeurianos, principalmente, a dos escritos dos últimos trinta anos, para verificar quais as reflexões que Paul Ricoeur desenvolveu acerca do tema: espera-se encontrar, ao menos, o fio condutor de uma reflexão que possa levar o leitor a compreender quem é o sujeito moral de imputação e quais são suas responsabilidades pelos atos praticados, quando estes implicam em um poder de decidir e agir sobre vidas, vontades e desejos. Ao final, encontra-se a trilha de uma reflexão sobre quem é aquele que julga e age sobre o outro, sob a perspectiva de uma visada ética que compreende o sujeito que julga uma ação como um homem capaz de justiça, mas falível em seu empreendimento

A body of critical legal scholarship argues that, by the time they have completed their studies, students who enter legal education holding social ideals and intending to use their legal education to achieve social change, have become cynical about the ability of the law to do so and no longer possess such ideals. This is explained by critical scholars to be the result of a process of ideological indoctrination, aimed at ensuring that graduates uphold the narrow and conservative interests of the legal profession and capitalist society, being exercised by law schools acting as adjuncts of the legal profession, and exercised upon the passive body of the law student. By using Foucault’s work on knowledge, power, and the subject to interrogate the assumptions upon which this narrative is based, this thesis intends to suggest a way of thinking differently to the approach taken by many critical legal scholars. It then uses an analytics of government (based on Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’) to consider the construction of the legal identity differently. It examines the ways in which the governance of the legal identity is rationalised, programmed, and implemented, in three Queensland law schools. It also looks at the way that five prescriptive texts to ‘surviving’ law school suggest students establish and practise a relation to themselves in order to construct their own legal identities. Overall, this analysis shows that governance is not simply conducted in the profession’s interests, but occurs due to a complex arrangement of different practices, which can lead to the construction of skilled legal professional identities as well as ethical lawyer-citizens that hold an interest in justice. The implications of such an analytics provide the basis for original ways of understanding legal education, and legal education scholarship.