1 |
Hans Kelsen's theory of normsHartney, M. January 1985 (has links)
No description available.
|
2 |
Constructive interpretation : Dworkin on interpretation as a method for understanding lawMitrophanous, Eleni January 1998 (has links)
No description available.
|
3 |
Jurisprudential inquiries between discourse and tradition : towards the incompleteness of theoretical picturesDel Mar, Maksymilian January 2009 (has links)
This thesis offers an alternative history of theoretical pictures of law and legal work. It argues that these theoretical pictures can be understood as giving primacy to either the explanatory paradigm of discourse on the one hand, or to the explanatory paradigm of tradition on the other. Broadly speaking, discourse-oriented explanations of law and legal work tend to focus on the nature, function and status of normative requirements themselves. Tradition-oriented explanations, on the other hand, tend to focus on the long-term acquisition and transmission, in specific contexts, of common ways of seeing and doing. The first part of the thesis is composed of five sections. The first four are dedicated to revealing the basic features of the above-mentioned explanatory orientations, i.e., law-as-discourse (IA1), legal-work-as-discourse (IA2), law-astradition (IB1), and legal-work-as-tradition (IB2). The fifth section (IC) uses these basic features to read five distinct works in legal theory as oscillating between the two explanatory paradigms. The second part of the thesis argues that to the extent that we recognise that jurisprudential inquiries are oriented towards either the explanatory paradigm of discourse or that of tradition, we are on our way to recognising the incompleteness of theoretical pictures of law and legal work. This second part offers three further arguments, which are designed to encourage the adoption of an attitude that acknowledges the incompleteness of the results of one’s inquiries. First, it is shown that truth can be the aim of an inquiry, but that this is not incompatible with incompleteness understood from the first person post factum perspective (IIA). Second, it is argued that the results of one’s inquiry are not complete because an inquiry only ever appears complete to one when (and only when) one does not problematise its central terms (IIB). Third, and finally, it is argued that the highly intensive mode of self-reflection engaged in by theorists practicing the examined life may lead to certain limitations in the construction of theoretical pictures (IIC).
|
4 |
On how the debate about what is law should proceed in the face of the methodology conflict in jurisprudenceBergeron, Gregory Michael 10 October 2008 (has links)
This thesis focuses on the contemporary literature in Anglo-American analytic
jurisprudence that takes answering the question â what is law?â as the primary goal.
Agreement about what is lawâ that is, agreement about which theory of law is accurate and
adequateâ is necessary to achieve the primary goal. Theorists have come to acknowledge
that no such agreement exists due to their disagreements over two subjects: (S1) what is law
and (S2) what methodology theorists should follow to produce an accurate and adequate
theory of law. I refer to theoristsâ disagreement about S2 as the methodology conflict.
Today, theorists advance towards the primary goal in two different directions: directly or
indirectly. The direct course labors to accomplish agreement about which theory of law is
accurate and adequate. The indirect course toils to accomplish agreement about which
methodology a theory of law should satisfy to be accurate and adequate, before advancing to
the direct course. If one course is the correct or best way to achieve the primary goal, it is
imprudent for theorists to continue to work towards the same goal in separate directions.
How, then, should theorists proceed? Answering this question, loosely put, is the main
objective of this thesis. I argue that theorists must resolve the methodology conflict first to be able to
achieve the primary goal of jurisprudence (i.e., to reach a common answer to the question
â what is law?â ). I reveal that the methodology conflict poses a serious problem for theorists
working to reach an agreement about S1: namely, theorists cannot agree about which legal
theory is accurate and adequate unless they agree about which methodology a legal theory
should satisfy to be accurate and adequate. Next, I settle the methodology conflict. I show
that a particular synthesis of the current two approaches to resolve theoristsâ disagreement
about S2 â imperialism and relativismâ provides a way out of the methodology conflict. I
explain that the solution to the methodology conflict is a reasonable four-step examination
process that enables theorists to engage in meaningful debate about S1 and S2 and work
more successfully towards achieving the primary goal.
|
5 |
The diversity and evolution of competition : an ideal proposed for regulatory designIlg, Michael Peter 05 1900 (has links)
This dissertation presents a concept of diversity as an ideal of international
economic regulation. The theme of diversity refers to the differentiation of individual
competitive strategies. The first advantage of such differentiation is argued to be as a
means of stable and adaptive progress; increasing the number of possible techniques with
which to meet as yet unforeseen challenges. As the first principle of diversity entails a
method for systemic responsiveness, the second principle gives content to this method
and states that social goals should serve as the incentives encouraging competitors toward
differentiation. The advantage offered by the second principle is that social non-economic
goals may be advanced in the present, as individuals attempt new routes to personal
reward via the satisfaction of collective objectives that previously may have had little or
no economic value.
As an ideal of diversity contemplates a method of systemic incentives, rather than
mandated outcomes, the location of innovation remains individual competitors.
Accordingly, the ideal of diversity is justified and articulated from a basis in individual
rights. Diversity is argued to be the optimal set of principles which individuals would
select if given the ability to design a new competitive system. In joining a method of
differentiation with the added social content of non-economic priority, diversity offers a
unique blend of economic efficiency and equity; or of self-interest and concern for the
welfare of others. Diversity allows an individual to think of their own pursuit of gain, but
also and simultaneously further collective goals by selecting the priorities that should
influence competitors toward differentiation. Other’s welfare becomes a route to
individual success.
The project progresses through three broad conceptual stages. First, international
problems of market failure are considered in light of strategies and the economic
impulses toward self and system defeating cycles of competition. Second, a redefinition
of legal and economic progress is offered to meet conditions of unpredictability, and to
arrive at an evolutionary method that encourages constantly competitive variation with
which to meet society’s future challenges. Third, an evolutionary approach to
international regulation is translated into a priority system of legal rights.
|
6 |
The legal reasoning of the European Court of Justice : the role of principle policy and ideologyParr, A. N. January 1986 (has links)
No description available.
|
7 |
Change in international law as exemplified by the problematic of interventionÇali, Basak January 2003 (has links)
No description available.
|
8 |
Legal writingO'Donovan, Katherine January 1990 (has links)
No description available.
|
9 |
A genealogy of lawGalbraith, D. January 1988 (has links)
No description available.
|
10 |
The diversity and evolution of competition : an ideal proposed for regulatory designIlg, Michael Peter 05 1900 (has links)
This dissertation presents a concept of diversity as an ideal of international
economic regulation. The theme of diversity refers to the differentiation of individual
competitive strategies. The first advantage of such differentiation is argued to be as a
means of stable and adaptive progress; increasing the number of possible techniques with
which to meet as yet unforeseen challenges. As the first principle of diversity entails a
method for systemic responsiveness, the second principle gives content to this method
and states that social goals should serve as the incentives encouraging competitors toward
differentiation. The advantage offered by the second principle is that social non-economic
goals may be advanced in the present, as individuals attempt new routes to personal
reward via the satisfaction of collective objectives that previously may have had little or
no economic value.
As an ideal of diversity contemplates a method of systemic incentives, rather than
mandated outcomes, the location of innovation remains individual competitors.
Accordingly, the ideal of diversity is justified and articulated from a basis in individual
rights. Diversity is argued to be the optimal set of principles which individuals would
select if given the ability to design a new competitive system. In joining a method of
differentiation with the added social content of non-economic priority, diversity offers a
unique blend of economic efficiency and equity; or of self-interest and concern for the
welfare of others. Diversity allows an individual to think of their own pursuit of gain, but
also and simultaneously further collective goals by selecting the priorities that should
influence competitors toward differentiation. Other’s welfare becomes a route to
individual success.
The project progresses through three broad conceptual stages. First, international
problems of market failure are considered in light of strategies and the economic
impulses toward self and system defeating cycles of competition. Second, a redefinition
of legal and economic progress is offered to meet conditions of unpredictability, and to
arrive at an evolutionary method that encourages constantly competitive variation with
which to meet society’s future challenges. Third, an evolutionary approach to
international regulation is translated into a priority system of legal rights.
|
Page generated in 0.0561 seconds