Like many former colonised countries, Haiti has been plagued by insecurity and conflicts caused by internal and external influences as well as natural disasters. In 1804, after a protracted conflict between slaves and French colonialists, Haiti became the first black country to gain its independence through a revolution. Today, Haiti is the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, ranking 153rd on the Human Development Index and a significant number of humanitarian organisations are present on the island aspiring at improving the standard of living of the population. The following study examines how the relationships of power emerging through the relationship between humanitarian and local leaders affect their perceptions of each other and identified the emotions emerging from these perceptions. The perceptions identified are the coloniality of power, corruption and distrust, the occurrence of conspiracy theories and the obstacles encountered in the implementation of a relief-development continuum model envisioned by general humanitarian policies. These perceptions create tensions between the humanitarian and local leaders, contributing to fuelling negative emotions such as regret, sadness, sense of failure, disappointment and anger. Negative emotions in this study affect the collaboration between humanitarians and local leaders, diminishing the positive influences and impact of humanitarian action on the well-being of the Haitian population. One of the components to increase these positive influences of humanitarian action is to lessen the asymmetricality of power between humanitarian and local leaders through the adoption of a Cultural Competence model by humanitarians.

In this thesis, the researcher observes that one of the most difficult phases in the work of church planting missions is that of the handover stage from pioneer missionaries to indigenous leaders. This is often fraught with suspicions and fightings, and hence tends to delay the work until such issues are finally dealt with. Having observed a different story in the relationship between Olive Doke and Paul Kasonga in the early years of the planting of Baptist work in Zambia, the researcher has argued that the key lay in their mutual respect and admiration. He, therefore, posits that where these two ingredients are nurtured in the early stages of missions there will be a smooth handover process. In order to show that this was not just a philosophical or pragmatic idea, the researcher began his work with a biblical interpretation of missions. Drawing from the way the Lord Jesus Christ and his apostles went about their own handing over process to the next generation of leaders, he identified these same attitudes of mutual respect and admiration. He argues that these played an important role in ensuring a meaningful handover process. The researcher then entered upon finding as much information as he could on the lives of Olive Doke and Paul Kasonga, and about their working relationship. This was through unearthing various archived materials and conducting key interviews in the region where they once laboured. This formed the core of this research and, upon subjecting this to analysis, it proved the thesis that the success of their working relationship and handover process at the Kafulafuta Mission lay in their mutual respect and admiration. Finally, the researcher offers a model or strategy to ensure that what may have happened inadvertently between Olive Doke and Paul Kasonga is nurtured among missionaries and indigenous leaders. The researcher works these principles into all the stages of church planting missions—all the way from the training of the missionaries to the time when the work is totally handed over into the hands of local leaders and the missionaries have withdrawn from the work. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / gm2014 / Science of Religion and Missiology / unrestricted

Cette thèse étudie la stabilité et l’instabilité politique des régimes hybrides. Elle pose la question suivante : dans quelles conditions l’autorité des élites au pouvoir est-elle reconnue ou contestée? Notre réponse s’articule en lien avec le caractère inclusif ou exclusif de la coalition dirigeante : c’est-à-dire, l’alliance stratégique des élites dirigeantes avec les groupes sociaux dominants. L’inclusion de ces derniers favorise le consentement et la stabilité; leur exclusion entraîne l’affrontement et l’instabilité politique. Sa composition dépend (i) du degré de violence organisée extra-légale et (ii) du degré de pénétration de l’État sur le territoire et dans l’économie. La première variable permet d’identifier quel groupe social au sein de l’État (militaires) ou du régime (partis d’opposition) est dominant et influence les formes de communication politique avec les élites dirigeantes. La deuxième variable permet d’identifier quel groupe social au sein de l’État (fonctionnaires) ou de la société (chefs locaux) est dominant et oriente les rapports entre les régions et le pouvoir central. L’apport de la recherche est d’approfondir notre compréhension des institutions politiques dans les régimes hybrides en mettant l’accent sur l’identité des groupes sociaux dominants dans un contexte donné. La thèse propose un modèle simple, flexible et original permettant d’appréhender des relations causales autrement contre-intuitives. En ce sens, la stabilité politique est également possible dans un pays où l’État est faible et/ou aux prises avec des mouvements de rébellion; et l’instabilité dans un contexte inverse. Tout dépend de la composition de la coalition dirigeante. Afin d’illustrer les liens logiques formulés et d’exposer les nuances de notre théorie, nous employons une analyse historique comparative de la coalition dirigeante en Malaisie (1957-2010), en Indonésie (1945-1998), au Sénégal (1960-2010) et au Paraguay (1945-2008). La principale conclusion est que les deux variables sont incontournables. L’une sans l’autre offre nécessairement une explication incomplète des alliances politiques qui forgent les conditions de stabilité et d'instabilité dans les régimes hybrides. / The thesis studies stability and instability in hybrid regimes. The research question is: under which conditions the authority of the elites in power is recognized or contested? Our answer rests on the inclusive or exclusive dimension of the ruling coalition: that is, the strategic alliance between the ruling elites and dominant social groups. Inclusion favors consent and stability whereas exclusion favors contention and instability. The composition of the ruling coalition depends on (i) the degree of extra-legal organized violence and (ii) the degree of state penetration over the territory and in the economy. The first variable identifies which social group in the state (military officers) or in the regime (opposition parties) is dominant and influences the forms of political communication with the ruling elites. The second variable identifies which social group in the state (bureaucrats) or in society (local leaders) is dominant and shapes the relation between regions and the center. The thesis contribution is to deepen our understanding of political institutions in hybrid regimes by focusing on the identity of dominant social groups according to a given context. It offers a simple, flexible and original model that allow us to grasp causal relations that would otherwise be counter-intuitive. Hence, political stability is also possible in a country where the state is weak and/or rebellion movements exist; and instability in the opposite context. It all comes down to the composition of the ruling coalition. In order to illustrate the line of reasoning and unfold the richness of our framework, a comparative historical analysis of the ruling coalition in Malaysia (1957-2010), Indonesia (1945-1998), Senegal (1960-2010) and Paraguay (1945-2008) is used. The main conclusion is that the two variables are key. One without the other necessarily amounts to an incomplete explanation of political alliances at stake when dealing with conditions of stability and instability in hybrid regimes.

Cette thèse étudie la stabilité et l’instabilité politique des régimes hybrides. Elle pose la question suivante : dans quelles conditions l’autorité des élites au pouvoir est-elle reconnue ou contestée? Notre réponse s’articule en lien avec le caractère inclusif ou exclusif de la coalition dirigeante : c’est-à-dire, l’alliance stratégique des élites dirigeantes avec les groupes sociaux dominants. L’inclusion de ces derniers favorise le consentement et la stabilité; leur exclusion entraîne l’affrontement et l’instabilité politique. Sa composition dépend (i) du degré de violence organisée extra-légale et (ii) du degré de pénétration de l’État sur le territoire et dans l’économie. La première variable permet d’identifier quel groupe social au sein de l’État (militaires) ou du régime (partis d’opposition) est dominant et influence les formes de communication politique avec les élites dirigeantes. La deuxième variable permet d’identifier quel groupe social au sein de l’État (fonctionnaires) ou de la société (chefs locaux) est dominant et oriente les rapports entre les régions et le pouvoir central. L’apport de la recherche est d’approfondir notre compréhension des institutions politiques dans les régimes hybrides en mettant l’accent sur l’identité des groupes sociaux dominants dans un contexte donné. La thèse propose un modèle simple, flexible et original permettant d’appréhender des relations causales autrement contre-intuitives. En ce sens, la stabilité politique est également possible dans un pays où l’État est faible et/ou aux prises avec des mouvements de rébellion; et l’instabilité dans un contexte inverse. Tout dépend de la composition de la coalition dirigeante. Afin d’illustrer les liens logiques formulés et d’exposer les nuances de notre théorie, nous employons une analyse historique comparative de la coalition dirigeante en Malaisie (1957-2010), en Indonésie (1945-1998), au Sénégal (1960-2010) et au Paraguay (1945-2008). La principale conclusion est que les deux variables sont incontournables. L’une sans l’autre offre nécessairement une explication incomplète des alliances politiques qui forgent les conditions de stabilité et d'instabilité dans les régimes hybrides. / The thesis studies stability and instability in hybrid regimes. The research question is: under which conditions the authority of the elites in power is recognized or contested? Our answer rests on the inclusive or exclusive dimension of the ruling coalition: that is, the strategic alliance between the ruling elites and dominant social groups. Inclusion favors consent and stability whereas exclusion favors contention and instability. The composition of the ruling coalition depends on (i) the degree of extra-legal organized violence and (ii) the degree of state penetration over the territory and in the economy. The first variable identifies which social group in the state (military officers) or in the regime (opposition parties) is dominant and influences the forms of political communication with the ruling elites. The second variable identifies which social group in the state (bureaucrats) or in society (local leaders) is dominant and shapes the relation between regions and the center. The thesis contribution is to deepen our understanding of political institutions in hybrid regimes by focusing on the identity of dominant social groups according to a given context. It offers a simple, flexible and original model that allow us to grasp causal relations that would otherwise be counter-intuitive. Hence, political stability is also possible in a country where the state is weak and/or rebellion movements exist; and instability in the opposite context. It all comes down to the composition of the ruling coalition. In order to illustrate the line of reasoning and unfold the richness of our framework, a comparative historical analysis of the ruling coalition in Malaysia (1957-2010), Indonesia (1945-1998), Senegal (1960-2010) and Paraguay (1945-2008) is used. The main conclusion is that the two variables are key. One without the other necessarily amounts to an incomplete explanation of political alliances at stake when dealing with conditions of stability and instability in hybrid regimes.