Issued also as Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University. / Bibliography: p. 57-58.

Thesis (All-College Honors) - - State University of New York College at Cortland, 2006 - - Department of Philosophy.

The main content of this thesis concerns a tableau method for solving the satisfiability problem for the modal μ-calculus. A sound and complete tableau system for the modal μ-calculus is given. Since every tableau in such tableau system is finite and bounded by the length of the formula, the tableau system may be used as a decision procedure for determining the satisfiability of the formula. An alternative proof of the small model property is obtained: every satisfiable formula has a model of size singleexponential in the length of the formula. Contrary to known proofs in literature, the results presented here do not rely on automata theory. Two simplifications of the tableau system are given. One is for the class of aconjunctive formulae. The resulting tableau system has been used to prove the completeness of Kozen’s axiomatisation with respect to the aconjunctive fragment of the modal μ- calculus. Another is for the formulae in the class Πμ 2 . In addition to the tableau method, the thesis explores some model-surgery techniques with the aim that such techniques may be used to directly prove the small model theorem. The techniques obtained so far have been used to show the small model property for Πμ 2 -formulae and for formulae with linear models.

Thesis (Master)--İzmir Institute of Technology, İzmir, 2006 / Keywords:Temporal logic, modal logic. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 45).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1973. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Bibliography: leaves 262-263.

Thesis (M.Comp.Sci.)--University of Melbourne, Dept. of Computer Science and Software Engineering, 2007. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 109-116).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 99-104). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 386-407). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Victoria University of Wellington, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references and index.

The present essay includes six thematically connected papers on negation in the areas of the philosophy of logic, philosophical logic and metaphysics. Each of the chapters besides the first, which puts each the chapters to follow into context, highlights a central problem negation poses to a certain area of philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses the problem of logical revisionism and whether there is any room for genuine disagreement, and hence shared meaning, between the classicist and deviant's respective uses of 'not'. If there is not, revision is impossible. I argue that revision is indeed possible and provide an account of negation as contradictoriness according to which a number of alleged negations are declared genuine. Among them are the negations of FDE (First-Degree Entailment) and a wide family of other relevant logics, LP (Priest's dialetheic "Logic of Paradox"), Kleene weak and strong 3-valued logics with either "exclusion" or "choice" negation, and intuitionistic logic. Chapter 3 discusses the problem of furnishing intuitionistic logic with an empirical negation for adequately expressing claims of the form 'A is undecided at present' or 'A may never be decided' the latter of which has been argued to be intuitionistically inconsistent. Chapter 4 highlights the importance of various notions of consequence-as-s-preservation where s may be falsity (versus untruth), indeterminacy or some other semantic (or "algebraic") value, in formulating rationality constraints on speech acts and propositional attitudes such as rejection, denial and dubitability. Chapter 5 provides an account of the nature of truth values regarded as objects. It is argued that only truth exists as the maximal truthmaker. The consequences this has for semantics representationally construed are considered and it is argued that every logic, from classical to non-classical, is gappy. Moreover, a truthmaker theory is developed whereby only positive truths, an account of which is also developed therein, have truthmakers. Chapter 6 investigates the definability of negation as "absolute" impossibility, i.e. where the notion of necessity or possibility in question corresponds to the global modality. The modality is not readily definable in the usual Kripkean languages and so neither is impossibility taken in the broadest sense. The languages considered here include one with counterfactual operators and propositional quantification and another bimodal language with a modality and its complementary. Among the definability results we give some preservation and translation results as well.