I study optimal monetary and macroprudential policies in a New Keynesian DSGE framework with leverageconstrainedbanks. In particular, I assess the desirability of alternative operational policy rules when theeconomy is hit by mortgage default shocks and show that their implications for inflation dynamics and policytrade-offs depend on whether the shocks originate in the household sector or in the entrepreneurial sector ofthe economy. Moreover, I find that the strategy of ‘leaning against the wind’ (LAW) of credit growth deliverssystematically poorer stabilization outcomes than standard flexible inflation-targeting when there exists anon-trivial trade-off between stabilizing output and inflation, but outperforms conventional monetary policyfor shocks that generate a comovement between the two, irrespective of the real or financial nature of theshock.I show that optimal macroprudential regulation that is as concerned with output as monetary policy candrastically reduce, and in many cases completely eliminate, the incentive to lean against the wind. I arguethat this is due to the ability of full-fledged optimal macroprudential policy to break the favourable complementaritybetween stabilizing credit growth and stabilizing output growth which underlies the incentive tolean against the wind. Macroprudential policy proves a superior substitute to LAW because it can achieve thesame financial stability objectives without systematically imposing costs in terms of price stability.

This dissertation consists of three essays on banking. The first two chapters analyze, theoretically and empirically, the relationship between bank capital and macroeconomic activity. The third chapter addresses a policy question about financial deepening in some emerging market economies. The first chapter develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to examine the impact of macroprudential regulation on the bank's financial decisions and the implications for the real sector. It explicitly incorporates costs and benefits of capital requirements. We model an occasionally binding capital constraint and approximate it using an asymmetric nonlinear penalty function. It is seen that higher capital requirements can dampen business cycle fluctuations and stronger regulation can induce banks to hold buffers and hence mitigate an economic downturn. We also see that higher capital requirements can enhance the welfare of the economy as a whole. Lastly, we find that switching to a counter-cyclical capital requirement regime can help moderate business cycle fluctuations and raise welfare. The second chapter empirically evaluates the impact of bank capital on lending patterns using an innovative instrumenting strategy. We construct an unbalanced quarterly panel of around nine thousand commercial banks over sixty quarters, from 1996 to 2010. Using different measures of capital, we find a moderate relationship between bank equity and lending. The relationship is also found to differ by size. The bigger banks have a greater responsiveness of lending to capital than smaller ones. The third chapter evaluates financial deepening in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and compares their performance with other top performers in Africa. First, we use an unbalanced panel of 16 countries and 158 banks and document some key areas that need immediate policy attention. Next, we use the financial possibility frontier methodology to benchmark the performance of some important economies in our sample, with respect to each other and their estimated potential. We find that the WAEMU countries perform poorly compared to the control group and their own estimated potential. We make policy recommendations to solve this problem and increase financial depth.

Legal aspects of macroprudential regulation in the EU Abstract Even though the term macroprudential regulation is regularly used in scientific literature, attempts to define this term are scarce. Clear delineation of macroprudential regulation enables the distinction of macroprudential tools from other policy tools, such as microprudential supervision tools or capital controls. Moreover, it allows the determination of essential macroprudential tools and their current application in light of the crisis related to the COVID-19 pandemic and the transition towards the CRR2/CRD5 framework. As part of the EU legal order, macroprudential regulation interacts with the principles of internal market functioning. As a matter of principle, macroprudential measures should not contradict rules governing the internal market, even though some tensions with the free movement of capital may emerge. Uncertainties about the judicial review of macroprudential regulation may also exist. Macroprudential measures should subject to a less rigorous judicial review inspired by CJEU monetary policy case law. The rationale behind this lies in the highly complex economic decision-making process accompanying the adoption of macroprudential regulation. There is vast heterogeneity amongst EU member states concerning the application of...

The thesis sheds light on key policy issues emerging from the recent Global Financial Crisis. The first chapter studies whether expansionary monetary policy contributes to bank risk-taking, in the case of Asia. I rely on panel data analysis covering 432 banks in 9 Asian countries over the year 2000-2011. The ratio of risky assets to total assets serves as a risk-taking indicator. The results support the existence of the bank risk-taking channel, which is more pronounced for banks listed on the stock market. I also report new findings with respect to how banks take more risk following monetary expansion. Importantly, evidence of excessive leverage is not found. The second chapter constructs a model for analyzing bank risk-taking. I embed firm heterogeneity, endogenous default risk and capital adequacy regulation into both RBC and NK DSGE models. A subset of the firms can partially default on their loans obligation but subject to non-pecuniary default penalty. With those financial frictions in place, I find that standard macroeconomic shocks can induce banks to engage in higher risk-taking. The chapter then explores the effectiveness of several macro-prudential tools in mitigating risk-taking. I find countercyclical capital buffers and risky to total asset ratio targeting to be effective. The third chapter emphasises the spillover effects of shocks originating in the housing and financial market on the real economy. I embed endogenous mortgage default into a New Keynesian model that features housing and the banking sector. The latter faces capital regulation. We study two key shocks, namely shocks to the variance of idiosyncratic housing shock and shocks to the penalty on capital regulation. Both are instrumental in causing a surge in mortgage default and loans risk premium, which constrains bank lending activity. The chapter later introduces three macroprudential measures to explore whether they improve economic stability and welfare.

L'étude vise principalement à analyser l'origine de la crise financière globale de 2007 (2007 GFC) au États-Unis et dans les autres économies avancées (AE), ses impacts macroéconomiques sur les économies (de marché) émergentes (EME) ainsi qu'un examen critique de leurs réponses en termes de politique économique. L'étude met en évidence les défis en matière de régulation post crise et discute des implications des réformes qui ont été récemment introduites dans les EME. A cette fin, la thèse se décline en quatre chapitres. Le premier chapitre établit le contexte théorique de la thèse et présente un exposé critique des approches orthodoxe (dominante/néolibérale) et hétérodoxe concernant la fragilité financière et la crise. Après avoir examiné l'approche orthodoxe, on met en évidence le mérite et la pertinence du cadre d'analyse de Minsky connu en tant que « Hypothèses d'instabilité financières » (FIH), afin de comprendre la question de la fragilité dans les économies de marché. Dans le deuxième chapitre, la thèse propose un compte rendu exhaustif des explications et des conséquences de la crise de 2007 en mettant l'accent sur ses prémisses qui se trouvent sur le marché immobilier américain. On met également en évidence les principaux dysfonctionnements du marché financier et du système de régulation qui se trouvent à l'origine de la crise. Le troisième chapitre présente une analyse approfondie du processus de transmission de la crise de 2007 aux EME. Par la suite, on met en évidence les réactions en matière de politique économique (monétaire) de certaines EME sous forme d'étude comparative. Le quatrième chapitre analyse les diverses réformes de régulation financière introduites après la crise. L'examen indique que ces réformes (la loi Dodd Franck Act de 2011 et les nouveaux standards Bâle III) sont d'inspiration néolibérale et qu'elles ne peuvent pas résoudre le problème de fragilité et de crise financière. Sur la base de notre analyse développée au travers de ces quatre chapitres on met en évidence deux principaux résultats. Premièrement, les marchés financiers ne devraient pas être laissés aux vicissitudes des marchés (libres). Il faudrait mettre en place un cadre de régulation pertinent assorti des principes macroprudentiels qui puissent remplacer l'approche dominante de marchés libres efficients. Les orientations de politique et d'analyse de « gouvernement puissant » et de « banque centrale puissante », assumées par l'économiste hétérodoxe Hyman Minsky, semblent appropriées pour comprendre et contenir la fragilité des économies de marché. Ensuite, il est recommandable pour les EME d'adopter des politiques cohérentes avec leurs propres caractéristiques macroéconomiques et avec leur niveau de développement financier et non de s'attacher à une croyance aveugle dans la libéralisation du marché ou dans le paradigme néolibéral. / This study mainly aims to investigate the origin of the global financial crisis of 2007 (2007 GFC) in United States and in other advanced economies(AEs),its macroeconomic impact on the Emerging Market Economies(EMEs) and the critical analysis of their policy response. Study highlights the regulatory challenges of the post-crisis period and discusses the implications of newly introduced regulatory reforms for the EMEs.In this aim the thesis is delineated into four chapters. First chapter of the thesis sets the theoretical context of the dissertation and presents a critical review of orthodox (mainstream/neoliberal) and the heterodox approaches on financial fragility and crisis. After giving a critique of the orthodox approach, merits and relevance of Minsky's framework known as “Financial Instability Hypothesis”(FIH) are emphasized to understand the issue of fragility in capitalist economies. Second chapter of the thesis provides a compelling compendium of various explanations and consequences of the 2007 GFC focusing on its origination in the US housing market. Main dysfunctions of the financial markets and the regulatory system that led to the eruption of financial crisis are highlighted. Third chapter presents an in-depth analysis of the contagion of the 2007 GFC to EMEs. A comparative case studies analysis highlights the policy response of selected EMEs. Fourth chapter of the thesis investigates the various financial regulatory reforms introduced in the aftermath of the 2007 GFC. Analysis in this chapter indicates that introduced reforms (The Dodd- Franck Act of 2011 and the new Basel III Banking Standards) are rooted in neoliberal philosophy so would be unable to solve the issues of fragility and financial crisis. On the basis of our analysis in these four chapters, two major conclusions are emphasized. Firstly, the financial markets should not be left to the vicissitudes of free markets, and a relevant regulatory framework having macroprudential orientations must be implemented to replace the dominant free-market-based approach. Analytical and policy insights (“big government” and “big central bank”) endorsed by heterodox economist Hyman Minsky seem appropriate to understand and constrain the fragility of capitalist market economies. Secondly, it is advisable for EMEs to adopt policies keeping in view their own macroeconomic characteristics and the level of financial development and not by the blind faith in market liberalisation or the neoliberal policy paradigm.

金融海嘯提供我們一個深刻的教訓，因為危機前信貸過度增長伴隨著大量的系統風險，最後導致景氣反轉時銀行業龐大損失。而這些損失將動搖整個金融體系，並引發了一連串的惡性循環(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision , BCBS ,2010a, 2010b)；若依循過往個別審慎監理((Microprudential regulation)原則，將無法察覺背後隱藏的系統風險。因此目前趨勢是將以個別(Micro)與總體審慎監理原則(macro)並重，針對能夠影響整體市場金融穩定風險來源而詳加監管，同時透過規範與監理措施適度的降低系統風險，最終達到金融穩定的目的。IMF、BIS以及FSB(2009)針對G20制定的金融機構、市場與工具的指導文件(Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments)中，認為有效控制系統風險是現階段政策監理最重要的主軸之一。所謂系統風險是指能影響金融機構所持有的部位以及對於實體經濟存在嚴重負面影響的風險來源；此總體風險將存在負外部性而非個別審慎監理的風險因子。 因此本文由兩篇宏觀審慎監管框架文章所構成的研究，分別針對市場流動性風險和信用風險的因子。透過非流動性賣權與逆景氣資本緩衝（CCB）買權來分析和評價兩種新的監管框架。第一篇論文的主要概念是討論市場流動性風險因子，雖然當前銀行監管的重點是資金流動性風險，如新巴塞爾協議三 (Basel III)的流動性風險覆蓋率（LCR）和淨穩定資金比率（NSFR），但金融機構實際上也同時面臨資金和市場流動性之間的高度順週期效應，導致流動性螺旋，並威脅到金融穩定。因此，本文提出一個市場流動性，系統性風險和宏觀審慎監理分析框架來填補這一空白。 與Drehmann和Juselius（2013B）的實證研究結果比較，我們發現利用6個月歷史波動度建構的非流動性選擇權是最有效的提前預警指標（EWIS），且符合穩定政策結構和最小監管成本。此外在三個子樣本和嚴重危機時期亦能同樣保持預警的穩健性。因此如果金融機構能透過預警減少金融機構投資種類、行業、交易對手與大額暴險的集中度時，將可以由危機發生後被動式轉變成危機發生前主動式的風險管理，將符合總體審慎監理定義：能影響所有而非單一的金融機構，以及有效控制破壞總體市場產生的系統風險。 在第二篇文章中，我們專注於信用風險監管框架的避險，即Basel III的逆景氣資本緩衝(CCB)。這個新穎的監理視角將鼓勵銀行在危機前的信貸繁榮時期增加資本緩衝，而非在危機後接受援助或者增加昂貴的資本。據美國聯邦存款保險公司（FDIC）統計，2014年第1季全美的存款機構風險加權資產為10.27兆美金；如果最高的逆景氣資本緩衝被應用到這些銀行，將有2570億美金的資本不得不額外注資。因此本文設計了一個新的買權來符合CCB的監管框架，建立提前資本防禦措施來減輕系統性風險和整體銀行業不穩定。首先發現這款買權將能在順境時注入資本，即更低的潛在違約風險與信貸寬鬆時期，進而抵禦未來發生的金融危機。我們的建議也符合Basel III的目標，在危機前2至5年協助銀行取得資本保護。最重要的是，CCB買權可以透過提前取得資本形成一個“減震器”，舒緩隨後而來經濟衰退的壓力達到降低銀行資本順週期性目標；此外還提供了一個對於銀行過度冒險行為的抗衡力量，成為一個“自動穩定器”來達到宏觀審慎監理目標。 / Financial tsunami offered a profound lesson as the pre-crisis excessive credit growth was accompanied by huge systemic risks that ultimately led to the reversal of economy and huge losses of the banking sector. Such losses will shake the entire financial system and trigger a series of vicious cycles (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, BCBS, 2010a , 2010b ); the hidden systemic risk may not be observed if we follow the previous principles of micro prudential regulation. The guidance formulated by G20 to assess the systemic importance of financial institutions, markets and instruments (IMF, BIS, and FSB, 2009) analyzes that the main issue of prior micro prudential regulation is that every financial institution’s incentive is to manage its own return-risk tradeoff but not necessarily manage the stability for the financial system as a whole. Consequently, the macroprudential regulation focusing on shocks originating outside the financial system can control the negative externalities of systemic risk rather than micro prudential regulation. This dissertation consists of two essays on the macro prudential framework of market liquidity risk and credit risk factor. We introduce, analyze, and value two new regulation frameworks via an illiquidity put option and a CCB call option respectively. The main concept of first essay is to discuss the macro prudential framework of market liquidity risk factor. Although the current banking regulation focuses on systemic funding liquidity risk such as Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) of Basel III, financial institutions would actually have highly procyclical effects between funding and market liquidity at the same time, leading to liquidity spirals and threatening to financial stability. We therefore propose a market liquidity, systemic risk and macroregulation analysis framework in Taiwan's capital market to fill this gap. Comparison with the Drehmann and Juselius' empirical study (2013b), we find that illiquidity options by using 6-month historical volatility and forecasting short-term stock declines are effective early warning indicators (EWIs) having most stable policy structures and minimal regulation costs. Applying AUC macroregulation criteria, we show this illiquidity measure is also maintained fairly robustness in different intervals, e.g. during three sub-samples and serious crisis periods. If financial institutions can diversify the concentration of portfolios varieties, industries, and counterparty before crises by using EWIs, the passive risk taking can be converted into the active risk management. It is necessary to prepare the market liquidity and macroregulation framework in advance. In the second essay, we focus the hedging product for credit risk factors, i.e. countercyclical capital buffer (CCB). This purpose of countercyclical capital buffer standards is to encourage banks to increase capital buffers in credit good times that can be used in the future stress. According to Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the risk-weighted assets of U.S. depository institutions were $10.27trillion dollars in 2014:Q1. If the maximum CCB is applied to these banks, an additional US$257 billion of equity capital will have to be raised. Hence, we design a new option to establish the capital defenses meeting CCB framework and then mitigating systemic risk and banking instability in advance. We show this product injects capital in good times i.e., lower credit risk and more credit expansion, to weather the future financial crisis. Our proposal also complies with the goal of Basel III to obtain capital in 2 to 5 years prior to crises. Most importantly, the CCB option can provide protection with additional capital to act as a "shock absorber" reducing a procyclicality problem in the subsequent downturn. Besides, this type of option also offers a countervailing force to excessive risk-taking behaviors to act as an "automatic stabilizer" for reaching macroprudential goals.