Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1953. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes "Table of statutes." Includes bibliographical references (leaves [525]-547).

Thesis (M.A. in applied economics)--Washington State University, May 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 47-48).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2004. / Advisor: Dr. Kevin Eastman, Florida State University, College of Business, Dept. of Risk Management and Insurance. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Sept. 22, 2004). Includes bibliographical references.

M. Tech. Architectural Technology / The research is focused on professional indemnity insurance for architects in Namibia. Professional indemnity insurance is not currently provided for in both the Architects' and Quantity Surveyors Act (Act 13 of 1979) of Namibia, or contracts used by architects in Namibia. The absence of professional indemnity insurance in contracts used by the Namibian built environment must be addressed, in order to create awareness of the risks involved in practising without professional indemnity insurance. This study will contribute to the knowledge of architectural practise in Namibia by emphasising the evident gaps in the existing contract data, namely the Architect's and Quantity Surveyor's Act (Act 13 of 1979) and the Client Architect Agreement of the Namibia Council for Architects and Quantity Surveyors. It is envisioned that passing a bill in parliament, making professional indemnity insurance compulsory for all registered professionals, will benefit the Namibian architectural environment. An applied research model is selected by implementing triangulation. The approach starts broadly in the architectural environment of Namibia, addressing issues of contracting and governing legislations, before focusing specifically on professional indemnity insurance and the need for it in the Namibian built environment.

In regards to health care, the civil tort system serves to both deter negligent behavior on the part of the provider and compensate victims for losses which must include bodily harm attributable to negligent medical care. Due to the unique malpractice landscape that evolved in the United States, national tort reform has increased over the last several decades and a need for reliable data exists. This paper matches claims from the National Practitioner's Data Bank to an independent state data bank to determine is systematic, nonrandom differences between the observations exist. The paper found that systematic differences existed and their existence was implicitly proven in a paper published in 2013. This calls into question the current state of knowledge surrounding medical malpractice liability reform.

Thesis--Auburn University, 2009. / Abstract. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 61-63).

During the past decade medical malpractice litigation has created problems and concern within the medical and legal professions, the malpractice insurance industry, and for healthcare patients. The purpose of this dissertation was to analyze and evaluate the ability of the negligence standard of civil liability to facilitate efficient resource allocation between physicians and their patients. The analysis also attempted to determine whether or not the negligence rule of liability is an effective means of ensuring that cost-justified levels of precaution will be undertaken and that the efficient levels of iatrogenic injuries will result. The negligence standard is not the appropriate liability assignment for activities involving direct contact between buyers (patients) and sellers (physicians). Transaction and negotiation costs are not so high as to engender significant negative externalities and to result in inefficient resource allocation. Tort liability is a problematic and costly system of victim compensation. The study concluded that most personal injuries arising from medical treatment should be allocated contractually between physicians and patients. Assigning more liability for adverse outcomes to patients would not likely reduce the quality of health care while allowing the parties involved to assume voluntarily the appropriate level of risks. / Ph. D.