Independent manufacturers' representatives (IMRs) are companies that sell products on behalf of manufacturers (principals), typically on a commission basis. IMRs offer principals specialized knowledge about product areas or markets, and they can function as attractive supplements or replacements for in-house sales units. The literature on IMRs' allocation of resources to their principals and the downstream impact on performance is underexplored. A paucity of published research exists using actual IMR sales and commission data, likely because this data is difficult to collect due to its sensitive nature. This dissertation fills this gap by exploring the influence of principals' use of sales controls, how these controls impact the psychological climate that arises between IMRs and their principals, and the downstream impact on IMRs' allocation of sales resources and the sales volumes actually produced. Furthermore, this dissertation answers the call for research on the impact of principal's use of house territories and house accounts, through the lens of the IMR. The dissertation features three essays. The purposes are: to identify gaps in existing IMR research in order to provide directions for future research in this domain; to explore the influence of the principal's sales controls on the psychological climate between the principal and IMR and the downstream impact on IMR allocation of sales resources and sales performance; and to develop theoretical and practical insights about the impact of principals' use of house accounts, i.e. customers served by an in-house sales organization, inside or outside IMRs' territories.