Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Civil-Military Relations))--Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. / Title from title screen (viewed July 18, 2006). "September 2005." Includes bibliographical references (p. 133-140). Also issued in paper format.

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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / Boost phase interception of ballistic missiles is envisioned as the primary response of the layered defense architecture implemented in the ballistic missile defense system. A limited time frame in which to take action and the necessity to implement hit-to-kill technology in the kill vehicle counterbalances the many advantages of boost phase interception. Direct hit missile technology is constrained by the requirement to minimize miss distance to a negligible amount between the kill vehicle and optimum aimpoint on the target. This thesis examines kill vehicle effectiveness, which is tantamount to miss distance, as a function of both the kill vehicle maximum acceleration capability and the guidance system time constant necessary to destroy a target. The kill vehicle guidance system is modeled in MATLAB as a fifth-order binomial series with proportional navigation. The simulation examines the effect of an accelerating target attributed to powered flight and aimpoint displacement caused by a shift in tracking point from the target plume to the payload when resolution occurs. The kill vehicle minimum requirements as indi-cated by the simulation include a lateral acceleration capability of four times the target acceleration and a guidance system time constant that is less than one-tenth the estimated flight time. / Lieutenant, Canadian Navy

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. / The United States is embarking on a course of designing and fielding a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to protect the US and her citizenry against ballistic missile attacks. The BMDS will need a Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) organization/system to support military and national decision makers in times of crisis. The C2BMC must also be able to react quickly once a missile event has occurred. This thesis will cover the doctrinal issues with merging Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and the National Missile Warning System into one system, how the Unified Command Plan affects missile defense efforts, the lessons learned from Desert Storm, and presents alternative chains of command that might allow the BMDS to engage threat missiles in a timely and efficient manner. Preliminary findings indicate that a 'flattened' chain of command for missile defense forces seems to be a positive starting point for the initial deployment of the BMDS. / Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, September 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): H. Lyman Miller, Gaye Christoffersen. Includes bibliographical references (p. 91-96). Also available online.

Thesis (M.S. in Applied Physics)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): William Colson, Robert Armstead. Includes bibliographical references (p. 67-68). Also available online.

The intent of this study is to assess the role of fundamental Japanese security policy objectives in driving the significant shifts in Japan???s approach towards missile defence cooperation with the United States from 1993 to 2003. In studying the relative influence of the objectives that guided Japan???s approach towards missile defence cooperation, this thesis seeks to address a gap in the literature. A debate has occurred over the direction of Japanese security policy that is based on widely different assumptions on the importance attached to various fundamental security objectives. At the same time, Japan???s approach to missile defence has been the subject of considerable analysis that identified the crucial importance of the issue for the attainment of these fundamental security policy objectives. But no linkage has been established between these two levels of analysis. In particular, there has been an absence of assessments of what Japan???s decisions on missile defence cooperation indicate about the relative influence of the various objectives. This thesis developed an analytical framework to enable such an assessment by examining the structure of missile defence cooperation undertaken. Japan possessed a range of options in the level and type of involvement in missile defence cooperation. That involvement would determine the eventual type of benefits and costs incurred against the affected objectives. Cooperation agreed to (or rejected) over the ten year period thereby provides a means to determine the influence of key objectives on Japan???s approach, and in particular those objectives that restrained involvement. The thesis finds that a clear hierarchy existed in the influence of the various objectives on Japan???s approach with changes in their influence explaining the evolution of Japan???s commitment. The desire to strengthen the alliance, weakening domestic political constraints, and disregard of China???s opposition provide the key explanations. These findings not only point towards the respective strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches employed to explain Japanese security policy, but they also suggest the value of greater attention to the state???s ability to overcome domestic constraints in determining policy in order to fully understand the broader transformation of Japanese security policy.

Thesis (M. S.)--Aerospace Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2009. / Committee Chair: Mavris, Dimitri; Committee Member: Biltgen, Patrick; Committee Member: Ender, Tommer.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Mikhail Tsypkin, Edward J. Laurance. Includes bibliographical references (p. 73-79). Also available online.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / Many potential adversaries seek, or already have theater ballistic missiles capable of threatening targets of interest to the United States. The U.S. Missile Defense Agency and armed forces are developing and fielding missile interceptors carried by many different platforms, including ships, aircraft, and ground units. Given some exigent threat, the U.S. must decide where to position defensive platforms and how they should engage potential belligerent missile attacks. To plan such defenses, the Navy uses its Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) system afloat and ashore, the Air Force has its Theater Battle Management Core Systems (TBMCS) used in air operations centers, and the Missile Defense Agency uses the Commander's Analysis and Planning Simulation (CAPS). AADC uses a server farm to exhaustively enumerate potential enemy launch points, missiles, threatened targets, and interceptor platform positions. TBMCS automates a heuristic cookie-cutter overlay of potential launch fans by defensive interceptor envelopes. Given a complete missile attack plan and a responding defense, CAPS assesses the engagement geometry and resulting coverage against manually prepared attack scenarios and defense designs. We express the enemy courses of action as a mathematical optimization to maximize expected damage, and then show how to optimize our defensive interceptor pre-positioning to minimize the maximum achievable expected damage. We can evaluate exchanges where each of our defending platform locations and interceptor commitments are hidden from, or known in advance by the attacker. Using a laptop computer we can produce a provably optimal defensive plan in minutes. / Lieutenant, United States Navy